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Conventions Used in this Thesis 
 
Numbering Studies 
The three studies in this thesis are numbered independently of the chapter in which they 
appear.  
 
Numbering Tables and Figures 
All tables and figures are numbered according to the chapter in which they appear. They 
are numbered as figure or table x,y., with x referring to the chapter number and y referring 
to the order in with the figure or table appears within that chapter. 
 
Abbreviations 
Although abbreviations have been described in the text the reader may find it helpful to 
refer to the following list: 
 
CSO  Child Sexual Offender 
OC  Offender Control 
CC  Community Control 
IT  Implicit Theory 
RT  Reaction Time 
IAT  Implicit Association Task 
LDT  Lexical Decision Task 
RSVP-M Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (Modified) 
ms  Milliseconds
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Abstract 
In the field of forensic psychology, child sexual offenders (CSOs) are often 
hypothesised to hold abnormal beliefs that facilitate the onset and maintenance of their 
offending. This idea has had considerable impact upon current CSO assessment and 
treatment practices. However, despite its intuitive appeal, empirical evidence supporting 
the hypothesis is unfortunately lacking.  
Information regarding the role that cognition plays in child sexual offending has 
been gathered almost exclusively using self report (i.e., interview and questionnaire) 
methods. In interview studies, CSOs talk at length about their offending and their 
statements are analysed for the presence of so-called cognitive distortions: utterances 
deemed to represent abnormal, offence-facilitating beliefs. In questionnaire studies CSOs 
and controls rate the veracity of listed cognitive distortion items and their answers are 
compared. In general, interview and questionnaire studies have tended to find that CSOs 
endorse cognitive distortions, which seemingly supports the notion that they hold offence-
supportive beliefs. However, serious issues plague the use of these self-report methods 
because endorsement of cognitive distortions might reflect phenomena other than beliefs.  
 The primary aim of this thesis was to examine the idea that CSOs hold offence-
supportive beliefs using methods designed to side-step issues associated with self-report 
methods. Across three studies, three cognitive experimental techniques were for the first 
time applied to the study of CSO cognition. In Study One, CSOs and offender and 
community controls completed an experimental procedure called the lexical decision task. 
Against hypotheses, when compared to controls CSOs did not interpret offence-related 
sentences in line with distorted beliefs. A possible explanation for this finding was that 
CSOs’ offence-supportive beliefs were insufficiently activated during testing.  
To investigate, in Study Two half the CSO and half the offender control 
participants were primed with images of scantily-clad children before commencing 
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experimental testing. During testing, CSOs and offender controls read sentences 
describing children behaving in potentially sexualised ways. Participants were then given 
a surprise recognition test in which half the sentences were re-presented in an 
unambiguously sexual form, and half in an unambiguously nonsexual form. Contrary to 
hypotheses, neither primed nor control child sexual offenders showed memory biases for 
sexualised sentences, suggesting they did not interpret the original sentences in line with 
offence-supportive beliefs.    
Finally, in Study Three, CSOs’ beliefs were examined using interview methods, 
and CSOs’ and offender controls’ beliefs were measured using a questionnaire as well as 
an experimental technique that used sentence reading times to implicitly measure beliefs. 
As hypothesised, CSOs showed evidence of holding offence-supportive beliefs according 
to the interview and questionnaire measures, but against predictions they demonstrated no 
experimental evidence of such beliefs. In fact, the three methods showed virtually no 
agreement regarding the belief-types each CSO was deemed to hold, raising important 
questions about the phenomena measured by each method. 
Overall, the results of this thesis did not support the stance that CSOs generally 
hold offence-supportive beliefs that set them apart from others.  The implications of these 
findings for theory and treatment are discussed and directions for future research are 
suggested.  
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The serious social costs that attend child sexual offending are well-documented. Its 
victims typically experience various adverse, long-term effects such as depression, 
anxiety, low self-esteem, self-destructive behaviour and intimacy difficulties (Browne & 
Finkelhor, 1986; Denov, 2004; Mullen, Martin, Anderson, Romans, & Herbison, 1996). 
Considerable financial resources are required to alleviate these ill-effects and to 
incarcerate the perpetrators of child sexual abuse (Chaffin, 1994; Fromm 2001; Purvis & 
Joyce, 2005).  
Despite these adverse consequences and the high levels of public condemnation 
that child sexual abuse attracts, its incidence is far from uncommon. While prevalence 
estimates in western countries vary widely across studies, it appears that around 20% to 
30% of females and 10% to 15% of males have experienced child sexual abuse (Briere, 
1992). In New Zealand, where The Crimes Act (1961) places the legal age of consent at 
16 years of age, findings from a large longitudinal study suggested that 18.5% of people 
under the age of 16 are sexually abused by adults (Fergusson, Horwood, & Woodward, 
2000). 
Why do certain individuals become child sexual offenders (CSOs)? What drives 
them to pursue an activity that is illegal, harmful to others, and largely reviled by the 
general public? This intriguing question has captured the attention of a large body of 
psychological researchers and theoreticians, and various factors thought to play an 
etiological role in child sexual offending have been highlighted. These range from broad 
sociological factors such as the sexualised portrayals of young people that occur in the 
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media (Stermac, Segal, & Gillis, 1990), to individually-situated, psychological 
mechanisms such as low self esteem (Marshall, Cripps, Anderson, & Cortoni, 1999a) and 
emotional regulation problems (Marshall, 1999). As will be discussed in the following 
pages, theories of child sexual offending have over time assigned increasing importance to 
the role of individual, psychological factors, with particular attention being paid to the role 
of cognition in sexual offending. Consequently, many researchers and clinicians accept the 
view that most or all CSOs hold stable, entrenched beliefs that facilitate their offending 
and set them apart from other non-offending individuals. This view certainly has intuitive 
appeal; after all, how could one commit such publicly denounced crimes without holding 
exceptional beliefs that somehow make such offending seem acceptable? This thesis will 
investigate what, if any, empirical evidence there is to support this intuition.  
To set the scene, this chapter will begin with a brief introduction to the information 
processing framework; a view of human mental activity that has been particularly 
influential in cognitive psychology and in the study of CSOs. Chapter content will then 
turn to a review of four influential theories that seek to explain how multiple factors 
interact to elicit sexual offending. The review will focus on the types of cognitions that 
each model highlights and the etiological role those cognitions are thought to play. It will 
be shown that there is disagreement over the definitions and mechanisms hypothesised as 
being associated with offence-supportive cognitions, both within and across the four 
models. 
Chapter Two will turn to focus on specific single-factor theories of CSOs’ offence-
supportive cognitions. It will be shown that although confusion regarding the nature and 
role of CSOs’ offence-supportive cognitions also permeates this area of the literature, 
there is nevertheless a sense that the key cognitions of interest are faulty, offence-
facilitating beliefs that set CSOs apart from others. Chapter Three explores what, if any, 
evidence exists that CSOs do in fact hold offence-supportive beliefs. Issues plaguing the 
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measurement of these beliefs will be outlined. Chapters Four, Five, and Six will present 
three unique experimental studies that aim to test the idea that CSOs have offence-
supportive cognitions that are held in belief- or schema-like structures. These studies were 
all designed to overcome problems inherent in the use of traditional measures. 
Importantly, the last of these studies will also triangulate findings regarding these beliefs 
as measured by an implicit, cognitive-experimental method and two explicit, conventional 
methods (i.e., interview and questionnaire). Finally, in Chapter Seven the thesis will 
conclude with a general discussion that summarises and integrates overall findings. 
Introductory concepts - A framework for cognition 
Researchers studying the cognitions of CSOs have discussed and labelled a huge 
range of cognitions thought to play a role in commissioning sexual offending behaviour. 
To get to grips with this plethora of terms it will be helpful to first consider a meaningful 
system for classifying components of cognition and understanding their interrelations. 
While there are many ways of conceptualising the human cognitive architecture and its 
associated processes and functions, the information processing framework has been 
particularly influential. Under the information processing framework, human cognition is 
viewed as being computational in nature. That is, data from the environment is thought to 
be represented in the mind in the form of symbols, upon which operations are performed 
(Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). The three key components of this information 
processing system have been identified by Hollon and Kris (1984) as cognitive structures, 
cognitive processes, and cognitive products. Each component is described below.  
Cognitive structures 
The human mind can be conceptualised as a vast network of information nodes 
that describe features of objects or events. As individuals process environmental stimuli, 
specific information nodes are activated, (i.e., brought into working memory). When two 
or more information units are repeatedly activated together they become linked, such that 
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activating one unit can automatically activate the other (Collins & Loftus, 1975). These 
linked bodies of information are called cognitive structures. In other words, cognitive 
structures are organised clusters of interrelated memories that form in response to life 
experiences (Collins & Loftus, 1975).  
An important property of cognitive structures is that when one unit in the structure 
is activated, closely associated memories and information units also activate (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975, Hollon & Kris, 1984). So, for instance, reading the word “purr” can activate 
information about cats. This information could include semantic knowledge about cats 
(e.g., they are four-legged animals) and episodic memories of cats (e.g., mental images of 
cats). Importantly, the co-activation of cognitive structures influences the way humans 
perceive, predict, interpret, and understand the world (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Kilhstrom & 
Klein, 1994; Ward, Hudson, Johnston, & Marshall, 1997). Rather than processing 
incoming stimuli anew each time we encounter an event, humans utilise stored 
information to observe and evaluate that event (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Dodge & Frame, 
1982). Consequently, cognitive structures can bias information gathering and storage such 
that one only sees and remembers information that aligns with existing memory stores. 
Take, for instance, a woman who holds a schema that frames academics as dull. Upon 
meeting an academic, this (clearly misguided!) woman will be more likely to interpret the 
academic’s words and actions as signals of dullness. In addition, she will notice and 
remember information that confirms her view of the academic, while discarding evidence 
to the contrary.  
Generally, cognitive structures are referred to as schemas (Hollon & Kris, 1984), 
although other words such as attitude and belief are sometimes used to denote cognitive 
structures (Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967; Ward, 2000). In fact, the demarcations 
between schemas, beliefs, and attitudes are ill-defined, with the words often being used 
interchangeably (e.g., Augoustinos & Walker 1995; Fiske & Taylor 1991; Freeman, 
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Pretzer, Fleming, Simon, 2004; McGinn & Young, 1996; Malamuth, Heavey & Linz, 
1993).  
In this thesis both schemas and beliefs will be referred to frequently, hence it is 
important to delineate the relationship between these two cognitive structures. Beliefs are 
propositions whose content is held by the individual to be true (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). 
Like schemas, they are configurations of stored information that can engender 
expectancies and provide frameworks for interpreting new experiences. In fact, schemas 
are generally conceptualized as structures that contain interrelated beliefs (Sherman, Judd, 
& Park, 1989; Ward, 2000). However, schemas tend to be more extensive than beliefs 
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980) and can contain additional information such as affective “tags” 
that allow one to evaluate objects as good or bad (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Fiske & 
Linville, 1980). Nevertheless, both beliefs and schemas are cognitive structures that hold 
cognitive content (i.e., information) and that organise the processing and storage of 
information.  
Cognitive processes 
Cognitive processes refer to the ways in which cognitive structures (and their 
contents) are used to process incoming information (Hollon & Kris, 1984). Such processes 
include where our attention is directed, how we encode, interpret and retrieve information, 
and how we predict what will happen next. To quote Hollon and Kris (1984), they are the 
“transformational rules for turning input into judgements” (p. 40). An important point to 
note about cognitive processes is that all humans commit processing errors. All humans 
engage in cognitive processing that is biased by the content held in their cognitive 
structures. For instance, when individuals process the world around them their attention is 
guided by what they believe is important and what they expect to see, which can lead them 
to ignore information that is relevant to the assessment of an event or object (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991). Thus, as Hollon and Kris explain, cognitive processes serve to maintain the 
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rigidity and constancy of certain cognitive structures. As will be discussed in Chapter 
Three, information processing errors are sometimes called cognitive distortions (Beck, 
1963; 1967), although within the CSO literature cognitive distortions have also been 
conceived of as products that reflect underlying cognitive structures. 
It should be noted that cognitive processes can be influenced by contextual and 
environmental factors (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). For instance, contextual factors that 
increase cognitive load can encourage cognitive “short-cuts”, wherein the individual tends 
to leap to conclusions rather than carefully analyse available information. Similarly, 
environmental factors that strongly activate schemas will tend to produce schema-driven, 
rather than data-driven,  processing.   
Cognitive products 
 As cognitive structures and processes interact they give rise to thoughts, 
attributions, ideas, and decisions. These emergent phenomena are called cognitive 
products (Hollon & Kriss, 1984). Cognitive products are accessible cognitions that can be 
brought to conscious awareness and directly reported. Hollon and Kriss describe cognitive 
products as metaphorical iceberg tips that offer glimpses into individuals’ cognitive 
structures, content, and processes.  
Interestingly, beliefs have been referred to as cognitive products (e.g., Beech & 
Mann, 2002; Ward, Fon, Hudson, & McCormack, 1998) even though, as noted earlier, 
they are also frequently described as if they are cognitive structures. How is it that beliefs 
can be viewed as both structures and products? The confusion may arise because beliefs 
can simply be defined as propositions that individuals assess as true. This definition fails 
to delineate the underlying processes that drive individuals’ assessments, or state whether 
the assessments necessarily remain static across time (Szentagotai et al., 2005). The word 
belief is therefore used to denote both stable convictions that consistently influence 
behaviour (e.g., a belief in God) and temporary products of information processing that are 
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driven by transitory situational factors (e.g., the wife who, in the midst of a heated 
argument, “believes” her husband to be an idiot). To avoid this confusion, in the current 
thesis the word belief will be used to denote stable cognitions that consistently influence 
information processing. More transitory belief-like products will be referred to as 
temporary appraisals.  
Because the information processing framework conceives of cognitive products as 
phenomena that emerge from cognitive structures, temporary appraisals are thought to 
map onto underlying cognitive structures. So when the wife mentioned above temporarily 
appraises her husband as an idiot, her assessment will be linked, for example, to a belief 
that when it comes to clothes storage, household floors should not be favoured over 
cupboards, drawers, and washing baskets. As will be discussed in this thesis, the notion 
that a fairly simple mapping exists between cognitive products and structures has been 
highly influential in the CSO literature, for the statements that CSOs utter are often taken 
to directly reflect cognitive structures. It is the assumed simplicity of this mapping that the 
experimental techniques employed in this thesis will call into question. 
Types of Theory Regarding Child Sexual Offending 
There are many theories of child sexual offending, most of which draw upon 
particular paradigms for understanding human behaviour. These include behavioural 
(Laws & Marshall, 1990), psychodynamic (Groth, Hobson, & Gary, 1982), and feminist 
(Hermann, 1990) paradigms. To help guide theory development within this field of 
inquiry, Ward and Hudson (1998) have proposed that theories regarding CSO aetiology 
can be sorted into three theory categories:  
Level I (multifactorial) theories 
Multifactorial theories attempt to provide a comprehensive and integrated 
explanation of sexual offending. Typically they take single aetiological factors identified 
in the literature and weave them into explanatory models. 
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Level II (single-factor) theories 
Single-factor theories focus on specific factors associated with the commissioning 
of sexual offences. They typically explain how the factor in question differentiates sexual 
offenders from others and how it contributes to sexual offending behaviour. Examples 
include intimacy deficits (Ward, Hudson, Marshall, & Siegert, 1995), deviant sexual 
arousal (Lanyon, 1991), and offence-supportive beliefs (Abel, Becker, & Cunningham-
Rathner, 1984). 
Level III (microtheory) theories 
Microtheories are essentially descriptive models of the sexual offending process. 
They outline how cognitive, behavioural, motivational, and contextual factors unfold 
across the course of the offending process (e.g., Ward, Louden, Hudson, & Marshall, 
1995). This temporal mapping of aetiological factors is often referred to as an offence 
chain. Microtheories, or offence chains, should provide fairly detailed accounts of what 
and when offence-related events occur, as well as showing how these events interact with 
individual characteristics to culminate in a sexual offence. For instance, the chain should 
illuminate the level and nature of violence or coercion involved in the offence process, the 
degree of planning preceding the offence and when that planning occurs, and whether or 
not the offence is part of an antisocial lifestyle. These factors should be interwoven with 
individual vulnerability factors such as social skills deficits and emotion regulation 
difficulties. Ultimately, microtheories ought to represent or describe what multifactor 
theories attempt to explain. 
 
Multifactor Theories of Child Sexual Offending 
The work documented in this thesis is primarily focussed on cognitions in CSOs 
and as such it explores a level II or single-factor theory. However, it must be stated that 
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although CSOs’ cognitions play an important role in their offending behaviour, no single 
factor acting in isolation can lead an individual to sexually offend. Rather, sexual 
offending is driven by numerous aetiological phenomena that interact in dynamic ways. 
Thus, before focusing squarely on CSO cognition, CSO cognition will first be considered 
within the context of these other phenomena. The following section considers four 
influential multifactor models of sexual offending and discusses the roles assigned to 
cognitive factors within each model. Three models relate to child sexual offending 
specifically (i.e., Finkelhor, 1984; Hall & Hirschman, 1992; Ward & Siegert, 2002) while 
one relates to sexual offending in general (i.e., Marshall & Barbaree, 1990).  
Finkelhor’s (1984) Pre-conditions Model 
According to this model, four preconditions must be met before an individual 
commits child sexual abuse. Finkelhor posits that these preconditions occur in a stepwise, 
temporal sequence. 
1. The CSO must be motivated to seek sexual relations with a child. This motivation 
will be driven by one or more of the following: 
a. he1 feels emotional congruence with the child (i.e., he identifies strongly 
with the child and believes the child capable of satisfying his emotional 
needs); 
b. he experiences sexual arousal in response to the child;  
c. he has limited access to other, more appropriate, sources of sexual 
gratification.  
2. The CSO must overcome internal inhibitions against acting on his desires. While 
this often involves the use of alcohol and drugs, sometimes situational factors (e.g., 
conditions inducing high personal stress) lower inhibitions. In addition, some 
                                               
1
 Because the vast majority of sexual aggressors are males (Pryor & Stoller, 1994; Fergusson & 
Mullen, 1999), throughout this thesis CSOs are given masculine descriptors. 
 
    
10 
CSOs hold a socially-endorsed view that men are more entitled than women and 
children. In other words, CSOs may believe that men deserve authority and that 
their rights supersede those of women and children.   
3. The CSO must overcome external inhibitors that make it difficult to act on his 
desires. In order to offend during this phase, he must create situations in which the 
abuse can occur. For instance, he may offer to baby-sit the targeted child.  
4. Finally, the CSO must overcome or undermine potential resistance exhibited by 
the child. This grooming process may involve forming a friendship with the child, 
bribing the child with gifts and affection, or securing the child’s acquiescence 
using violence and threats. 
 As this outline indicates, Finkelhor theorised that offence-facilitating cognitions 
can play an important role in child sexual offending, but are neither sufficient nor 
necessary conditions for sexual offending to occur. According to precondition two CSOs 
may hold the view that men are entitled to use children to meet their own needs, and this 
view will lower their inhibitions against sexual offending. However, these disinhibiting 
cognitions do not provide the motivation to offend, and instead are used by the offender to 
feel better about pursuing his emotionally- and sexually-derived drives. Thus, rather than 
being unique, CSO-specific phenomena, the disinhibiting cognitions are socially-endorsed 
views that play a causative role in CSOs’ actions only when combined with a desire to 
sexually abuse.  
Unfortunately, it is not clear what form these disinhibiting cognitions actually take. 
At times Finkelhor suggests that CSOs hold stable belief structures, acquired via social 
learning, that consistently lead them to interpret situations in offence-supportive ways. For 
instance, Finkelhor lists “male inability to identify needs of children” (p. 57) and 
“ideology of patriarchal prerogatives for fathers” (p. 56) as disinhibitors. Then again, he 
also describes these disinhibiting cognitions as if they are temporary appraisals, as 
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evidenced by his referral to them as “rationalisations” (see p. 63) and self-directed 
“excuses” (see p. 45).  
Thus, it appears that Finkelhor viewed the nature and role of CSOs’ disinhibiting 
cognitions in two ways: first as beliefs that help to cause sexual offending by eliciting 
offence-supportive interpretations of events; and second as excuses utilised during a 
decision-making process to achieve a desired goal.  
Marshall and Barbaree’s (1990) Integrated Theory 
According to the Integrated Theory, biological, sociological, cultural, and 
situational factors combine to elicit sexual offending. The theory posits that males are born 
with a biological predisposition to sexually aggress. During childhood, however, they 
learn to inhibit their aggression and regulate their emotions. Through social learning they 
also develop attitudes and behaviours that discourage sexual aggression. Consequently, 
when males experience the dramatic hormonal changes of puberty (which heighten desire 
for sexual activity and aggression) they are usually able to control their impulses and can 
meet their needs through appropriate means. However, some males fail to inhibit their 
sexual aggression as a result of three influences: 
Childhood Experiences 
Some males experience childhood adversity (e.g., poor attachment with parents, 
exposure to physical or sexual abuse), which leads to poor socialisation. These 
experiences limit the opportunity to adequately develop social skills. They also encourage 
self-centredness and indifference to the rights and needs of others, feelings of hostility and 
inadequacy, and the belief that aggression is an effective approach. Thus, there is a 
disruption in the social learning process by which males typically discover how to attain 
intimate bonds with others and how to constrain aggression. Consequently, the young man 
who has suffered adverse childhood experiences might use aggression to meet his 
emotional and sexual needs. 
    
12 
Sociocultural Context 
The sociocultural environment often contains misleading messages that encourage 
sexual aggression against women and children. Sources such as mainstream media and 
pornographic material can endorse beliefs that portray males as deserving dominance over 
women and children, or that encourage the use of violence to attain desired ends. 
Vulnerable males (i.e., those who have had adverse childhood experiences) are more 
likely to embrace these negative attitudes and beliefs because of the sense of power and 
superiority over others that such beliefs confer.  
Transitory Situational Factors 
According to the Integrated Theory, sexual offenders generally offend under 
circumstances that disinhibit their control. Oftentimes these circumstances will be 
deliberately created by the offender but this is not always the case. Males who have 
experienced adverse childhood experiences are more likely to be behaviourally influenced 
by disinhibiting circumstances. However, even well socialised males will offend if 
exposed to an overwhelming set of disinhibitors. Such disinhibitors include alcohol 
intoxication, elevated sexual arousal, heightened anger and stress, and conditions that 
reduce risk of crime detection, or that heighten alienation of the victim.  
The Integrated Theory is broad in scope, viewing the offender as a biologically-
instantiated being who is situated within a web of shifting environmental influences. 
Nevertheless, cognitions (learned from childhood experiences and interactions with the 
offender’s social milieu) are assigned an aetiological role in the model. These offence-
supportive cognitions are generally described by Marshall and Barbaree (1990) as beliefs 
and attitudes. Marshall and Barbaree suggest that these learned beliefs can lower 
inhibitions against sexual abuse by making the abuse seem less harmful, abnormal, or 
immoral – which presumably protects the offender’s self image and minimises negative 
affect such as guilt. Thus it appears that sexual offenders can hold cognitions that, when 
    
13 
combined with environmental and biological stressors, play a causative role in the 
commissioning of sexual abuse. Marshall and Barbaree do not state whether all sexual 
offenders necessarily hold these beliefs. However, the authors assert that “… the influence 
of several disinhibitors at once, particularly over an extended period, may overcome the 
constraints of even the most prosocial man” (p. 269). This statement implies that men can 
sexually offend in the absence of offence-supportive beliefs. Quite how these external 
factors actually disinhibit men against sexual offending is unclear, although it is possible 
that the authors conceived of them as altering the way that cognitive processing occurs. To 
summarise Marshall and Barbaree’s conception of offence-relevant cognitions, they 
appear to propose that sexual offenders can hold beliefs that play an aetiological role in 
their sexual offending behaviour. However, the authors also posit that some sexual 
offenders commit their abuses in the absence of such beliefs. 
Hall and Hirschman’s (1991; 1992) Quadripartite Model 
In 1992 Hall and Hirschman developed an interactive model of child sexual 
offending. It was built on an earlier model (Hall & Hirschman, 1991) designed to explain 
sexual offending against adults. According to the Quadripartite Model (Hall & Hirschman, 
1991; 1992) four factors act as motivational precursors to sexual abuse:  
Sexual arousal 
Hall and Hirschman (1992) argue that CSOs tend to show greater than normal 
arousal to paedophilic stimuli. However, the authors note that not all CSOs exhibit deviant 
arousal. They also note that sexual arousal alone is unlikely to engender sexual offending, 
and will probably be accompanied by offence-supportive cognitions (see below).  
Offence-supportive cognitions 
Hall and Hirschman describe a number of child-related cognitions that CSOs can 
have which encourage sexual abuse. For example, the authors state that CSOs may think 
that children can benefit from abuse because it educates them about sex. In addition, they 
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may think that children can initiate and enjoy sex. Hall and Hirschman (1991; 1992) call 
these appraisals “cognitive distortions”, although they do not explicitly define what 
cognitive distortions are. On one hand, the authors frequently describe cognitive 
distortions as if they are temporary cognitive products. For example, they frequently refer 
to cognitive distortions as “cognitive appraisals” (Hall & Hirschman, 1991; 1992) and also 
call them “rationalisations” (Hall & Hirschman, 1992). On the other hand, the authors 
describe CSOs’ cognitive distortions as if they are stable belief structures. For instance, in 
their 1991 paper Hall and Hirschman say that cognitive distortions can act as motivational 
precursors to sexual assaults. This implies some distortions are not so much temporary 
appraisals as stable cognitions that actually drive sexual offending. The authors also state 
that a conceptualising framework for cognitive distortions can be found in a belief based 
model called the Health Belief Model. In addition, when providing an example of a rape-
related “cognitive distortion”, the authors give a proposition that actually represents a 
generalised belief: “women are hostile to men and deserve to be raped” (p. 13).  Again, in 
their 1992 paper the authors describe the following generalised belief as an example of a 
CSO-relevant cognitive distortion: “sexual contact with children is a method of educating 
them about sex” (p. 14).  
Emotional dyscontrol 
Hall and Hirschman state that some CSOs are motivated by anger or, more 
commonly, by depression to offend. 
Personality deficits 
According to the theory some CSOs’ early experiences (e.g., childhood sexual 
abuse, parental neglect) may produce enduring traits that interact with the above-
mentioned factors to facilitate sexual offending.  
 In addition to being motivational precursors, the above four factors also define 
CSO typologies, because one factor is the dominant aetiological influence for different 
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groups of CSOs. While all CSOs exhibit some level of the above four factors, less 
dominant factors are only mobilised via activation of the dominant factor. Hence, there are 
four child molester subtypes, demarcated according to which factor is dominant.  
To summarise Hall and Hirschman’s conceptualisation of the role/nature of 
cognitions in child sexual offending, all CSOs exhibit offence-supportive cognitions to 
some degree. These cognitions are a necessary but not sufficient factor in the 
commissioning of sexual offending behaviour. For some CSOs these cognitions do not 
play a major role and instead are contributory only when a more powerful factor activates 
the desire for sexual offending. For other CSOs, however, offence-supportive cognitions 
somehow serve as the dominant drivers of their offending. As discussed, Hall and 
Hirschman sometimes appear to conceptualise these so-called “cognitive distortions” as if 
they are belief structures, while at other times they appear to conceptualise them as 
temporary products.  
Ward and Siegert’s (2002) Pathways Model 
Ward and Siegert created the Pathways model by knitting together the theories 
outlined earlier. According to the Pathways model, four psychological mechanisms 
generate the particular emotional, cognitive, sexual, and social phenomena that 
characterise CSOs. These are: intimacy and social skills deficits; deviant sexual scripts; 
emotional dysregulation; and cognitive distortions. While each mechanism contributes to 
every sexual offence, one mechanism is particularly influential. This primary mechanism 
determines the aetiological pathway a sexual offender follows. The four psychological 
mechanisms and their influences as primary mechanisms are outlined below. 
Intimacy and social skills deficits 
Ward and Siegert (2002) argue that CSOs have diminished ability to form close, 
intimate relationships with adults. Some may also have experienced abuse or neglect as 
children, and thereby have disrupted internal working models regarding relationships and 
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the importance and emotional availability of others. CSOs for whom this is the primary 
mechanism are unable to achieve intimacy with adult partners, so they transfer their need 
for sex and closeness to children. These offenders believe they have a right to fulfil their 
sexual needs however they can. This results in a sexual arousal response to children and 
engenders attempts to establish adult-like relationships with children.  
Deviant sexual scripts  
Sexual scripts are described by Ward and Siegert (2002) as mental representations 
about sexual encounters that individuals develop during childhood. Essentially, scripts are 
types of schemas and as such are cognitive structures (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Schank & 
Abelson, 1977). Sexual scripts guide individuals as to how, where, when, and with whom 
one can have sex. Ward and Siegert argue that early sexual abuse can create inappropriate 
scripts because it exposes children to sexual experiences before they are cognitively and 
emotionally able to process them. Because CSOs are more likely to have been sexually 
abused as children they are more likely to hold deviant scripts. CSOs who are primarily 
driven by this mechanism have sexual scripts wherein relationships are represented in 
purely sexual terms, and they hold distorted beliefs regarding relationships. Deficits in 
forming close adult relationships lead them to try to achieve intimacy through sexual 
contact with children, for these CSOs believe that children are more trustworthy, safe, and 
accepting than adults.  
Emotional dysregulation 
Emotionally dysregulated individuals have difficulty managing their emotions to 
achieve their goals. CSOs who are primarily driven by this mechanism sexually offend 
when they cannot effectively manage their negative emotions. Strong negative emotions 
either break down their disinhibitions concerning sex with children, or lead them to 
opportunistically use sex with children to elevate their mood. While they prefer sex with 
age-appropriate partners, they will use sex with children if access to adult partners is 
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blocked. Ward and Siegert state that in these cases cognitive distortions will arise as an 
attempt to rationalise predatory sexual behaviours. The authors’ conception of cognitive 
distortions is discussed below. 
Cognitive distortions 
Cognitive distortions are broadly defined by Ward and Siegert (2002) as 
“maladaptive beliefs and attitudes, and problematic thinking styles” (p. 333). Note that 
this definition introduces some confusion because it covers both cognitive structures 
(beliefs and attitudes) and processes (thinking styles). Ward and Siegert state that CSOs 
for whom cognitive distortions are primary drivers, “possess general pro-criminal attitudes 
and beliefs” (p. 338) that lead them to “disregard social norms forbidding sex with 
children and… exploit any opportunity for self-gratification if it presents itself” (p. 339). 
This description essentially paints cognitive distortions as belief structures, rather than 
temporary appraisals or other cognitive processes. Ward and Siegert further reinforce the 
conceptualisation of cognitive distortions as cognitive structures by stating that the 
distorted comments CSOs make may reflect faulty schemas that hold offence-supportive 
content. However, Ward and Siegert also point out that cognitive distortions might simply 
be rationalisations CSOs put forward to excuse their actions, either to maintain self-esteem 
or to cast themselves in a positive light socially. At this point the authors are highlighting 
the fact that cognitive distortions can simply be viewed as cognitive products; things 
CSOs say that may or may not reflect underlying cognitive structures. 
According to the Pathways model, the above four mechanisms generate four CSO 
categories by acting as primary drivers of sexual offending behaviour and determining the 
pathway along which the offending pattern unfolds. In addition, there is a fifth category 
that consists of CSOs who have multiple, pronounced dysfunctional mechanisms. Many of 
these men will have been sexually abused as children and will have consequently 
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developed deviant sexual scripts. They are likely to be “pure” paedophiles who consider 
sexual relationships with children to be ideal.  
 It is important to note that although the role of the four mechanisms identified by 
Ward and Siegert vary according to CSO typology, all CSOs will be influenced to some 
degree by each mechanism. The implication is that every CSO has faulty cognitions that 
contribute to his offending. Thus, in the Pathways model cognitions are moved from the 
peripheral position assigned them, for example, in the Integrated Theory, to a position of 
great importance. The influential cognitions that Ward and Siegert identified in the 
Pathways model are: sexual scripts (which are cognitive structures); and so-called 
cognitive distortions. As explained, the authors often describe cognitive distortions as if 
they are cognitive structures (e.g., scripts and beliefs), although they also sometimes refer 
to them as if they are cognitive processes (e.g., thinking errors) or cognitive products (e.g., 
excuses). Thus, it appears that Ward and Siegert afford a key role to a range of cognitions 
that arise across the offence chain. It is clear that Ward and Siegert view CSOs’ cognitions 
as playing a causative role, as they are described as giving the offender permission to 
offend.  Because cognitive distortions are multiply defined within the Pathways model, it 
is unclear how one should differentiate between cognitive distortions that represent 
offence-supportive beliefs and those that may instead be excuses or rationalisations that 
arise in the aftermath of offending. 
What do our Multifactor Models Tell Us? 
In summary, all four major multifactor theories of sexual offending posit that 
CSOs’ cognitions can interact with other factors to generate offending behaviour. 
However, the nature and extent to which these cognitions contribute to child sexual 
offending vary from theory to theory.  
Finkelhor (1984) and Marshall and Barbaree (1990) imply that holding abnormal, 
offence-supportive cognitions is neither necessary nor sufficient for an individual to 
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sexually offend against children. However, the more recent theories of Hall and 
Hirschman (1991; 1992) and Ward and Siegert (2002) suggest that all CSOs exhibit 
faulty, offence-supportive cognitions to some degree. Hence, theorists’ perceived 
importance of cognitive factors in the commissioning of child sexual offences appears to 
have increased over time. Conceptions of what these cognitions are, however, and how 
they exert their influence, vary within and across theories. There is confusion within and 
across the models as to whether CSOs’ offence-supportive cognitions are temporary 
products or cognitive structures. Finkelhor and Hall and Hirschman sometimes suggest 
that CSOs’ offence-supportive cognitions are belief structures, and at other times describe 
them as cognitive products. Marshall and Barbaree appear predominantly to view the key 
offence-relevant cognitions as cognitive structures (i.e., beliefs and attitudes). Likewise, 
Ward and Siegert seem to view the cognitions that support sexual offending as cognitive 
structures (i.e., beliefs, attitudes, and scripts). However, they also describe CSOs’ offence-
supportive cognitions as cognitive processes (e.g., “thinking styles”).  
There is also variance within and across the models as to the causative role of 
CSOs’ offence-related cognitions. At times it is unclear whether CSOs’ offence-
supportive cognitions help drive their desire to offend, or whether they are generated 
simply to justify something that is already desired. Alternatively, they may be beliefs that 
fail to inhibit the desire for offending, or post-hoc constructions used to diminish guilt 
(and perhaps maintain future offending). For instance, looking at the idea that beliefs play 
a causative role, Finkelhor described how beliefs endorsing male entitlement could 
predispose a CSO to offend, while Marshall and Barbaree claimed that learned beliefs 
could interact with biological and environmental factors to elicit offending. Likewise, Hall 
and Hirschman identified CSO beliefs regarding the perceived benefits for children of 
sexual activity as being motivational precursors to sexual abuse, while Ward and Siegert 
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named sexual scripts and cognitive distortions as two of the four major mechanisms 
generating CSOs’ symptoms.  
On the other hand, Finkelhor painted CSOs’ offence-relevant cognitions as 
phenomena that emerge in response to the emotional and sexual needs that really drive 
child sexual abuse. So while offence-supportive cognitions may be co-opted when the 
CSO strives to meet his needs, those cognitions are not the key aetiological factor. 
Similarly, Hall and Hirschman suggested that CSOs' faulty cognitions might only be 
mobilised when a dominant, motivating factor drives them towards offending.  This 
question over the causative role of CSOs’ offence-relevant cognitions is an important one, 
because its answer will further inform treatment providers as to which aspects of CSOs’ 
internal and external worlds should receive maximum attention in treatment: if cognitions 
are merely co-opted in the service of overarching needs and desires they presumably do 
not form the main treatment target. This point will be returned to in Chapter Seven. 
To summarise, our most influential multifactor models of sexual offending show 
considerable variation in their portrayal of cognitive factors relevant to the commissioning 
of child sexual abuse. It is unclear whether the abnormal cognitions of interest in the study 
of CSOs are structures, processes, or products. Also unclear is whether the key cognitions 
actually drive sexual offending, or are simply enlisted in the service of other emotional 
and biological drives. Finally, if cognitive structures or processes do drive child sexual 
offending, it is unclear whether these structures or processes play a role in the offending 
behaviour of all or only some CSOs. As will be shown in the following chapter, this 
confusion over the nature and role of CSOs’ cognitions is not unique to the multi-factor 
theories. Rather, it is strongly mirrored in the single-factor theory literature. 




A Single-Factor Theory: CSOs and Offence-Supportive Beliefs 
 
The idea that CSOs hold faulty, offence-supportive beliefs was first posited by 
Abel and colleagues (Abel et al., 1984; Abel et al., 1989). In their 1984 paper, Abel et al. 
noted that CSOs often excuse, minimise, or justify their sexual assaults when asked to 
explain their behaviour. Examples provided by Abel et al. (1984) included, “A child who 
does not resist my sexual advances really wants to have sex with me” (p. 98) and, “Having 
sex with a child is a good way for an adult to teach the child about sex” (p. 99). Abel et al. 
referred to these statements as “cognitive distortions”.  
Although Abel et al. (1984) did not state the source of the term cognitive 
distortions they likely borrowed it from the writings of Beck (1963; 1967). Beck (1967) 
described cognitive distortions as the automatic and systematic errors in thinking that 
characterise depressed people. Examples that Beck provided of these thinking errors 
included “personalisation” (a tendency to perceive oneself as causing, or being at the 
centre, of events) and “overgeneralisation” (perceiving a negative outcome in one situation 
to be predictive of negative outcomes in other situations). Beck surmised that these 
cognitive distortions were information processing errors that stemmed from a triad of 
negative beliefs that depressed people held about the self, others, and the world. Thus, 
according to Beck (1963, 1967), cognitive distortions are cognitive processes that are 
linked to, but not synonymous with, cognitive structures.  
Unlike Beck, when Abel et al. (1984; 1989) applied the term cognitive distortions 
to the sexual offending field the authors were less clear about whether distortions ought to 
be conceptualised as products, processes, or structures. In essence, Abel and colleagues 
simply used the term as a label for the seemingly inaccurate statements that CSOs make 
regarding their offending behaviour. In their 1984 paper, Abel et al. provided researchers 
with a list of the types of cognitive distortions that, based on their own clinical experience, 
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the authors thought were most common in CSOs. The seven cognitive distortions 
categories they identified are presented in table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. 
Cognitive distortions categories noted in Abel, Becker, and Cunningham-Rathner (1984) 
 
Cognitive distortions 
A child who does not resist my sexual advances wants to have sex with me 
Having sex with a child is a good way for adults to educate them about sex 
Children do not tell others about the sexual activity because they secretly 
enjoy it 
In the future, society will begin to accept sexual relations between adults and 
children 
An adult who fondles a child without penetration is not harming the child 
When children ask questions about sex, it is because they want sexual relations 
with adults 
My relationship with the child is greatly enhanced through having sex with 
them 
 
Although Abel et al. (1984) called the above items “cognitive distortions”, they 
stated that the items were, “…only a sample of the various beliefs and attitudes held by 
adults as they involve themselves with children” (p. 101). In fact, the above list seems 
simply to be a series of belief statements. In other words, Abel et al. presented cognitive 
distortions as if they were belief structures common in CSOs, rather than thinking errors 
or other cognitive processes. In addition, they did not acknowledge that cognitive 
distortions might simply be things that CSOs tell themselves or others to create a 
favourable self-image or to appear more favourable socially. This view of CSOs’ 
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cognitive distortions as belief structures is reinforced  by Abel et al.’s (1984) definition of 
cognitive distortions as “cognitive beliefs that support sexual involvement with children” 
(p. 98). Hence, Abel et al. (1984) frequently implied that they did not conceive of 
cognitive distortion as thinking errors, as Beck (1963; 1967) had done, and instead thought 
of them as beliefs.  
Unfortunately, the definition of CSOs’ cognitive distortions was muddied when 
Abel et al., (1989) later broadened the meaning to include other phenomena such as, “…an 
individual’s internal processes, including the justifications, perceptions and judgments 
used by the sex offender to rationalise his child molestation behaviour”(p. 137). In their 
1989 paper Abel and colleagues not only called cognitive distortions beliefs, but also 
described them as cognitive processes (e.g., perceptions) and products (e.g., judgments). 
In fact, in their 1989 paper Abel et al. frequently described cognitive distortions as if they 
were things CSOs said to themselves to feel better. For instance, they stated that cognitive 
distortions appeared to: 
“…allow the offender to justify his ongoing sexual abuse of children without the anxiety, 
guilt and loss of self-esteem that would usually result from an individual committing 
behaviours contrary to the norms of his society” (Abel et al., 1989, p.137).  
Thus, with the publication of Abel et al.’s 1989 paper, the term "cognitive 
distortion” developed a very wide definitional reach; it could mean cognitive structures, 
cognitive processes, or cognitive products. Of course, in the absence of any theory or 
research to guide Abel and colleagues as to the factors that might underlie CSOs’ 
cognitive distortions, it is understandable that the authors found it difficult to provide a 
tight definition of the construct in question. 
Following publication of Abel et al.’s (1984; 1989) work, Neidigh and Krop 
(1992) set about listing in greater detail the types of cognitive distortions endorsed by 
CSOs. They asked 101 CSOs to write answers to open-ended questions about the 
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“thoughts, ideas or beliefs” (p. 210) that had contributed to their sexual offending. The 
authors then sorted the resultant 357 separate statements into 38 categories. The ten most 
commonly-endorsed statements are listed in Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2. 
Ten most common cognitive distortions categories and percentage of offenders producing 
response, as per Neidigh and Krop (1992) 
 
Percentage   Cognitive distortions 
25       She enjoyed it 
25   This won’t hurt her or affect her in any way 
21   This is not so bad, it’s not really wrong 
20   I was high on drugs or alcohol at the time 
19   I wasn’t thinking or I wouldn’t have done it 
15   No one will ever find out so I won’t get caught 
14   She is flirting and teasing me, she wants me to do it 
12   We love each other so this is ok 
10   She didn’t say no or tell, so it must be ok with her  
10   There is no force involved, so this must be mutual 
 
Neidigh and Krop (1992) commented that although many of the derived categories 
aligned with the seven cognitive distortions identified by Abel et al. (1984), some 
categories did not directly map onto Abel et al.’s (e.g., “No one will ever find out so I 
won’t get caught”, “I was high on alcohol or drugs at the time”). Presumably this was 
because Neidigh and Krop’s categories were developed from actual, personal CSO 
statements rather than the general, clinician-derived statements Abel et al. (1984) had 
listed.  
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By organising CSOs’ statements about their offending, Neidigh and Krop (1992) 
provided researchers with a database of content captured by offender statements. 
Nevertheless, Neidigh and Krop’s work did not clarify what these statements represented, 
or how they might be involved in the commissioning of sexual offences against children. 
Interestingly, while Abel et al. (1984) had referred to their list of seven cognitive 
distortions as beliefs or attitudes, Neidigh and Krop raised the idea that the statements 
recorded in their study might actually be “surface level descriptions” (p. 213) rather than 
representing “deeper cognitive schemas or beliefs”(p. 212). However, the authors also 
indicated that cognitive distortions might in fact represent beliefs because, in a confusing 
twist, they suggested that their 38 category statements could be compiled into a scale for 
assessing CSO cognition. By saying that distorted-sounding statements could be used as 
items for CSOs to agree or disagree with in the absence of offending cues, Neidigh and 
Krop implied that cognitive distortions are not mere transitory thinking errors, nor 
descriptions used to explain or excuse offending, but rather beliefs that CSOs hold across 
time.  
We have so far seen that Abel et al. (1984) introduced the idea that CSOs hold 
beliefs that facilitate their offending and that differentiate them from others. The authors 
frequently referred to these beliefs as cognitive distortions. In addition, they listed some of 
the themes captured by these beliefs (a task soon expanded by Neidigh & Krop, 1992). 
However, confusion developed when Abel et al. (1989) and Neidigh and Krop suggested 
that CSOs’ distortions might actually reflect other processes. In short, Abel and colleagues 
weren’t able to define the processes underlying cognitive distortions, or offence-relevant 
statements, although they often implied that cognitive distortions are beliefs. Because the 
phenomena underlying cognitive distortions remain unclear, in this thesis the meaning of 
cognitive distortions will be taken to simply refer to the offence-related statements that 
    
26 
CSOs utter or endorse which are interpreted by others as being faulty or distorted in some 
way.  
Other researchers have used the term cognitive distortion to refer to a raft of other 
cognitive structures, processes, and products. For example, cognitive distortions have been 
called excuses (Pollock & Hashmall, 1991), rationalisations (Neidigh & Krop, 1992), 
justifications, Abel et al., 1989), minimisations (Murphy, 1990), schemas (Malamuth & 
Brown, 1994), denial (Vanhouche & Vertommen, 1999), and defensiveness (Rogers & 
Dickey, 1991). A number of authors have commented on this plethora of terms (e.g., 
Beech & Mann, 2002; Geer, Estupinan, & Manguno-Mire, 1999; Maruna & Mann, 2006), 
but an agreed-upon definition has never asserted itself in the literature. This lack of 
consensus stems from the fact that researchers are not sure what phenomena actually drive 
cognitive distortions, and a lack of research into underlying factors has left psychologists 
unable to accurately describe the phenomena that cognitive distortions represent.  Very 
recently it has been proposed that cognitive distortions represent judgements that CSOs 
make about what they believe to be true, what is desirable, and how one best explains 
one’s actions (Ward, Keown, & Gannon, 2007). In other words, according to this model 
cognitive distortions reflect belief-based, value-based, and action-based evaluations and 
thus are not solely driven by beliefs. Because of its recency, this model has yet to be tested 
and it remains to be seen whether it will be taken up by researchers and clinicians. At 
present, however, there is a general sense in the literature that cognitive distortions reflect 
offence-supportive beliefs (Gannon & Polaschek, 2006; Marshall, Anderson, & 
Fernandez, 1999b). In the following section this point will be considered in further detail. 
Despite the highly variable use of the cognitive distortion terms by different researchers, it 
must be reiterated that it has not yet been clarified which phenomena CSOs’ cognitive 
distortions represent: all that is known is that they are marked by distorted or faulty-
sounding statements that CSOs utter or endorse.  
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Cognitive Distortions as Beliefs  
Abel et al. (1984) introduced a key pair of ideas to the sexual offending literature: 
1) CSOs typically hold offence-supportive beliefs; and 2) evidence for these can be found 
in the distorted-sounding statements CSOs endorse. This interlocking pair of ideas has 
increasingly become embedded in the framework from which psychologists think about 
and study factors driving child sexual offending. The evidence for this assertion will now 
be reviewed. 
As was shown in Chapter One, the view that CSOs typically hold distorted beliefs 
– as evidenced by their cognitive distortions – is reflected in the most recent major 
multifactor theory of child sexual offending. Recall that in the Pathways model, Ward and 
Siegert (2002) frequently referred to cognitive distortions as beliefs, and they proposed 
that cognitive distortions play a causative role in child sexual offending. In fact, the 
Pathways model contends that cognitive distortions are involved in the offending pathway 
of every CSO. If cognitive distortions are generally thought of as being equivalent to 
beliefs, the universal involvement of cognitive distortions within the Pathways model 
suggests that the majority of CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs of some kind.  
The assumption that most or all CSOs hold static beliefs has also pervaded the 
writings of researchers looking at single-factor theories of child sexual offending. This is 
evidenced by the raft of researchers who have noted that that CSOs typically hold 
cognitive distortions, while directly calling those cognitive distortions “beliefs” (e.g., 
Blumenthal, Gudjonnson & Burns, 1999; Bumby 1996; Howitt, 1995; Marshall et al., 
1999b; Milner & Webster, 2005; Saradjian & Nobus, 2003; Ward et al. 997).  
The concept that most CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs and that evidence for 
these can be found in their seemingly distorted statements is also reflected in CSO 
treatment programmes. A key target of current CSO treatment programmes is to challenge 
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offence-supportive beliefs (Kirsch & Becker, 2006; Vivian-Byrne, 2004). While authors 
often describe this process as the modification of cognitive distortions (e.g., Becker & 
Murphy, 1998; Beech & Fisher, 2002; Marshall et al., 1999b; Marshall & Barbaree, 1999), 
the same authors recommend treatment techniques that actually appear to be aimed at 
shifting stable beliefs. For instance, in a section entitled ‘Changing Cognitive Distortions’, 
Marshall and Barbaree (1999) stress the importance of having each programme attendee 
describe details of his offending so treatment providers can target his, “…misperceptions 
and distorted attitudes and beliefs about his victim, his offence, and about other more 
general issues (e.g., … a sense of entitlement about children)” (p. 69). Marshall and 
Barbaree go on to explain that when “cognitive distortions” are uttered they should be 
challenged by group members in treatment as a way for the group to learn from each other 
and to, “think critically about their own beliefs, attitudes and perceptions” (p. 70). Further 
evidence that changing beliefs is a key target of CSO treatment programmes is evidenced 
by the fact that the effectiveness of such programmes is frequently assessed by measuring 
the extent to which attendees show response shifts on cognitive distortion questionnaires 
(Mann, Webster, Wakeling, & Marshall, 2007).  Such questionnaires are actually designed 
to measure stable offence-supportive beliefs. Whether or not they succeed at this task is an 
issue that will be discussed shortly.  
The notion that faulty beliefs drive CSOs’ cognitive distortions has become so 
entrenched that researchers have started theorising about the nature of those underlying 
beliefs. Recent writings have proposed that the beliefs which purportedly drive cognitive 
distortions emanate from deep cognitive structures, or schemas (e.g., Beech & Mann, 
2002; Drake, Ward, Nathan & Lee, 2001; Mann & Beech, 2003; Maruna & Mann 2006; 
Milner & Webster, 2005; Ward, 2000; Ward & Keenan, 1999). This premise has been 
articulated most clearly in Ward’s work on implicit theories (Ward, 2000; Ward & 
Keenan, 1999). Drawing from cognitive/behavioural literature on the development of 
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people’s cognitions (e.g., Carpendale & Chandler, 1996; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995), 
Ward and Keenan proposed that the beliefs that generate cognitive distortions are not 
unrelated propositions, and instead are the product of underlying implicit theories (ITs). 
Ward (2000) described ITs as networks of interrelated beliefs and concepts that CSOs 
hold about the nature of their “victims, the world, and themselves” (p. 821). According to 
Ward, the content contained within these cognitive structures leads CSOs to interpret the 
world in specific, offence-supportive ways.  
In order to identify the types of implicit theories that CSOs hold, Ward and Keenan 
(1999) analysed the types of statements that CSOs had been reported to utter in interview 
studies (e.g., Neidigh & Krop, 1992), as well as the potentially distorted statements listed 
in questionnaire measures of offence-supportive beliefs. In other words, Ward and Keenan 
sought to identify the clusters of beliefs that might underlie CSOs’ cognitive distortions in 
order to gain a picture of the cognitive content held in their implicit theories. The results 
led Ward and Keenan to surmise that there are five ITs encapsulating the following 
themes: Children as Sexual Beings, Dangerous World, Entitlement, Nature of Harm, and 
Uncontrollable.  
The Children as Sexual Beings IT contains beliefs that children have sexual 
interests and desires and that they are capable of making informed decisions about sex. 
CSOs holding this IT are likely to misinterpret children’s actions as being sexually 
provocative. An example cognitive distortion that might be generated by this belief cluster 
is, “the child was asking for sex”. 
Beliefs contained within the Dangerous World IT hold that the world is a hostile 
place full of aggressive and rejecting individuals who inflict pain and suffering on each 
other. There are two possible belief types that might result from a view of the world as 
being hostile. The first set of beliefs hold that one should withdraw into the safety 
afforded by relationships with children, who are viewed as innocent and accepting. An 
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example of an associated distorted statement is, “children are much safer than adults”. The 
second belief set holds that one should “fight back” against the world, manipulating and 
punishing those who can be dominated, and pre-emptively striking out against others 
before they have a chance to cause harm. An associated cognitive distortion might be, “I 
did it because she needed to be taught a lesson”. 
The Entitlement IT refers to beliefs in which the offender considers himself 
superior to others because of his personal characteristics or social role. For example, he 
may consider that as a man he is in a dominant position compared to women and children. 
As a consequence of this superiority his wants and needs assume higher importance than 
the needs of others. A distorted-sounding statement associated with this IT might be, “as a 
man it’s my right to get my kids to do whatever I please” 
Beliefs characterising the Nature of Harm IT serve to minimise or deny the harm 
that sexual activity can inflict on children. CSOs with this IT will sometimes attempt to 
justify their actions by claiming that more harmful behaviours, such as physical assault, 
can be inflicted against a child. A possible cognitive distortion associated with this belief 
cluster is, “It was only a bit of fun anyway”. 
Finally, the Uncontrollable IT contains beliefs that one’s life is chaotic and 
following an uncontrollable course. The CSO who holds this IT believes that they are 
overwhelmed by powerful internal and external forces (e.g., sexual desire, drugs, alcohol, 
stress, social pressures), leaving them unable to shape their day-to-day existence.  A 
cognitive distortion that might be generated by this cluster of beliefs is, “I wouldn’t have 
done it if I wasn’t high at the time”. 
Ward and Keenan (1999) did not assert that these implicit theories are universal 
among CSOs. For one thing, they noted that not every CSO should be expected to hold all 
five ITs. Rather, individuals are likely to hold different numbers of ITs. In addition, Ward 
and Keenan remarked that some CSOs might not hold any ITs at all. The authors stated 
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that, “…although they are plausible sources of the kinds of distorted thoughts individuals 
who sexually offend against children exhibit, we are not suggesting that all sexual 
offenders hold these implicit theories” (p. 822).  
Unfortunately, Ward and Keenan did not expand on how one might tell the 
difference between a distorted statement that represents an implicit theory and one that 
represents other phenomena, such as impression management strategies. To their credit 
Ward and Keenan acknowledged this issue, stating that,  
“At this point in time we are relatively ignorant of the underlying nature of 
cognitive distortions… However, in the absence of any substantial research or 
theoretical literature on the nature of mental representations in sexual offenders… 
we suggest that it is a useful first step to articulate plausible implicit theories that 
offenders could use to explain, predict and understand the actions of victims and 
themselves.” (p. 822) 
 
Following on from Ward and Keenan’s (1999) idea, Mann and Beech (2002) 
constructed a model showing the role of schema-based cognition in sexual offending. 
Beech and Mann defined a schema as, “a structure containing beliefs or attitudes that 
follow a similar theme or pattern and that have developed as a result of trying to make 
sense of early life experiences” (p. 145). According to Mann and Beech’s model, sexual 
offenders’ dysfunctional schemas lead them to process ambiguous or negative life events 
in such a way that hostile interpretations are produced. When these cognitive products 
combine with other sexual offending-related factors (e.g., impulsivity, deviant sexual 
interests, lack of intimacy) the sexual offender makes a choice to engage in sexually 
abusive behaviour. Thus, Beech and Mann (2002) developed a model in which 
dysfunctional schemas are not the primary drivers of sexual offending, but are instead 
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components that, when combined with a range of relevant risk factors, will heighten the 
likelihood of sexual assault occurring. 
 Whether CSOs’ offence-supportive beliefs are best viewed as being isolated 
structures or as being linked in with larger, more pervasive schematic structures is a matter 
currently under consideration within the sexual offending field (Gannon, Keown, & Rose, 
in press). What is evident, however, is that the hypothesis that CSOs hold offence-
supportive beliefs in some form or another has gained widespread acceptance. Naturally, 
this acceptance raises a very important question… what evidence is there to support the 
hypothesis? In the following chapter this question will be explored in depth.  




What’s in a Measure? Research Underpinning the Notion of Offence-
Supportive Beliefs 
 
As mentioned earlier, the hypothesis that CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs 
certainly has intuitive appeal. However, no matter how seemingly appealing a premise is, 
in the field of science we must critically consider the evidence that runs for and against it. 
Typically, researchers seeking information about CSOs’ offence-supportive beliefs have 
conducted two types of inquiry. First, researchers have interviewed CSOs about their 
offences and identified response statements that sound distorted or inaccurate. These so-
called cognitive distortions have usually been taken to reflect offence-supportive beliefs. 
Second, researchers have created questionnaires for CSOs in which offence-related 
propositions are listed, such as, “A child won't have sex with an adult unless the child 
wants to” (Abel and Becker Cognitions Scale; Abel et al., 1989). CSOs are asked to rate 
the extent to which they agree with each item. If CSOs indicate greater mean agreement 
with questionnaire items than comparison groups this difference is assumed to 
demonstrate that CSOs hold enduring, context-independent cognitions that distinguish 
them from non-abusive individuals. In other words, those CSOs are usually thought to 
believe questionnaire items to be true.  
The subsequent section will review interview and questionnaire studies to consider 
the extent to which CSOs utter or endorse cognitive distortions. Information gathered from 
these two sources will be discussed, and the significance of that evidence in terms of 
CSOs’ beliefs will be considered. Attention will then turn to the cognitive experiment, an 
underutilised but potentially valuable method for assessing sexual offender cognition.  
Interview Studies of CSO Statements 
As discussed, Abel et al. (1984) were the first to organize the content of CSOs’ 
post-offence statements. The fact that these statements were interpreted as evidence of 
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faulty beliefs is apparent in the authors’ assertion that the statements represented, “beliefs 
and attitudes held by adults as they involve themselves with children” (p. 101). Following 
Abel et al.’s work, Neidigh and Krop (1992) adopted a more formal approach to recording 
and categorizing CSOs’ post-offence statements. Using a written questionnaire format, 
they collected 357 statements which were assigned to 38 differently themed categories by 
three judges who showed high levels of interrater agreement. Neidigh and Krop were less 
certain about whether the collected statements represented beliefs. While there was some 
suggestion from Neidigh and Krop that they might reflect beliefs, the authors also posited 
that the recorded statements might represent “surface level cognitions” (p. 211) and 
“conscious self talk” (p. 211) rather than “deeper attitudes and beliefs” (p. 211). The 
authors made this comment after examining their participants’ scores on the ABCS. 
Neidigh and Krop found that their participants endorsed an average of 1.8 distortions on 
the ABCS. This was a substantially lower number than the average 3.5 distortions that 
participants endorsed when being interviewed. Because CSOs appeared more distorted 
when being interviewed, and because CSO questionnaires are essentially designed to 
assess entrenched beliefs, Neidigh and Krop proposed that their participants’ interview 
statements may have reflected temporary, situation-specific appraisals rather than beliefs. 
Subsequent authors (Gannon & Polaschek, 2006) have pointed out that CSOs might also 
reveal more distortions when being interviewed because their belief structures are primed 
by in-depth discussions about their offences, increasing the online availability of their 
offence-relevant cognitions.  
Hartley (1998) interviewed eight intrafamilial CSOs (i.e., CSOs who, unlike 
extrafamilial CSOs, have only offended against family members). Hartley stated that the 
aim of this study was to investigate how intrafamilial offenders use cognitive distortions to 
overcome their inhibitions against sexual offending. Cognitive distortions were described 
by Hartley as CSOs’ faulty “thoughts, perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes” (p. 25). The 
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study was based on Finkelhor’s (1984) premise that CSOs must surmount internal 
inhibitions in order to commit sexual abuse. The so-called cognitive distortions that CSOs 
in this study provided were grouped by Hartley into four categories. These were: 
cognitions related to sociocultural factors (i.e., beliefs that society tolerates child sexual 
abuse in certain circumstances); cognitions used to reduce fear of disclosure (i.e., self-
reassuring thoughts that the abuse will go undetected); Cognitions used to diminish 
responsibility (i.e., beliefs that the abuse is unplanned or not harmful); and cognitions 
related to permission seeking (i.e., beliefs the child could consent to the abuse). Hartley 
concluded that the statements uttered by CSOs in her study demonstrated that cognitive 
distortions are not only post-hoc rationalizations, but also represent pre-offence cognitions 
that lower inhibitions against offending.  
In another interview study of CSOs’ cognitive distortions, Ward et al. (1998) 
conducted a grounded theory analysis of assessment interviews held with 20 intakes at a 
CSO treatment programme. Within each interview, interviewees explained what motivated 
them and how they overcame internal inhibitions, external inhibitions, and victim 
resistance. Their statements were broken down into a series of so-called meaning units and 
Ward et al. hypothesised that some of these statements revealed information about the 
belief content held within CSOs’ cognitive structures. However, meaning units were also 
found to reveal information about the offence chain. That is, they revealed information 
about CSOs’ cognitive operations (e.g., descriptions, denials, or minimisations of the 
offence) and their styles of disclosing information (i.e., detailed, euphemistic, concrete, 
and passive). Thus, although Ward et al. used the content of CSOs’ utterances to 
categorise pre-existing offence-supportive beliefs, they also warned that CSOs’ reports 
may be affected by other processes. Setting aside issues about whether Ward et al.’s model 
is a fruitful way of categorising offender cognition, it is significant that the authors 
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stressed the importance for researchers and clinicians to be aware of CSOs’ cognitive 
operations and meta-level variables when analysing their interview statements.  
More recently, Saradjian and Nobus (2003) questioned 14 CSO clergymen about 
their offences. The authors did this with the aim of identifying content held within the 
clergymen’s beliefs, as well as the processes by which those pre-existing beliefs could 
“shape and affect subsequent judgments and behaviour” (p. 908). They detected ten 
categories of cognitive content, many of which, as Gannon and Polaschek (2006) have 
pointed out, were similar to Ward and Keenan’s (1999) implicit theories (e.g., “Teenage 
boys are full of sex, they want it”: Children as Sexual Beings). Saradjian and Nobus 
concluded that clergy CSOs used these beliefs both prior to the offences to overcome 
inhibition, and after the offences to reduce self guilt and maintain a positive self image. 
The authors reported that CSOs in their study held similar beliefs to other CSOs, although 
religious beliefs were also part of their offence-supportive thinking (e.g., God allowed it to 
happen).   
Finally, Marziano, Ward, Beech, and Pattison (2006) interviewed 22 CSOs to 
group any resultant offence-supportive content into one of the five ITs described in 
Chapter Two. CSOs were questioned at length about their offences and the interview 
transcripts were coded for semantic meaning units. Of the 6,497 resultant meaning units, 
41% were classified as cognitive distortions and allocated to an IT category. CSOs were 
found to most frequently endorse Children as Sexual Beings (28%), followed by 
Uncontrollable (26%), Dangerous World (22%), Nature of Harm (14%), and Entitlement 
(10%). Despite the fact that Ward and Keenan (1999) contended that not all CSOs would 
hold ITs and that some CSOs would hold only one or two ITs, Marziano et al. reported 
that all 22 CSOs endorsed cognitive distortions that fitted either four or five IT categories. 
The authors took this remarkably high level of IT-themed cognitive distortion 
endorsement (along with the fact that no other so-called “core beliefs” were identified) to 
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strongly suggest that CSOs do in fact hold ITs. Marziano et al. did not raise the possibility 
that some of the statements made by participants may have reflected phenomena other 
than underlying beliefs.  
In summary, the interview studies reviewed above have all found that CSOs utter 
cognitive distortions when they are interviewed about their offences. In the only study 
where the rate of such utterances was compared with endorsement of cognitive distortion 
questionnaire items (i.e., Neidigh & Krop, 1992) a much higher rate of endorsement was 
found using the interview technique. Taken together, these results suggest that interview 
studies reliably find evidence to support the hypothesis that CSOs generally exhibit 
cognitive distortions. Less clear, however, is what these distortions mean. While they are 
generally presented as evidence of faulty beliefs, the authors of two interview studies 
(Neidigh & Krop, 1992; Ward et al., 1998) did warn that CSOs' cognitive products may 
not necessarily represent belief structures.  
In recent years these warnings have been echoed by a number of researchers who 
have raised questions about the nature of cognitive distortions and underlying phenomena 
(e.g., Beech & Mann, 2002; Gannon & Polaschek, 2006; Maruna & Mann, 2006, Neidigh 
& Krop, 1992; Segal & Stermac, 1990). Recall that the CSOs who Neidigh and Krop 
studied endorsed two times as many cognitive distortion items when being interviewed 
than when answering a questionnaire.  This difference could perhaps be explained by the 
notion that CSOs who are asked to account for their actions sometimes produce 
justifications, minimizations, and denial, to deflect self-criticism or the opprobrium of 
others. Alternatively, when asked to explain their offending CSOs may report temporary, 
situation-bound appraisals that they engaged in during the time of their offending. These 
appraisals could have been specific, transitory cognitions that were generated through the 
interaction of environmental factors and individual emotional and neuropsychological 
drivers (see Ward & Beech, 2006). In fact, the idea that situational variables might 
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overcome more entrenched cognitions has been applied by several authors to the sexual 
offending field. For example, Howells, Day, and Wright (2004), Gannon and Polaschek 
(2006), and Ward, Hudson and Marshall (1995) have all noted that the concept of 
cognitive deconstruction can be called upon when accounting for CSOs’ sexually abusive 
actions. Cognitive deconstruction is a construct that was originally identified by 
Baumeister (1989, 1990). It is essentially a shift from abstract, higher levels of processing 
to more concrete, stimuli-driven ones. This attentional shift occurs when people are in the 
midst of stressful circumstances. It is thought to be a self-protective strategy that 
temporarily screens people from self awareness, guilt and shame. When a person enters a 
cognitively deconstructed state their self-concept becomes less integrated and meaningful, 
they focus on immediate rather than long-term goals, their thinking becomes less abstract 
and more concrete, their self-standards are less influential, and their inhibitions and their 
capacity to feel guilt diminishes. Baumeister (1990) contended that individuals can 
oscillate between this state and a more aware and integrated one.  
If this idea is applied to CSOs (as was first done by Ward et al., 1995), one can see 
that an individual feeling high levels of negative affect, for instance, might feel a strong 
drive to achieve intimacy through sexual contact with a child. Although the CSO may 
believe that adult-child sexual contact is unacceptable, when he enters a cognitively 
deconstructed state his beliefs have little influence on his behaviour. In the cognitively 
deconstructed state his attention is directed to isolated cues, and because his processing 
has become less abstract he fails to appraise those cues within the context of their broader 
meaning. So, for example, if his victim moves about in such a way that her underwear 
shows he could interpret this as a sign of sexual enticement, failing to acknowledge that 
his victim’s action actually stems from an innocent lack of self-awareness. Deaf to his 
own beliefs, he is now capable of performing acts that are unconsciously aimed at 
alleviating his emotional pain. Once self awareness returns the individual might then seek 
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some way of neutralising the attendant guilt. Thus, in his mind he generates cognitive 
distortions, which in this case would be self-soothing statements designed to minimize the 
perceived harm done, or his sense of personal responsibility.  
 At present, the notion of cognitive deconstruction seems to sit rather 
uncomfortably with recent literature on child sexual offending, and it is a topic that is not 
often raised by researchers. This may be because it is hard to align with the view that most 
or all CSOs have abnormal belief structures. After all, if one holds that CSOs have 
exceptional beliefs that enlist pro-offending motivations, what need is there for a theory 
that says sexual offending can occur in the context of exceptional, belief-subsuming 
circumstances? The concept does, however, align more with the older theories of 
Finkelhor (1984) and Marshall and Barbaree (1990). Recall that Finkelhor claimed CSOs 
offend only in situations when their internal inhibitions have been lowered, implying that 
offenders can actually offend in spite of, not because of, their beliefs. In a similar vein, 
Marshall and Barbaree said sex offenders generally offend under circumstances that 
disinhibit their control. The authors contended that even well socialised males can offend 
if exposed to specific circumstances and very strong stressors, a notion that clearly sits 
well with the idea that CSOs might offend when in a cognitively deconstructed state.  
The cognitive deconstruction concept raises the possibility that cognitive 
distortions are sometimes things CSOs say to themselves to neutralize post-offence guilt. 
Alternatively, cognitive distortions could represent attempts on the part of CSOs to 
construct a coherent-sounding account of their motivations and decisions. Interviewers 
often ask CSOs to provide explanations relevant to their offending and to report on their 
internal states during the offending period. Usually this requires the speaker to recall 
events that happened some considerable time ago. Providing his memory is up to this 
challenge, the speaker must then report on internal states that he may very well have not 
been aware of at the time. As explained earlier, humans often use schemas to guide where 
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we direct our attention, how we perceive and interpret stimuli, and how we recall 
information. Yet information regarding the contents of those schemas is not something 
that humans have ready access to (Beck, 1996; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In fact, humans 
are notoriously bad at understanding their own motivations (Kunda, 1999). As an 
example, participants in studies have been shown to often make moral judgements based 
on intuitive, emotionally-driven appraisals. Yet when asked to explain how they made 
their judgements those people generally claim to have made rational decisions, citing 
culturally-sanctioned reasons for choosing a particular response (Haidt, 2001). People 
commonly construct these types of rationalisations despite the fact that the vast majority 
of human psychological processes occur outside of conscious awareness (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). In particular, humans have little or no 
introspective access to higher order cognitive processes such as those used in problem 
solving, evaluation, judgment, and action selection (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). As Nisbett 
and Wilson explain, humans are often unaware of their own responses as they make them. 
Likewise, humans are generally unaware that stimuli have heavily influenced their 
responses, or even that the influential stimuli are present in their environment. Although 
individuals are capable of adopting an effortful, data-driven processing style (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991), even when making a conscious effort to monitor cognitions humans can 
still be driven by factors that lie outside awareness. For instance, Bargh and Chartrand 
reported that when individuals try to make conscious, effortful judgments about others, 
unbeknownst to these individuals their judgments have already been formed on the basis 
of rapid, unintentional evaluations.. 
Despite the many difficulties involved in trying to report on one’s motivations and 
decision-making processes, the CSO who is asked to explain his offending may produce a 
plausible-sounding account. While this could indicate that he is providing an accurate 
description of the offence process, it is more likely that he is playing storyteller, weaving 
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together fact and fiction in order to create a coherent account of his offending. Malle 
(2006) notes that when people engage in undesirable or unusual behaviours it is very 
difficult for them to admit ignorance of their own reasons. Likewise, listeners often want 
to hear excuses that explain behaviour in a compelling way (Malle, 2006). Thus, the CSO 
being interviewed may attempt to construct a perfectly rational, yet nevertheless faulty, 
causal history that either reduces his discomfort at not knowing why he committed his 
crimes, or that gives the interviewer an explanation they seem to want.   
In addition to the above possibilities, some cognitive distortions may be statements 
that CSOs utter in order to project a more positive image of themselves to others (see 
Gannon & Polaschek, 2006; Maruna & Mann, 2006). According to Maruna and Mann, it  
is common for people, especially westerners, to provide excuses when asked to explain 
their misdeeds. That is, humans have a tendency to cite external causes and mitigating 
circumstances when accounting for their bad behaviour. In particular, humans tend to deny 
planning or intentionality when explaining misdeeds, both to minimise their own guilt 
(Baumeister & Wotman, 1992) and to enhance their reputation (Maruna & Mann, 2006). 
Such excuses can actually play an adaptive role, because they allow the speaker to 
maintain healthy self-esteem levels and can strengthen social ties by indicating a desire to 
follow social norms (Maruna & Mann, 2006). In short, excuse-making is both common 
and adaptive… unless, it seems, one has sexually offended against children. In this case, 
individuals who engage in excuse-making are usually pathologised.  
Finally, some cognitive distortions might simply be fairly accurate event 
descriptions. When an offender says something like, “I was too drunk at the time to think 
straight” or, “I was depressed” or, “she hopped into the bed and started cuddling up to me” 
his descriptions might merely be that: descriptions. The offender is not necessarily 
excusing his behaviour. Rather, he may be trying to give his listener information about 
external and internal forces acting on him during the offending period. Maruna and Mann 
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(2006) and Mann and Hollin (2007) have noted that far from being misinterpretations that 
ought to be challenged, such statements could very well signal dynamic risk factors the 
offender needs to address in treatment. Regardless, there has been a tendency in clinical 
practice to declare almost any causal explanation that offenders extend regarding their 
behaviour as being distorted (Maruna & Mann, 2006).  
In summary, the seemingly distorted-sounding statements that CSOs utter in 
interviews could arise from a raft of phenomena. They might, as is often suggested, be 
direct descriptions of abnormal content held within belief structures or schemas. On the 
other hand, they might represent CSOs’ attempts to make logical sense of behaviour that 
was not enacted for logical reasons, or attempts to introspect on motivations that lie 
beyond the reach of introspection. Alternatively, they might be direct reports about 
temporary appraisals the offender made when offending, or self-soothing statements that 
kick into gear when the offender contemplates the guilt-inducing fact that he abused a 
child. They might be excuses the offender extends to his listener because he wants to 
assure the listener he is a likeable person after all. Then again, cognitive distortions might 
sometimes be matter-of-fact descriptions that are not designed to excuse or justify 
anything. Unfortunately, the research literature contains scant discussion about these 
competing phenomena, how psychologists might tell the difference between them, or what 
the treatment implications are that they yield. 
 
Questionnaire Studies of CSO Statements 
Despite warnings that CSOs’ cognitive products might not represent beliefs, 
researchers have nevertheless used the semantic content derived from CSOs’ interview 
studies to develop questionnaire measures of offence-supportive beliefs. Typically, these 
questionnaire measures are administered to CSOs and offender or community control 
groups under confidential or anonymous conditions. The underlying rationale is that if 
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CSOs hold stable, non-situational, offence-supportive beliefs their answers should be 
statistically distinct from those provided by non-CSOs (Ward et al., 1997).  
The first such questionnaire was developed by Abel, Becker, Cunningham-
Rathner, Rouleau, Kaplan, and Reich (1984). Called the Abel and Becker Cognitions Scale 
(ABCS), this 29-item scale was simply based on the authors’ clinical experience in 
verbally assessing CSOs. Abel et al. (1989) found the scale to have acceptable 
psychometric properties (test-retest reliability of .76 over three weeks and internal 
consistency ranging from .59 to .82 across six extracted factors). Examples of items 
include “A child who doesn't physically resist an adult’s sexual advances, really wants to 
have sex with the adult” and, “Having sex with the child is a good way for an adult to 
teach the child about sex.” Items are scored on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly 
agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree). The scale was found by Abel et al. (1989) to have six 
factors, which were labelled (see pp. 144-145) as follows: “Child-adult sex helps the 
child”; “Children initiate child-adult sex for specific reasons”; “Adults initiate child-adult 
sex for specific reasons”; “The child’s behaviour shows their desire for child-adult sex”; 
“Adults can predict when child-adult sex will damage the child in the future”; “Child-adult 
sex is or will be acceptable in society”. Abel et al. (1989) noted that ABCS items were 
transparent, meaning that no attempt was made to disguise the questionnaire’s purpose.  
Despite this transparency the instrument has been used with a reasonable degree of 
success in various studies. Abel et al. (1989) used the ABCS to compare responses from 
240 CSOs, 48 non-CSO paraphilics (i.e., men who exhibited other forms of sexual 
deviancy), and 86 community controls. CSOs were found to endorse significantly more 
items than community controls on all six factors, although no factor statistically 
distinguished CSOs from paraphilics. Stermac and Segal (1989) also used the ABCS to 
compare 20 CSOs with 17 rapists, 35 clinicians and 94 community controls. CSOs 
demonstrated significantly higher endorsement of items than any other group. In 1995 
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Hayashino, Wurtle, and Klebe examined whether the ABCS could distinguish 
extrafamilial CSOs from intrafamilial CSOs, community controls, offender controls and 
rapists. In line with the authors’ expectations, extrafamilial CSOs demonstrated 
significantly higher levels of agreement than all other groups. Interestingly, intrafamilial 
CSOs did not respond differently than rapists or other control groups. Researchers have 
suggested that extrafamilial CSOs hold higher levels of distorted beliefs than intrafamilial 
CSOs (Fisher, Beech, & Browne, 1999; Vanhouche & Vertommen, 1999; Ward, 2000), 
which may account for Hayashino, Wurtle, and Klebe’s findings. Extrafamilial CSOs are 
hypothesised to be more distorted than intrafamilials because they tend to have more 
victims over a longer offending period and therefore have more opportunities to practice 
interpreting their world in a distorted manner and thus to strengthen their offence-
supportive beliefs or schemas. 
 In contrast to Abel et al.’s (1989) and Stermac & Segal’s (1989) findings, Beech 
et al. (1999) were unable to distinguish between CSOs and nonoffenders using the ABCS. 
The authors dealt with this unexpected result by removing the two-thirds of the CSO 
sample that they classed as “low-deviancy” (i.e., showing some combination of having 
fewer victims, picking victims of only one gender, and offending within their own 
families), and including only “high-deviancy” CSOs in the analysis. At this point a 
significant difference was found between CSOs and nonoffenders. Finally, Tierney and 
McCabe (2001) found that the ABCS statistically discriminated between CSOs and 
community controls, but did not distinguish CSOs from adult sexual offenders or offender 
controls.  
Taken together, these studies indicate that the ABCS can often distinguish CSOs’ 
responses from those provided by community controls, but that it is less successful at 
differentiating CSOs from other offender groups. While Abel et al. (1989) did not measure 
socially desirable responding when examining the ABCS, questionnaire measurement of 
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social desirability was included in other ABCS studies (i.e., Hayashino, Wurtle, & Klebe, 
1995; Stermac & Segal, 1989 ; Tierney & McCabe, 2001), all of which eliminated it as an 
influence on ABCS results. In the case of Beech et al.’s (1999) study neither high 
deviancy nor low deviancy CSOs were found to differ from nonoffenders in terms of 
socially desirable responding. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that discriminative 
ability of the ABCS may have been limited by transparency of items (e.g., Blumenthal et 
al., 1999; Bumby, 1996; Tierney & McCabe, 2001). In other words, researchers have 
surmised that rather than providing completely honest responses, some CSO participants 
engage in “socially desirable responding”, or “faking good”, thereby muddying group 
differences between CSOs and controls.  
 To minimize the potentially confounding effects of socially desirable responding, 
Bumby (1996) designed the MOLEST, a questionnaire measure that prevents CSOs from 
being neutral about their beliefs. Responses to MOLEST items are made on a 4-point 
Likert scale, removing the opportunity for respondents to choose a “neutral” response. 
Bumby reported that this 38-item scale has excellent psychometric properties, with an 
internal consistency of .97 and test-retest reliability of .84 over two weeks. In addition, the 
scale has a low correlation with the Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MSDS; 
Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Example items are, “Sometimes, touching a child sexually is a 
way to show love and affection” and, “Some children can act very seductively”. 
 Bumby (1996) compared the MOLEST responses of 44 intrafamilial CSOs, 25 
rapists, and 20 non-sexual offender controls. All participants were incarcerated in a 
maximum security correctional facility. In a successful demonstration of the instrument’s 
discriminative power, CSOs were found to endorse significantly more distorted statements 
than rapists and non-sexual offender controls, while the offender control groups could not 
be statistically differentiated from each other. Other researchers have since found the 
MOLEST to statistically discriminate extrafamilial CSOs from offender and community 
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comparisons (Marshall, Marshall, Sachdev, & Kruger, 2003), extrafamilial CSOs from 
rapists (Arkowitz & Vess, 2003), CSOs from sexual offenders against adults (Blumenthal 
et al., 1999) and CSOs from rapists and violent offenders (Feelgood, Cortini & Thompson, 
2005). Most recently, Pervan and Hunter (2007) used the MOLEST to compare the 
cognitions of 64 CSOs, 36 rapists, 25 violent offenders, and 14 male university students. 
Contrary to the ABCS findings reported by Hayashino et al. (1994) and Fisher et al. 
(1999), Pervan and Hunter found no significant differences between extrafamilial and 
intrafamilial CSOs’ scores, and for this reason they did not analyse the CSO subtypes 
separately. It was found that CSOs attained significantly higher scores than rapists and 
violent offenders, but did not differ from university students. Despite being unable to 
distinguish between CSOs and university males, and despite the fact that their method 
simply involved using propositional belief statements to measure cognitive distortions, 
Pervan and Hunter concluded that, “the clear group differences… reaffirms the notion that 
sexual offenders are prone to misinterpret or reinterpret social perceptions in a way that 
justifies, defends, and maintains their offending behaviour” (p. 88).  
At around the time that Bumby was developing his questionnaire, Hanson, 
Gizzarelli, and Scott (1994) created the Hanson Sex Attitude Questionnaire (HSAQ). This 
47-item instrument was constructed to assess the offence-supportive beliefs of 
intrafamilial CSOs. The HSAQ contains six subscales (Sexual Entitlement, Children are 
Sexual, Sexual Harm, Frustration, Affairs, Sex/Affection Confusion), and items are 
answered using a 5-point Likert scale. Hanson et al. reported that all subscales 
demonstrated acceptable alphas ranging from .62 to .92. Test-retest reliability was not 
described. Examples items are, “Everyone is entitled to sex” (Sexual Entitlement), “Some 
children like to sexually tease me” (Sexy Children), “Children can easily forgive parents if 
they have sex with them” (Sexual Harm), “I am often sexually frustrated” (Frustration), 
“A man can have sex outside marriage and still love his wife” (Affairs), and “Sex makes 
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all relationships stronger” (Sex/Affection Confusion). Hanson et al. found that Sexual 
Entitlement, Children are Sexual, and Sexual Harm subscales statistically distinguished 
intrafamilial CSOs from male batterers and community controls. However, Frustration, 
Affairs, and Sex/Affection Confusion did not discriminate CSOs from controls, even 
though analysis of covariance suggested that these scales were not subject to socially 
desirable responding.  
 More recently, a 22-item cognitive distortion questionnaire called the Child 
Molester Scale was devised (CMS; McGrath, Cann, & Konopasky, 1998). Its items are 
comprised of statements that justify sexualized adult-child interactions such as, “Play 
wrestling with children which includes some tickling and touching between the child’s 
legs is not sexual assault” and, “Children usually outgrow any problems resulting from a 
sexual experience they had as a child". McGrath et al. posited that wording distorted 
statements in a justificatory way would reduce socially desirable responding. McGrath et 
al. also included distracter items to obscure the purpose of the instrument. Item responses 
are indicated using a 5-point Likert scale.  
 To date, the CMS has demonstrated only limited ability to distinguish CSOs from 
controls. In the first study of its discriminative abilities McGrath et al. (1998) collected 
scale responses from 30 CSOs, 30 offender controls, and 30 male university students 
under conditions of complete anonymity. These response were compared with those of a 
group of 44 CSOs who were about to be assessed for parole and who were not assured 
anonymity. As expected, CSOs overall and CSOs in the parole condition endorsed 
significantly more CMS items than the university males, and CSOs who were assured 
anonymity showed higher levels of item endorsement than CSOs in the parole condition. 
However, CSOs in the parole condition could not be differentiated from offender controls, 
even though the parole-eligible CSOs had good reason to respond to CMS items in a 
socially desirable way. In another study where confidentially of responses to the CMS was 
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assured (see Gannon & Polashchek, 2006, for a review), Tierney and McCabe (2001) 
found that CSOs’ responses to CMS items did not significantly differ from those of non-
sexual offender controls and sexual offenders against adults. 
 Overall, questionnaires that ask respondents to indicate their belief levels across 
lists of cognitive distortions tend to discriminate between CSOs and comparison groups. 
Therefore, on the face of it, questionnaire studies would seem to suggest that CSOs often 
hold stable, offence-supportive beliefs that set them apart from other offenders and 
nonoffenders. However, looking slightly below the surface, there is an intriguing pattern 
lurking in the findings of these studies: even when CSOs demonstrate greater endorsement 
of distorted-sounding statements on questionnaires, they do not actually agree with those 
statements. Closer examination of scores shows that CSOs’ Likert scale ratings typically 
tend towards the disagree option. For example, Langevin (1991) found that almost 93% of 
CSOs’ responses to the ABCS fell into the disagree or strongly disagree range. In other 
investigations of the ABCS, Hayashino et al. (1994) and Tierney and McCabe (2001) 
reported that CSO respondents disagreed with statements overall. Similarly, studies using 
the MOLEST have indicated that CSOs do not endorse cognitive distortion items. For 
instance, CSOs’ responses in Arkowitz and Vess’ (2003) study were skewed towards the 
disagree option and Marshall et al. (2003) found a mean CSO total response score of 66 
within a possible range of 38-152, again indicating that CSOs disagreed with items. 
Likewise, Blumenthal et al. (1999) found that CSOs scored a mean total of   80.1 on the 
MOLEST. With MOLEST scores of 76 indicating disagreement, and scores of 114 
indicating agreement, Blumenthal et al.’s CSOs clearly tended towards disagreement with 
MOLEST items. In addition, Feelgood et al. (2005) reported that CSOs’ responses to the 
MOLEST were in the slightly disagree range. Finally, Pervan and Hunter (2007) found 
that CSOs attained a mean total score of 64, indicating clear disagreement with items. 
Nevertheless, the authors went on to conclude that CSOs’ response indicated “the 
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endorsement of cognitive distortions” (p. 88). It seems strange, to say the least, that one 
might interpret disagreement with items as a sign that those items are being endorsed. 
Most psychologists would challenge any sexual offender who similarly mistook 
disagreement for affirmation! 
 To summarise, then, even when questionnaire measures of offence-supportive 
beliefs find differences between CSOs and others, the clinical significance of those 
differences is debatable in light of the fact that CSOs tend to disagree with questionnaire 
items. One has to ask whether slight differences in disagreement levels between CSOs and 
others offers support for the hypothesis that CSOs hold distorted, abnormal beliefs.  
When confronted with this paradox, or with nonsignificant comparisons between 
CSOs’ and controls’ questionnaire responses, some researchers have argued that the 
results indicate socially desirable responding on the part of the CSOs. For instance, when 
Langevin (1991) found that only 7.2% of CSOs’ ABCS items fell into the neutral to 
strongly agree range, he argued that these findings were best accounted for by the 
likelihood that CSOs were engaging in socially desirable responding. This argument was 
extended despite the fact that no measure of social desirability was included in Langevin’s 
study. Likewise, Fisher et al. (1999) suggested that their own study may not have 
distinguished between controls and intrafamilial/low deviancy CSOs because those CSOs 
faked good when answering the ABCS. Fisher et al. extended the same argument to 
account for the fact that Hayashino et al.’s (1995) study did not differentiate intrafamilial 
CSOs from controls. Finally, Kolton, Boer, and Boer (2001) interpreted null findings 
using a modified version of the ABSC as evidence that only when CSOs respond using the 
strongly disagree option should their responses be viewed as distortion-free. Amazingly, 
the authors argued that all other CSO responses ranging from disagree to strongly agree 
should count as evidence of distorted beliefs!  
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Of course, these approaches represent a tautology: when CSOs’ responses differ 
from controls’ the results are accepted as support for the hypothesis that CSOs hold 
distorted beliefs, but when differences are not detected the results are dismissed as 
indicating that CSO respondents faked good. By adopting such a stance it becomes 
difficult, if not impossible, to produce questionnaire results that negate the offence-
supportive belief hypothesis. Importantly, research has produced little or no evidence that 
CSOs do feign disagreement when answering questionnaire items. This lack of evidence 
rests on the fact that social desirability bias is either not measured when questionnaire 
assessments of offence-supportive beliefs are administered, or that when it is measured it 
is generally not found to predict participants’ responses (Gannon & Polaschek, 2006). For 
instance, Arkowitz and Vess (2003) found that although CSOs’ MOLEST responses were 
skewed towards disagreement, those responses did not significantly correlate with general 
social desirability. Blumenthal et al. (1999) also reported that although CSOs’ mean total 
scores indicated disagreement, social desirability did not appear to affect their MOLEST 
responses. Three recent studies have tried to shed new light on this issue by investigating 
CSOs’ tendency to fake good using experimental techniques. Two studies (Gannon, 2006; 
Gannon & Polaschek, 2005) found evidence CSOs weren’t faking good, while one study 
(Gannon, Keown & Polaschek, 2007) found evidence they were. On balance then, the 
body of evidence seems to suggest that socially desirable responding does not greatly 
interfere with CSOs’ questionnaire responses. Nevertheless, when CSOs confound 
researchers’ hypotheses by disagreeing with questionnaire items or answering 
questionnaires similarly to controls, there is a tendency to surmise that those CSOs have 
hidden their distorted beliefs away from the eyes of prying researchers. Strangely, 
researchers do not seem to consider the alternative possibility that control groups, aware of 
the widespread abhorrence of child sexual abuse, might sometimes fake good on CSO 
questionnaires. It is, after all, not out of the question that controls could sometimes answer 
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such questionnaires defensively, exaggerating their disagreement for fear of being 
suspected capable of child sexual offending. Were this scenario the case, it would account 
for the mixed pattern of questionnaire findings equally well.  
 There is another reason to query the idea that questionnaires provide evidence that 
CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs. As was the case with the interview method, the 
questionnaire method assumes that CSOs’ faulty beliefs are chronically accessible and 
readily open to offenders’ introspection. Yet research has suggested that this assumption 
may well be unwarranted: humans are often unable to accurately introspect on the contents 
of their cognitive structures. If it is difficult for people to accurately report their beliefs 
they may instead try to logically deduce what those beliefs are. When rating an item like, 
“Children who have been involved in sexual activity with an adult will eventually get over 
it and go on with their lives” an offender who has abused a child may reason that he 
cannot hold a competing belief, or he wouldn’t have committed the crime. As noted 
earlier, it seems intuitively wrong that someone with a belief that sexual abuse is harmful 
might nevertheless molest a child. It has been shown, however, that the CSO who makes 
this conjecture could be wrong; people can and do behave in ways that violate their own 
belief systems. 
We have so far seen that interviews and questionnaires have been used to study the 
hypothesis that CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs, and they have revealed data that has 
been interpreted as support for that hypothesis. Yet both interviews and questionnaires 
record cognitive products without shedding light on the underlying phenomena that drive 
CSOs’ responses. This is not to say that interview and questionnaire approaches are not 
valuable tools when studying CSOs; they certainly have allowed theoreticians and 
clinicians to hypothesise about the nature and content of CSOs’ offence-relevant 
cognitions. However, there is a need for these techniques to be complimented by more 
sophisticated, implicit methods that use phenomena other than cognitive products to 
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investigate CSOs’ beliefs. In the section below studies that have attempted to measure 
cognitive processes, rather than products, will be reviewed. 
A New Paradigm: Information Processing Studies 
 
As discussed, people are not always able to consciously access information about 
their own cognitive processes and contents. Even if they successfully introspect on these 
cognitive phenomena, there is no guarantee that they can accurately articulate their 
thoughts, or that they will choose to do so honestly. To overcome these issues, cognitive 
scientists have developed experiments that minimise both the opportunity for participants 
to censure their responses and the need for them to introspect on implicit cognitions. 
These experiments are designed to allow covert observation of the ways in which humans 
automatically process information. For example, the time that it takes for participants to 
automatically respond to stimuli is surreptitiously recorded, or their memory for presented 
information is tested. The observations provide important clues about participants’ 
underlying cognitive structures and contents. Underpinning the design of such 
experiments is the principle that cognitive structures and their contents strongly influence 
the way that humans attend to, encode, store, and react to environmental stimuli. As 
Greenwald and Banaji (1995) argue, it is “theoretically essential” (p. 5) that such indirect 
measures be used within the field of psychology to investigating people’s implicit 
cognitions. This argument has been echoed by researchers interested in studying CSO 
cognition (e.g., Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004; Ward et al., 1997). 
Almost two decades ago Stermac and Segal (1989) tried to lead sexual offender 
research away from the study of cognitive products and towards the experimental 
investigation of information processing operations. In a study looking at CSOs’ 
interpretations of vignettes, Stermac and Segal compared 20 CSOs with 17 rapists, 35 
male and female clinicians and 94 male and female community controls. All participants 
read 12 short descriptions of sexual encounters between an adult and child. Stermac and 
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Segal varied the degree of sexual contact portrayed in each vignette across four levels 
ranging from touching to genital contact with ejaculation. In addition, the child’s response 
to sexual contact was varied across three levels, from smiling, to passive/no response, to 
crying with resistance. Participants were asked whether the child enjoyed what happened, 
whether the child wanted it to happen, whether the child benefited from the experience 
and to what extent the child, and then the adult, was responsible. Answers were indicated 
using a five-point Likert scale. Compared to control groups, CSOs self-reported that the 
vignettes showed greater benefits and enjoyment for the child and less harm to the child. 
CSOs also reported more child desire and responsibility for the encounters and less adult 
responsibility. Also, CSOs needed to see a clearly negative response (i.e., crying) from the 
child before perceiving harm to the child.  
Stermac and Segal (1989) concluded that CSOs may hold schemas or beliefs that 
lead them to misinterpret cues given by children during sexual encounters. The authors 
went on to suggest that these belief structures may form important treatment targets. While 
Stermac and Segal’s conclusions may be correct, it should be noted that their methods 
allowed only a limited study of CSOs’ information processing. Because participants were 
directly told what the child’s reaction was, errors of perception couldn’t be made. In other 
words, rather than measuring CSOs’ misinterpretations of behaviour the authors asked 
them to rate the consequences of the behaviour (i.e., benefits and enjoyment). In this way, 
Stermac and Segal’s vignette method echoed a questionnaire-based approach. It would 
have been easy for Stermac and Segal’s participants to deliberately alter their responses. 
Controls, for instance, could have made sure their responses emphasised the harmful 
nature of sexual contact with children. Thus, the methodology may have allowed similar 
types of response biases that can occur using the questionnaire method of assessment 
described earlier. Of course, despite these limitations the study represented an important 
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attempt to study CSOs' beliefs using fresh methods, and the findings may indeed indicate 
that CSOs interpreted the vignettes in line with distorted belief structures.  
Despite Stermac and Segal’s (1989) promising start, cognitive-experimental 
studies of CSO cognition were not readily taken up by researchers. Fortunately, this trend 
now appears to be changing, as recent years have yielded a handful of new studies in 
which CSO information processing is explored. For instance, three sets of researchers 
have recently used an experimental method called the Implicit Association Test to test the 
hypothesis that CSOs hold particular ITs. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is a robust 
technique for measuring the strength of associations existing between concepts stored in 
long-term memory (see Greenwald, McGee, & Schwartz, 1998; Swanson, Rudman, & 
Greenwald, 2001). Put more simply, it measures how readily people associate words or 
images representing two contrasting concepts (e.g., young people and old people) with 
positive or negative meanings. Participants are presented with single words or images on a 
computer screen and asked to sort them into categories using a button press. One button is 
used to indicate two categories. For instance, a left button press might indicate a response 
meaning either slow or elderly, while a right button press might indicate quick or young. 
Thus, when the word crawl or an image of an elderly person appears on the computer 
screen, the left button should be pressed, and when the word sprint or an image of a young 
person appears the right button should be pressed. In a reversal of this task the left button 
is still associated with the word elderly, but it is also associated with the word quick, while 
the right button will now mean young and slow. The measure of interest within this 
example would be whether people are faster to categorise items when the words elderly 
and slow are associated with the same button, or when the words elderly and quick are 
associated. In all likelihood the former would occur, because when two concepts are 
highly associated in a participant’s mind, they find it easier to sort words when the two 
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associated concepts require the same response key than when they require different 
response keys.  
Mihailides, Devilly, and Ward (2004) compared the IAT responses of 25 CSOs 
with 25 nonsexual offenders, 25 male university students, and 25 female university 
students. Mihailides et al. reasoned that if CSOs held a Children as Sexual Beings IT, they 
would be faster to link the concept of children with sexual words than nonsexual words, 
relative to controls. Likewise, if CSOs held  Uncontrollable and Entitlement ITs they 
should be faster, relative to controls, to press buttons that link the concepts “losing 
control” and “mine” with sexual words than nonsexual words. It was found that compared 
to the three control groups, CSOs were significantly faster to link words congruent with 
the Children as Sexual Beings and Uncontrollable ITs than words incongruent with these 
theories. Compared to university controls CSOs were also faster to link Entitlement-
related and sexual concepts, although CSOs and offender controls could not be 
distinguished on the Entitlement IT. Mihailides et al. (2004) concluded that their results 
supported the hypothesis that CSOs hold ITs that influence their cognitive processing. 
Gray, Brown, MacCulloch, Smith, and Snowden (2005) reported similar findings 
for stimuli designed to tap concepts that can be said to represent the Children as Sexual 
Beings IT. Like Mihailides et al., Gray et al. used the IAT paradigm to explore the degree 
to which child concepts, relative to adult concepts, were associated with sex. The 
responses of 18 CSOs and 60 nonsexual offenders were compared. CSOs’ responses were 
slower when adult and sex words required use of the same response key than when child 
and sex word required the same response key. Nonsexual offenders demonstrated the 
opposite pattern.   
Finally, Nunes, Firestone, and Baldwin (2007) also used the IAT to investigate the 
hypotheses that CSOs conceptualise children as being more pleasant, less powerful, and 
more sexually attractive than controls. The first two concepts would appear to tap into the 
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Dangerous World IT, while the last concept taps the Children as Sexual Beings IT. 
Participants were 27 CSOs and 29 nonsexual offenders. As expected, the results indicated 
that CSO participants viewed children as more sexually attractive than adults. Strangely, 
however, nonsexual offenders did not differentiate between children and adults in terms of 
sexual attractiveness. Nunes et al. failed to comment on the unexpectedness of this 
finding, focussing instead on the fact that CSOs appeared to indicate a conception of 
children as being sexual agents. Also against predictions, the results indicated no 
differences between CSOs and nonsexual offenders regarding words that associated 
children with concepts of powerlessness or pleasantness.  
In general, the above results have been interpreted as indicating that the IAT 
method can be used to indirectly and successfully measure the content held in CSOs’ 
cognitive structures. Certainly, IAT techniques are an excellent tool for studying implicit 
cognition because they are relatively uncontaminated by dishonest or inaccurate 
responding (Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Greenwald et al., 2002; Greenwald & 
Farnham, 2000). However, the conclusions some authors have drawn from the above 
studies are problematic as they do not support the hypothesis that CSOs hold schemas or 
beliefs that set them apart from nonsexual offending individuals per se. The studies do not 
demonstrate, unequivocally, that CSOs process and misinterpret information in IT-
consistent ways; they simply show that CSOs hold stronger associations between certain 
concepts than others. CSOs may, for instance, hold stronger associations between children 
and sex concepts because they have discussed these associations more frequently 
throughout the conviction process or while interacting with prison psychologists. 
Similarly, semantic linkages between words pertaining to sex and losing control might be 
expected in men who are continuously confronted with the fact that a lack of self-control 
in relation to sexual matters has landed them in prison. Therefore, although IAT studies 
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may reflect differences in the cognitive structures held by CSOs, their findings should be 
interpreted with caution. 
In a piece of research that bears similarities to the above IAT studies, Kamphuis, 
De Ruiter, Jannsen and Spiering (2005) used a lexical decision task to see if semantic 
links existed between the concepts of sex and power in CSOs.  As will be explained in 
detail in Chapter Four, the lexical decision task is an implicit measure of cognition that 
uses individuals’ word processing speeds to analyse links between words and concepts 
held in long-term memory. The underlying rationale is that individuals make faster 
decisions about words when those words have been primed by prior presentation of a 
related word. Kamphuis et al. reasoned that if CSOs have strong links between sex words 
and power words, then presenting CSOs with words about sex should automatically prime 
words about power and thereby enable faster responses (compared to controls) to power 
words than other words, and vice versa.  Although beliefs that sex and power are linked 
are not explicitly identified by Ward and Keenan (1999) as a type of IT, one could argue 
that people who hold a Dangerous World IT are concerned with power and may interpret 
sexual encounters as being about power and control. Kamphuis et al. found that compared 
to violent offender controls, CSOs were faster to respond to power words that had been 
preceded by sex words. Compared to student controls CSOs were not faster to respond to 
power words that had been preceded by sex words, although in their conclusions the 
authors interpreted this marginal result (p = 0.51) as showing a significant difference. 
CSOs and student controls were also faster than violent offender controls to respond to sex 
words that had been preceded by power words. Thus this experiment provides some 
limited evidence that CSOs hold associations between the concepts of sex and power. 
However, as with the above IAT studies a potential semantic linkage between sex and 
power concepts among CSOs cannot be taken as evidence that CSOs hold offence-
supportive beliefs. 
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Another experimental study (Gannon, Wright, Beech & Williams, 2006) recently 
utilized Stermac and Segal’s (1989) idea of using written vignettes to investigate whether 
CSOs misinterpret social information. However, unlike Stermac and Segal, Gannon et al. 
did not ask participants to make judgments about what they had read, and instead asked 
participants to recall the material they had read. Gannon et al. reasoned that if CSOs hold 
offence-supportive beliefs they should interpret, and therefore recall, relevant material in a 
manner consistent with those beliefs. In the study 28 CSOs and 20 offender controls read a 
vignette describing a sexual offence against a child. Ten ambiguous statements that could 
be interpreted in an offence-supportive way were embedded within the vignette. That is, 
the statements could be interpreted in a manner consistent with belief content represented 
by four out of the five ITs identified by Ward (the Entitlement IT was not represented). 
For example, the child protagonist was described as putting her hand on the adult 
character’s thigh, an action that could be interpreted in line with beliefs regarding 
Children as Sexual Beings).  In a surprise recall task CSOs were asked to report what 
content they remembered from the vignette. Contrary to expectations, when each 
participant’s free recall of the vignette was analysed, CSOs showed no difference in recall 
compared to other offenders; all participants misremembered the vignette, but did so in a 
way that was not offence-supportive. The results seemed to indicate that the CSOs’ ITs 
were weak, absent, or inaccessible. Thus the findings did not align with Stermac and 
Segal’s (1989) results, where CSOs apparently interpreted descriptions of adult-child 
sexual contact in offence-supportive ways. Gannon et al. used a more indirect measure of 
information processing (i.e., recall) than that used by Stermac and Segal (i.e., self-report). 
Therefore, Gannon et al.’s findings may indicate that participant responses in Stermac and 
Segal’s study were influenced by other factors, such as participants’ perceptions of what 
they ought to say. On the other hand, it is possible that offenders in Gannon et al.’s study 
censured their recollections so as to appear less distorted. However, the fact that few 
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participants could articulate task aims in a follow-up questionnaire suggests that socially 
desirable responding was not an issue. In summary, the findings from Gannon et al.’s 
study are intriguing and certainly highlight the need for further controlled, empirical 
research into the nature of CSOs’ beliefs. It is this research gap that will be addressed in 
this thesis. 
What’s in a Measure? 
Throughout the past chapter three methods for measuring CSOs’ offence-
supportive beliefs have been reviewed. Two of these methods—conventional 
questionnaire and interview methods—try to measure beliefs by exploring the cognitive 
distortions that CSOs utter or endorse. Interview methods reliably find evidence of CSOs’ 
cognitive distortions, and questionnaire methods frequently find that CSOs disagree with 
cognitive distortions less strongly than comparison groups do. Unfortunately, however, 
while measurement of these cognitive products may reveal the content of underlying 
beliefs, they may also reveal a range of other cognitive, affective, and contextually-driven 
phenomena.  
Less-utilised is the cognitive-experimental method, wherein CSOs' cognitive 
processes are measured and compared to those of control groups. When designed well, 
experiments of this sort can bypass many of the conceptual issues and response biases 
associated with conventional methods of CSO belief measurement. Of the handful of 
cognitive experiments conducted with CSOs there has been mixed results. One study 
(Stermac & Segal, 1989) found CSOs responded in a seemingly more distorted manner 
than controls. However, because this experiment minimised the opportunity for 
information processing errors to occur, and because it ultimately relied on participant self-
reports, it is unclear what conclusions can be drawn from it. Three other studies have used 
the IAT method to investigate whether CSOs hold stronger associations between concepts 
that are thought to be linked within particular ITs. While these studies (along with a 
    
60 
lexical decision task study) have found that CSOs have stronger semantic links than 
controls between particular concepts they do not actually demonstrate that CSOs process 
and misinterpret information in IT-consistent ways. Finally, a study by Gannon et al. 
(2006) used a recall experiment to explore whether CSOs process offence-relevant 
descriptions in a distorted way. No differences were found in the recollections of CSOs 
compared to controls. Although there is again some chance that CSOs in Gannon et al.’s 
study censured their responses, this final study raises questions about whether CSOs really 
do typically have belief structures that lead them to misinterpret important aspects of their 
social worlds. 
In short, interviews consistently find that CSOs utter distorted statements that are 
often interpreted as reflecting faulty beliefs. Questionnaires are often able to differentiate 
between CSOs and others, which has also been interpreted as a sign that CSOs hold faulty 
beliefs. A handful of cognitive experiments have produced evidence that CSOs hold 
stronger associations between certain concepts, and one experiment has suggested that 
CSOs do not in fact hold beliefs that lead them to misinterpret information. If these three 
different method types all measure the prevalence and nature of CSOs' offence-supportive 
beliefs, one would expect their findings to be more consistent with each other. That is, 
interviews, questionnaires and cognitive experiments should show some agreement over 
the frequency with which offence-supportive beliefs occur among CSOs and the types of 
beliefs that individual CSOs are shown to endorse on each measure should roughly align.  
So to what extent do interview, questionnaire and experimental measures of 
offence-supportive beliefs show agreement regarding the frequency and nature of CSO 
beliefs? Amazingly, this question is unanswerable, because of the fact that it has gone 
virtually unexplored. In fact, a review of the literature suggests that only one published 
study has even approached the topic of multimethod comparison. Neidigh and Krop 
(1992) gave the question some notice by counting the number of cognitive distortions that 
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CSOs endorsed in an interview and comparing that with the number of items they 
endorsed on a questionnaire (i.e., the ABCS). They found that, on average, twice as many 
cognitive distortions were counted per CSO using the interview technique. As Neidigh and 
Krop stated, this frequency difference suggests that interviews and questionnaires might 
not be measuring the same phenomena. As noted earlier, interviews might elicit more 
distortions because the underlying phenomena being revealed (i.e., distorted statements) 
are social desirability processes, rather than beliefs. On the other hand both measures 
might be eliciting beliefs, but in interviews they are more evident because, for instance, 
CSOs’ belief structures are maximally activated, or because CSOs underreport agreement 
with questionnaire items. To shed light on this issue it would have been helpful if Neidigh 
and Krop had also noted whether there was agreement about the types of distortions that 
CSOs endorsed across the two measures. This may have given some clue as to whether 
both measures were in fact tapping similar belief content. Unfortunately this information 
was not provided by Neidigh and Krop.  
As far as agreement between cognitive-experimental and conventional measures of 
CSO belief is concerned, no comparisons appear to be available. Looking at more general 
areas of enquiry, Fazio and Olson (2003) have noted that when measuring socially 
undesirable constructs, low correlations are often found between implicit (e.g., cognitive-
experimental) methods and explicit (e.g., interview and questionnaire) methods. Fazio and 
Olson explain that this might be because people can more readily fake good on explicit 
self-report measures. Again, reviewing the types of beliefs that CSOs appear to endorse on 
implicit versus explicit measures might give some indication of whether the differing 
methods overlap to some extent in the types of constructs that they measure. If implicit 
and explicit methods both measure the content of belief structures then it should be 
expected that at least some agreement will emerge across implicit and explicit measures in 
terms of the types of beliefs each CSO endorses. In other words, when CSOs do appear to 
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endorse beliefs in interview, questionnaire and experimental measures, even if the level of 
belief endorsement differs, the types of beliefs that they endorse should show some 
agreement. In the final study reported in this thesis the need for research utilising 
multimethod assessment of CSOs’ beliefs will at last be addressed. 
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Research Agenda 
A primary aim of this research is to use implicit measures of cognition to better 
understand the belief structures of CSOs and explore how they relate to cognitive 
distortions. The previous chapters have outlined issues and controversies surrounding the 
measurement of CSOs’ offence-supportive beliefs. In short, current measures have made it 
difficult to tell whether CSOs do in fact hold beliefs that lead them to endorse offence-
relevant statements and process information in offence-relevant ways. This thesis will 
attempt to extend the literature through the use of controlled experimental techniques 
adapted from the field of cognitive science. The techniques used will curtail participants’ 
ability to censure their responses. In addition, participants will not be required to perform 
the difficult (or even impossible) task of introspectively and retrospectively reflecting on 
cognitive structures and processes active at the time of their offending. As a way of 
shedding further light on the phenomena being measured by implicit and self-report 
measures of CSOs’ beliefs, this research will also investigate whether correlations can be 
found between interview, questionnaire and experimental measures. 
The first study, reported in Chapter Four, describes the unique use of an adapted 
version of a lexical decision task. Lexical decision tasks have previously been used to 
study belief content in individuals by measuring their response times to particular words. 
In Study One the lexical decision task is used to seek support for the hypothesis that CSOs 
hold beliefs containing IT-consistent themes which set them apart from offender and 
community-based controls. 
In Chapter Five a second study is described in which a memory-based task 
previously used to study information processing in violent men is applied to the study of 
CSOs’ belief structures. CSOs and offender controls are compared in their recall for 
ambiguous information tapping the Children as Sexual Beings IT. This study will also 
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make use of visual primes, which will be presented in an attempt to activate offence-
supportive beliefs. 
Finally, Study Three in Chapter Six takes an in-depth exploration of the types of 
beliefs that CSOs are classified as holding according to three measurement methods. 
CSOs and offender controls are interviewed and their offence explanations coded for the 
presence of IT-congruent themes. Next, both CSOs and offender controls complete a 
different type of cognitive experiment that has been used in other fields to study beliefs 
and schemas, and their responses are compared. CSOs’ and offender controls’ answers on 
a questionnaire measure of offence-supportive beliefs are also compared. The types of 
beliefs that CSOs endorse according to each of these measures are investigated and an 
analysis of the level of agreement between the measures is conducted. 
A general note on the recruitment of participants 
The three methods used to investigate CSOs’ belief structure in this thesis were 
implemented within the space of two years across three prisons. Therefore, there was 
overlap between participants, with some offender participants taking part in two or three 
of the following studies. Rates of overlap are discussed within Chapters Five and Six. 
In all three studies offender participants were not recompensed in any way for their 
participation, although chocolate biscuits were offered for consumption during each 
research session. In Study One (the only study that used community-based controls) a $20 
music voucher was given to community participants. 
A general note on written material provided to participants 
 Across the three studies conducted in this thesis a large number of documents were 
distributed to participants. In each study recruitment sheets, information sheets, consent 
forms, debriefing sheets, and feedback forms were distributed, and sometimes these 
documents contained variations according to the participant group for which they were 
written (e.g., community-based controls and offenders received different recruitment 
    
65 
flyers that reflected their different circumstances). To conserve space not all of these 
documents have been included in the Appendices. Instead, one example of each type of 
participant document can be found in Appendices Eleven to Fifteen. 
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Chapter Four  
An Experimental Study of Offence-Supportive Beliefs: The Lexical 
Decision Task 
Introduction 
The previous chapter described the existing over-reliance on self-report methods to 
explore CSOs’ offence supportive beliefs. There is a clear gap in the research literature 
that calls for the use of controlled, experimental studies to investigate CSOs’ belief 
structures. This chapter will introduce the lexical decision task, a technique that allows for 
the indirect measurement of cognitive structures and their contents.  
Study One: The Lexical Decision Task 
As mentioned in the preceding pages, cognitive structures can aid cognitive 
processing. For instance, when cognitive structures such as beliefs and schemas are active 
they enable faster processing of information related to the contents of those structures and 
can enhance recall of relevant information (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Rudman, 
Greenwald, Mellot, & Schwartz, 1999). Conversely, information will take longer to 
process if it is incongruent with an active schema or belief. The lexical decision task is an 
experimental paradigm that exploits the fact that cognitive structures can facilitate or 
inhibit information processing, in order to gain glimpses of the nature and content of 
people’s underlying cognitions.  
The lexical decision task (LDT) was first performed by Meyer and Schvaneveldt 
(1971), who asked participants to indicate whether two simultaneously presented words 
were real words or nonwords. Results showed that participants were faster to respond 
when the words were semantically related, (e.g., bread and butter) than when they were 
unrelated (e.g., doctor and butter). While differing versions of the LDT have since been 
performed, the overarching results are the same: people are quicker to identify words that 
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follow contextual primes (i.e., a related word or concept) than words that have followed 
non-related primes (Neely, 1991). For example, when a participant sees the sentence stem 
John ate the… they will be faster to recognise the target word food than the word foot 
(Forster, 1981). Research has indicated that this so-called “sentence context effect” occurs 
only if the target word is the expected completion of the sentence stem (Fishler & Bloom, 
1979).  In other words, participants will respond faster to the target word only if they 
cognise that it is a likely ending to the sentence. This finding makes sense in light of the 
fact that readers use the content of their individual cognitive structures to anticipate text 
content (Duffy, 1986; Fincher-Kiefer, 1992; Fitzgerald, 1995) and to spend less time 
processing the ends of sentences (Sharkey & Sharkey, 1987). 
Researchers have successfully used these findings as a means for exploring the 
content of people’s beliefs (e.g., Baldwin, Fehr, Keedian, Seidel, & Thomson, 1993; Kay 
& Jost, 2003; Mikulincer, 1998; Mikulincer, Birnbaum, Woddis, & Nachmias, 2000). For 
instance, Baldwin et al. used a version of the lexical decision task to explore the beliefs 
that people with different attachment styles have about others. Baldwin et al. compared the 
way that groups of individuals with different attachment styles processed sentences that 
presented alternative interpersonal outcomes. After identifying each participant as either 
secure, avoidant, or anxious-ambivalent, the authors asked participants to read context 
sentences followed by target words that were designed to reveal their interpersonal 
expectations. For example, the context sentence if I try to get close to my partner then my 
partner will…might be followed by the positive outcome word accept or the negative 
outcome word reject. Each context sentence was briefly presented on a computer screen to 
participants, and was immediately followed by either a negative outcome word, a positive 
outcome word, or a nonword. Participants were simply instructed to indicate (by pressing 
a button) whether each outcome word they viewed was a real or a made-up word. Of 
interest was the time participants took to make each decision. Baldwin et al. reasoned that 
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securely-attached participants would hold positive expectations about their partners in 
terms of three domains (trust, closeness and dependency). Therefore, beliefs about the 
trustworthiness, closeness, and dependability of partners (which ought to have been 
activated by context sentences) should have lead securely attached participants to respond 
more quickly to positive outcome words within the three domains. Conversely, insecurely-
attached participants should have held negative expectations about their partners and 
therefore should have been faster to respond to negative outcome words. This pattern of 
result is exactly what was found.  
In 1998 Mikulincer replicated Baldwin et al’s (1993) result after using a lexical 
decision task to compare people with different attachment styles in terms of their beliefs 
about how others are likely to react to anger. In another study, Kay and Jost (2003) 
investigated whether “just world beliefs” (i.e., beliefs that the world is fair and people get 
what they deserve) can influence the speed of individuals’ lexical decisions about justice-
related words. The authors found that when they threatened (and thereby activated) 
individuals’ just world beliefs, those individuals were faster to respond to justice-related 
words than neutral words, and were faster than control participants (whose beliefs hadn’t 
been activated) to respond to justice-related words. 
The current study adopts Baldwin et al.’s approach in order to investigate the 
beliefs of CSOs, offender controls, and community-based controls. Participants are 
presented with a series of context sentences that relate to Ward and Keenan’s (1999) five 
ITs described in Chapter Two. Each context sentence is followed by a letter string that 
participants quickly identify as a word or a nonword. Target words are either IT-consistent 
(i.e., complete sentences in a way consistent with IT-based propositions), or IT-
inconsistent (i.e., do not complete sentences in a way consistent with IT-based 
propositions). It is hypothesised that CSOs will interpret context sentences in a manner 
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consistent with offence-supportive schemas and thus, relative to controls, will be quicker 
to respond to IT-consistent than IT-inconsistent words. 
METHOD 
Participants 
One hundred men took part in this study: 32 CSOs, 37 offender controls, and 31 
community-based controls. CSOs and offender controls were recruited from three New 
Zealand Department of Corrections prisons based in the lower North Island. All offenders 
were recruited by unit managers, who distributed a recruitment flyer to prisoners inviting 
them to put take part in a “word decision” study. Because the current author did not 
directly distribute fliers to prisoners it is unclear what proportion of prisoners who were 
asked to take part in the study agreed to participate.  
Community controls were recruited by emailing recruitment flyers to staff at the 
Wellington Branches of The Samaritans and Youthline (two local volunteer helpline 
organisations) and to a group of approximately 40 staff members within a large New 
Zealand financial institution. Recruitments flyers for all participants stated that 
participants should be able to read reasonably well (i.e., they should be able to read the 
recruitment flyer with ease and have had the necessary skills to pass a year-10 secondary 
school English paper such as New Zealand Fifth Form Certificate English or its 
equivalent). A total of 115 men completed the experiment (41 child sexual offenders, 43 
offender controls, and 31 community controls). However, nine CSOs and six offender 
controls were dropped from the study because on the lexical decision task they made more 
than six errors out of 45 trials; an error rate of 13%. It should be noted that previous LDT 
studies that have used the design on which this study is based have not addressed the issue 
of how an appropriate cutoff rate is best determined. For instance, Baldwin et al. (1993) 
removed (without explanation) two participants who had 26% and 36% error rates, while 
Mikulincer (1998) and Mikulincer et al. (2000) simply mention that across all participant 
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between 2.3% and 4.8% of responses were errors. Surprisingly, Kay and Jost (2003) do 
not address the issue of error rates at all. Thus, it appears that there is no agreed-upon 
method for determining error rate cutoffs. In the current study the rate was determined by 
selecting participants whose error rates placed them as outliers compared to all other 
participants combined. Selection criteria and demographic details for each participant 
group follows. Only details for those men included in the study are reported. 
Group selection criteria and demographic details 
CSOs  
CSOs were men who at the time of testing were incarcerated for sexually abusing a 
person under the age of 16. CSOs were aged from 21 to 77 years (M = 48.47, SD = 15.07) 
and their victims’ ages ranged from 2 to 15 years (M = 10.13, SD = 3.51). Although an 
initial aim was to recruit only untreated, extrafamilial CSOs, the inclusion criteria had to 
be relaxed slightly to meet sample size requirements. According to current and historic 
conviction records, 20 CSOs were extrafamilial offenders (i.e., CSOs who had molested at 
least one child who was not a family member), while 12 CSOs were intrafamilial 
offenders (i.e., CSO who had molested only biological or non-biological family members). 
Three of the extrafamilial and none of the intrafamilial offenders had received cognitive-
behavioural therapy to reconstruct distorted offence-related cognitions. The three treated 
CSOs had all committed at least one sexual assault against a child since receiving therapy. 
The mean Static-99 score for all CSO participants indicated a medium recidivism risk 
level (M = 3.06, SD = 2.38), as defined by Phenix, Hanson, and Thornton (2000). The 
number of years that CSOs had spent in formal education ranged from nine to 11 years (M 
= 10.03, SD = 0.59). Five CSOs identified themselves as Māori, 21 as European, and six 
as “other”. Fourteen CSOs had committed a violent offence at some stage in their 
offending history, with ten of these having committed two or more violent offences.  
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Offender controls (OCs) 
OCs were men who were serving a prison sentence for one or more offences, but 
who had never been convicted of a sexual offence against a person under the age of 16. Of 
the OCs, four men had a conviction for a sexual offence against a person over 16 listed in 
their conviction history. OCs were aged from 18 to 69 years (M = 33.68, SD = 10.82). The 
number of years that OC participants had spent in formal education ranged from nine to 11 
years (M = 9.60, SD = 0.64). Eighteen OCs identified themselves as Māori, 16 as 
European, and three as “other”. Twenty-eight OCs had a violent offence recorded in their 
conviction histories (index offences included), with 26 of these having committed two or 
more violent offences. 
Community controls (CCs)  
Community controls were males living in Wellington, NZ, who had never served a 
prison sentence or been convicted for a sexual offence. CCs were aged from 21 to 59 years 
(M = 37.42, SD = 11.11). The number of years that CCs had spent in formal education 
ranged from nine to 11 years (M = 10.03, SD = 0.59). Four CCs identified themselves as 
Māori, 22 as European, and 5 as “other”.  
 Characteristics of the participant groups are displayed in Table 4.1. The groups 
differed significantly on age, F(2, 97) = 12.85, p <.001, with CSOs having a higher mean 
age than OCs (M = 48.47, SD = 15.07 versus M = 33.68, SD = 10.82). CCs (M = 37.42, 
SD = 11.11) did not differ in age from either offender group. The groups also differed 
significantly on number of years spent in formal education, F(2, 97)  = 6.20, p = .003, with 
CSOs (M = 10.03, SD = 0.59) and CCs (M = 10.03, SD = 0.55) having spent more years in 
formal education than OCs (M = 9.59, SD = 0.64). A chi-square test of association also 
confirmed that between-group differences in ethnicity existed, χ2 (4, N = 100) = 14.32, p 
= .006, Cramer’s V = .268, with OCs having a significant difference in ethnic mix 
compared to CSOs, χ2 (2, N = 69) = 8.71, p = .013, Cramer’s V = .355 and CCs, χ2 (2, N 
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= 68) = 9.90, p = .007, Cramer’s V = .382. Significant differences also existed in total 
number of violent convictions recorded in CSOs’ and OCs’ prison records, t(67) = 3.08, p 
= .003, with OCs (M = 4.08, SD = 4.03) having significantly more mean violent 
convictions per participant than CSOs (M = 1.53, SD = 0.45).  
 
Table 4.1 




C h ild  S e x O ffe n d e r C o m m u n ity
O ffe n d e rs C o n tro ls C o n tro ls
n  =  3 2 n  =  3 7 n  =  3 1
A g e  (y e a rs )
M e a n 4 8 .4 7 3 3 .6 8 3 7 .4 2 * * *
S D 1 5 .0 7 1 0 .8 2 1 1 .1 1
Y e a rs  in  e d u c a tio n
M e a n 1 0 .0 3 9 .5 9 1 0 .0 3 * *
S D 0 .5 9 0 .6 4 0 .5 5
E th n ic ity  (n )
M a o r i 5 1 8 4 * *
E u ro p e a n 2 1 1 6 2 2 * *
O th e r 6 3 5 * *
V io le n t  C o n v ic tio n s  (n )
M e a n 1 .5 3 4 .0 8 * * -
S D 2 .5 5 4 .0 3 -
C S O  ty p e  (n )
In tra fa m ilia l 1 2 .0 0 - -
E x tra fa m ilia l 2 0 - -
C h ild  v ic i tm s  (n )
M e a n 3 .4 1 - -
S D 3 .1 5 - -
V ic tim  a g e  (y e a r s )
M e a n 1 0 .1 3 - -
S D 3 .5 1 - -
S T A T IC -9 9  S c o re
M e a n 3 .0 6 - -
S D 2 .3 8 - -
*  =  p < .0 5 ; * *  =  p < .0 1 ; * * *  =  p < .0 0 1
 






Victoria University of Wellington and New Zealand Department of Corrections 
approved all procedures and materials used in this study. Before testing, participants read 
an information sheet outlining the details of the study and their participant rights (which 
accorded with NZPS Code of Ethics). The information sheet warned participants that 
during the experiment written material would be presented that referred to criminal 
activity, and some of this material would “link children and sex”. Participants were told 
that they would need to provide some background information about themselves, and 
offender participants were told that an experimenter would check their prison records after 
testing was complete. All participants signed a consent form before taking part in the 
experiment. They were also given the opportunity to request a combined debriefing and 
results summary sheet once results had been collated.  
Design 
The experimental design was based on the LDT method used by Baldwin et al. 
(1993). A computer task was set up so that participants were presented with 45 incomplete 
sentences (word stems), each of which was followed by a word or a nonword. Each word 
stem related to one of the five belief clusters on which Ward and Keenan’s (1999) ITs are 
based. Thirty words and 15 nonwords followed the 45 word stems. Fifteen of the thirty 
words completed the sentence in a way that was offence-supportive (i.e., consistent with 
IT-related beliefs), while the other fifteen words completed the sentence in a non-offence 
supportive manner (i.e., inconsistent with IT-related beliefs). 
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Materials 
It was possible that reading speed differences between participants might have a 
confounding effect on LDT responses. Therefore, before the experiment commenced 
participants completed a reading speed task that would allow adjustment of LDT 
responses according to individual differences. Ten simple-structure sentences and ten 
complex-structure sentences (rated on structure complexity by Fischler & Bloom, 1979) 
were presented to participants via the Superlab programme (see Appendix One). 
Participants were asked to press any button on the response pad to indicate that they had 
finished reading each sentence.   
 Forty-five incomplete word stems were created, and to each word stem three letter 
strings (one offence-supportive completion word, one non offence-supportive completion 
word, and one nonword) were assigned. Nonwords were generated by taking common 
verbs (e.g., dribble, dance) and changing one letter (e.g., kribble, wance). Nonwords were 
matched for number of characters with real words. An ANOVA confirmed that target 
word length did not differ significantly across completion word type (offence-supportive, 
non offence-supportive, and nonword), F(2, 132)  = 0.18, p = .837. A t-test confirmed that 
offence-supportive and non offence-supportive target words did not differ according to 
ranked frequency of use in New Zealand English, t(88) = -1.19, p = .236.  
Below is an example word stem and three letter strings that were assigned to it (for 
a full list of word stems and letter strings used in this experiment refer to Appendix Two):  
Word Stem                                 Letter String 
Having sex with children won’t do them any  HARM   (Offence-supportive) 
       GOOD    (Non Offence-supportive) 
                  KNID        (Nonword) 
Three versions of the LDT were created and 45 of 135 possible word stem/letter 
string combinations were assigned to each version (15 Offence-supportive, 15 Non 
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Offence-supportive, 15 nonwords). Participants were randomly assigned to Versions One, 
Two, or Three of the LDT2. Within each LDT version, the five IT categories identified by 
Ward and Keenan (1998) were represented evenly among the 45 sentences that were 
presented (i.e. nine sentences representing each IT were shown). No participant saw the 
same word stem or letter string twice.  
Apparatus 
The reading task and LDT were programmed using a Superlab package. The 
program was run on a 12 inch colour monitor screen, resolution = 1024 x 768 pixels from 
a Dell Pentium Latitude D600 laptop computer. Written instructions and stimuli were 
centred on a white screen in bold black Times New Roman text (font size 40). Participants 
made their responses on a Cedrus Model RB-730 response pad that held seven response 
keys. The two endmost keys had a coloured covering (one yellow and one green) while the 
keys in between were white. Two labels (reading “made-up word” and “real word”) were 
placed on the response pad above the two coloured keys; placement of labels was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
The Superlab program controlled the random presentation of 20 sentences in the 
reading task and recorded (in milliseconds) the time that elapsed between each button 
press the participant made to view a new sentence. The programme also controlled the 
random presentation of word stems and letter strings in the LDT, and recorded the 
response time (RT) and type of response (correct / incorrect) made. Each word stem was 
presented to participants individually for 3000 ms3. Immediately following presentation of 
each incomplete sentence, a letter string (i.e., a word or a non word) appeared on the 
                                               
2
 ANOVAs confirmed that participant groups in the three LDT versions did not significantly differ in terms of age, 
years of education, and reaction times to offence-supportive words, nonoffence-supportive words or nonwords. A Chi-
square test found no differences in ethnicity. 
 
3
 Incomplete sentence presentation duration was based on feedback from five independent community-based raters. On 
completion of the experiment all participants were asked to rate sentence presentation on a 5-point Likert Scale ranging 
from 0 (Much too quickly) to 4 (Much too slowly). Mean rating was 2.11, indicating that, on average, participants felt 
incomplete sentences were presented “at the right speed”.  
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screen for 2000ms. To encourage rapid responding, the computer emitted a loud whistling 
sound if a participant did not register their response to the letter string within 2000ms. 
Procedure 
 Participants were tested individually, in a single session. Each testing session took 
approximately 30 minutes per participant. After giving written consent, all participants 
were asked to give some basic demographic information about themselves such as age, 
ethnicity, and years of formal education. Offender participants were asked about the nature 
and number of their crimes. CSOs were also asked to provide details of their sexual 
offences (e.g., age and number of victims, relationship to victims) and to answer other 
questions that would allow calculation of their Static-99 scores. Next, participants were 
verbally instructed on how to complete the reading test. They were told to read at a 
normal, comfortable reading speed, and to press any button on the response pad once they 
had read the full sentence. Unfortunately, despite instructions participants were often 
observed not paying attention during this reading task and many also attempted to talk 
during the task. Because these reading speed measures appeared to be an unreliable 
measure they were not used in the final analysis. 
Next, participants were given verbal instructions on how to complete the LDT and 
were taken through a practice phase. The experimenter watched as each participant 
completed the practice run. If any participant appeared to be struggling with the task the 
experimenter would take the participant’s place and have them watch as the experimenter 
completed the practice run. The participant would then complete the practice phase again.  
 Upon completion of a satisfactory practice run, participants were told to follow 
the same procedure during the experimental phase that they did during the practice phase, 
paying careful attention to each word stem. All participants were again warned that they 
would see material during the task that they may find distasteful, but to try not to be 
distracted by this. It was stressed that their task was not to make a value judgment about 
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the appropriateness of completion words, but rather to simply indicate whether they were 
viewing a word or nonword. When they were ready to start the experimental phase 
participants pressed any key on their response pad. To make participants feel comfortable 
during the task, the experimenter stayed in the room but faced away from the computer 
screen and read some papers until the participant indicated that they had finished.  
RESULTS 
Results were analysed to see whether they confirmed the hypothesis that CSOs 
alone would respond in a way that indicated they held schemas containing offence-
supportive content. CSOs’, OCs’, and CCs’ reaction times were compared to see whether 
CSOs were faster to identify words that completed sentences in an IT-consistent way (i.e., 
offence-supportive words) than words that did not complete sentences in an IT-consistent 
way (i.e., nonoffence-supportive words). 
To investigate, each participant’s reaction times (RTs) in milliseconds (ms) were 
summed and averaged to produce mean reaction times within 12 variables. The 12 
variables were: All offence-supportive word RTs; All nonoffence-supportive word RTs; 
Offence-supportive word RTs for each of the five individual IT categories; Non offence-
supportive word RTs for each of the five individual IT categories.  
To measure each participant’s basic speed of responding, mean reaction times to 
the 15 nonwords were also calculated. Because nonwords are devoid of semantic meaning 
they could not be primed by sentence stem content; mean nonword RTs therefore served 
as a covariate measure of participant cognitive processing and motor response speed. It 
should be noted here that although age and years of formal education significantly 
differentiated the groups (see Method), neither of these factors were significant covariates 
and so are not reported in the following analyses.  
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Data preparation 
Only RTs from correct responses were analysed4. RT data generally contains 
outlying data points that represent factors unrelated to the hypotheses (e.g., attentional 
lapses and unintentional motor responses). Thus, it is important to separate these outliers 
from data that reflect reactions arising from the cognitive mechanisms under investigation 
(Ratcliffe, 1993). In accordance with previous research (e.g., Cumming, Graham & 
Patterson, 2006; Holden, Kroner, Fekken, & Popham, 1992; Ratcliffe, 1993; Welford, 
1980), measures were taken to adjust for such outliers. Mean RTs to nonwords and to each 
of the 12 variables described above were Windsorised (Barnett & Lewis, 1978). That is, 
extremely high RT scores (i.e., RTs more than two standard deviations above the group 
mean) were assigned the next lowest RT for that group and especially slow RT scores (i.e., 
RTs more than two standard deviations below the group mean) were assigned the next 
highest RT for that group. This adjustment ensured that all RTs were included in the data 
set while mitigating for the impact of potentially spurious responses. 
Table 4.2 lists the three participant groups’ mean Windsorised reaction times to the 
nonwords and the 12 variables listed above. 
                                               
4
 99% of all responses were correct. 
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Table 4.2. 
Participant groups’ mean reaction times (in milliseconds) to LDT words and nonwords 
 CSO OC CC 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
All Nonwords 1025.18 154.54 1040.24 167.88 824.14 150.76 
Offence-
Supportive 
      
All ITs combined 962.92 187.68 942.51 164.05 773.46 148.62 
Children as 
sexual beings 
990.92 192.00 958.48 189.26 823.54 174.99 
Dangerous world 871.54 161.92 871.99 155.45 725.45 141.25 
Entitlement 956.69 233.41 909.92 203.58 757.18 197.11 
Nature of harm 1014.50 295.97 941.62 193.69 757.34 167.13 
Uncontrollability 956.93 215.38 1014.80 255.98 794.30 165.78 
Non Offence-
Supportive 
      
All ITs combined 929.13 173.68 872.52 110.52 778.50 133.88 
Children as 
sexual beings 
938.41 210.17 920.59 149.61 752.25 138.64 
Dangerous world 857.55 206.38 788.27 146.75 727.65 162.50 
Entitlement 946.51 174.12 887.26 150.11 806.59 150.55 
Nature of harm 930.47 213.23 860.67 156.13 803.20 167.59 
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Main analysis of response times 
To calculate each participant’s shift in reaction time between the two word types, 
mean RTs to all offence-supportive words were subtracted from mean RTs to all 
nonoffence-supportive words. This generated an overall mean difference in RTs, with 
positive scores indicating faster responding to offence-supportive content relative to non-
offence supportive content (i.e., responses are offence-supportive). Negative scores, on the 
other hand indicate faster responding to non offence-supportive content relative to offence 
supportive content (i.e., responses are non offence-supportive). 
To investigate the effects of group (CSO, OC, CC) and word type (offence-
supportive, nonoffence-supportive) on reaction time, an ANCOVA was carried out with 
mean difference in RTs as the dependent variable and group as the fixed factor. That is, an 
ANCOVA was conducted that compared the groups on their responses to offence-
supportive words overall versus nonoffence-supportive words overall. Nonword RTs were 
identified as a significant covariate and were added to control for individual differences in 
generalised processing and response speeds. The results of the ANCOVA were surprising, 
as they demonstrated no significant interaction, F(2, 96) 2.08, p = .131, partial eta squared 
= .041. In other words, against predictions CSOs did not respond faster to offence-
supportive words relative to nonoffence-supportive words when compared to OCs and 
CCs (see Figure 4.1.). Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that no group (CSO, OC or CC) 
could be statistically differentiated from another. Interestingly, these results held 
regardless of CSO offence characteristics. In other words, when the ANCOVA was run 
with only intrafamilial CSOs’ responses or only extrafamilial CSOs’ responses included in 
the data, the above pattern of results was replicated. In addition, CSOs’ Static-99 scores 
were not found to correlate with their overall mean difference in RTs. To check that the 
above findings were unaffected by the fact that four OC participants had sexually offended 
against adults, the above ANCOVA was rerun with their data removed from the analysis. 
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Again, the pattern of results remained unchanged. Contrary to predictions, shifts in RTs to 
offence-supportive and nonoffence-supportive words ran in the nonoffence-supportive 
direction for CSOs (M = -25.80ms), as well as OCs (M = -59.87ms), and CCs (M = -
15.28ms). Hence, all three groups demonstrated a pattern of responding seeming to 
































Figure 4.1. Mean Differences (+/- SEM) in Offence-supportive and Nonoffence-
Supportive Reaction Times to All Implicit Theories 
 
While overall responses did not indicate that CSOs were interpreting information 
in an offence-supportive way, more detailed analysis might reveal that CSOs appear more 
distorted within certain IT categories. To investigate whether this was the case, a mean 
difference in offence-supportive and non offence-supportive RT responses for each of the 
following categories of items was generated: Children as Sexual Beings, Dangerous 
World, Entitlement, Nature of Harm, and Uncontrollable. 
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For each of these five ITs an ANCOVA was run to examine the effects of group 
(CSO, OC, CC) and word type (offence-supportive, nonoffence-supportive) on mean 
reaction time. For each ANCOVA, mean difference in RTs was the dependent variable, 
group was the fixed factor, and mean nonword RTs were the covariate (although the 
pattern of results for all analyses described below pertained when mean nonword RTs 
were not added as a covariate, with the uninterpretable exception that CCs obtained more 
positive scores than CSOs for Nature of Harm, and CSOs in turn obtained more positive 
scores than OCs). Because the analysis involved three t-tests, alpha was set at .01 to 
compensate for the associated inflation of type 1 error.  
The Children as Sexual Beings ANCOVA did not reveal a significant interaction 
between group, word type, and mean reaction time, F(2,96) 0.15, p = .862, partial eta 
squared = .003. Likewise, significant interactions were not found for Dangerous World, 
F(2,96) 2.08, p = .131, partial eta squared = .041, Entitlement, F(2,96) 0.08, p = .927, 
partial eta squared = .002, and Nature of Harm, F(2,96) 1.67, p = .194, partial eta squared 
= .034. However, the ANCOVA examining Uncontrollable did demonstrate a significant 
interaction, F(2, 96) 4.33, p = .016, partial eta squared = .083. Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
revealed that CSOs’ RT shift (M = 20.35ms) was significantly different (p = .005) to OCs’ 
(M = -122.90ms). Although CSOs’ RT shift was not significantly different (p = .552) from 
that of CCs (M = -14.75ms), it should be noted that CSOs demonstrated a positive shift in 
RTs, indicating an offence-supportive response pattern, while OCs and CCs demonstrated 
a negative (nonoffence-supportive) shift (see Figure 4.2.). Note that the standard error of 
the mean for Uncontrollable is larger than for all ITs combined. This pattern was found 
for each of the five ITs when they were considered in isolation and reflects the fact that a 
smaller sample size (i.e., number of scores) comprised mean RT differences within each 
IT than for all ITs combined. 


































Figure 4.2. Mean Differences (+/- SEM) in Offence-supportive and Nonoffence-
Supportive Reaction Times to Uncontrollable 
 
Because significant ethnic group differences existed between groups (i.e., Māori 
comprised 49% of the OC sample, compared to only 16% of the CSO and 13% of the CC 
samples), one-way ANOVAs were run to see whether all (CSO, OC, and CC) Māori 
participants responded differently to each of the ITs than all Europeans or all those in the 
“Other” ethnic category.  For each ANOVA, mean difference in RT was the dependent 
variable, and ethnicity (Māori, European, Other) was the fixed factor. The three ethnic 
groups did not significantly differ in their mean difference in RT for Children as Sexual 
Beings, F(2,97) 2.04, p = .136, partial eta squared = .040, Dangerous World, F(2,97) 2.99, 
p = .055, partial eta squared = .058, Entitlement, F(2,97) 0.76, p = .468, partial eta squared 
= .016, nor Nature of Harm, F(2,97) 0.58, p = .564, partial eta squared = .012. 
Interestingly, though, the ANOVA for Uncontrollable did demonstrate a significant 
interaction, F(2, 97) 4.13, p = .019, partial eta squared = .078. Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
revealed that for Uncontrollable the mean difference in RT among Māori (M = -115.75ms, 
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SD = 199.62) was significantly different (p = .015) to that among Others (M = 81.12ms, 
SD = 277.70). That is, Māori as a group appeared significantly less distorted than Others. 
Although Māori also appeared less distorted than Europeans (M = -40.06ms, SD = 193.74) 
on Uncontrollable, the difference was not significant (p = .364).  
To summarise, the overall hypothesis was not supported by the data. CSOs did not 
demonstrate an offence-supportive pattern of responding compared to OCs and CCs when 
RTs to all ITs were combined. This pattern of results also held for RTs to Children as 
Sexual Beings, Dangerous World, Entitlement, and Nature of Harm. However, when RTs 
to Uncontrollable were compared, CSOs’ RTs significantly differed from OCs’. That is, 
CSOs demonstrated offence-supportive responding for this IT, while OCs and CCs did 
not. Also, for Uncontrollable only, Māori participants showed a less distorted pattern of 
responding than participants in the “other” ethnic category. 
DISCUSSION 
 
It was predicted that CSOs would show a pattern of faster response times to IT-
consistent target words than IT-inconsistent words relative to OCs and CCs. In the main, 
this hypothesis was not supported. Overall, CSOs did not respond faster to offence-
supportive words than nonoffence-supportive words, and their response times to target 
words could not be differentiated statistically from the control groups’. For four out of the 
five IT categories (Children as Sexual Beings, Dangerous World, Entitlement, and Nature 
of Harm) this pattern of results held true. Interestingly, however, responses to the 
Uncontrollable IT revealed a pattern consistent with the proposed hypothesis. Here CSOs 
did respond faster to offence-supportive than nonoffence-supportive words, and their 
scores were significantly faster than OCs’.  
Taken together, the findings of this study suggest that CSO participants did not 
hold offence-supportive beliefs. The null results emerged despite the fact that the method 
adopted in this study has successfully been used by other researchers to uncover evidence 
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of different beliefs held within particular groups (e.g., Baldwin et al., 1993; Mikulincer, 
1998). While these findings run contrary to the widespread hypothesis that CSOs hold 
offence-supportive beliefs, they do support a recent empirical study (Gannon et al., 2006) 
in which no evidence could be found that CSOs were misinterpreting offence descriptions 
in line with offence-supportive beliefs.  
Questionnaire and interview studies frequently find evidence that CSOs endorse 
cognitive distortions. Rather than investigating cognitive distortions, in this and Gannon et 
al.’s study the aim was to observe the content of cognitive structures by studying 
participants’ information processing. It appears that, overall, in neither study did CSOs 
process information in a manner suggesting that they held offence-supportive beliefs. 
Therefore the lack of evidence that CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs found in this and 
Gannon’s study suggest that CSOs’ cognitive distortions may not be driven primarily by 
false beliefs. This in turn suggests that additional mechanisms might be at work; a finding 
consistent with recent proposals that social and self-protective phenomena (Maruna & 
Mann, 2006), or judgment processes (Ward, Keown, & Gannon, 2007) may play a role. Of 
course, the results of this and Gannon et al.’s study do not suggest that ITs or faulty core 
beliefs play no role in the generation of cognitive distortions. Rather, they indicate that 
faulty core beliefs underlie the cognitive distortions of only some CSOs. 
The findings cast an interesting light on the IAT studies carried out by Mihailides 
et al. (2004), Gray et al. (2005) and Nunes et al. (2007). In the Mihailides et al. study, 
associations were found between CSOs’ concept of sex and children, their concept of sex 
and uncontrollability, and, to a lesser degree, their concept of sex and entitlement. 
Likewise, Gray et al. and Nunes et al. found CSOs held associations between children and 
sex concepts. In each of these three studies the authors concluded that their results 
supported the idea that CSOs hold ITs that set them apart from others. In this study some 
evidence was found that the CSO sample held an Uncontrollable IT, but no evidence that 
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a Children as Sexual Beings IT was held. This latter finding underscores the earlier point 
that holding associated concepts may be a different cognitive phenomenon to holding 
distorted beliefs.  
Participants’ responses to Uncontrollable were intriguing, as CSOs’ mean scores 
significantly differed from OCs’, but not CCs’. The Uncontrollable IT generated the most 
extreme scores from the offender groups, with CSOs producing their only mean positive 
(or offence-supportive) score, and OCs producing their most negative (or nonoffence-
supportive) score. One could interpret the positive CSO response as supporting Ward’s 
theory (Ward & Keenan, 1999; Ward, 2000) that CSOs have beliefs that support 
propositions about one’s behaviour being Uncontrollable. These beliefs may have been 
held by CSO participants prior to their offending and may have played an important 
causative role. However, if such beliefs do in fact have an aetiological role in child sexual 
offending this implies that the beliefs distinguish CSOs from general members of the 
population. Yet this is not what was found; CSOs’ responses to Uncontrollable did not 
significantly differ from CCs’. This calls into question any interpretation of the current 
results as evidence that CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs regarding uncontrollability.  
The significant difference between CSOs’ and OCs’ responses might also be 
construed as evidence that CSOs hold an Uncontrollable IT. Yet this interpretation is 
again problematic, because the difference between the two offender groups is partly 
attributable to OCs having such a strong negative response to the Uncontrollable IT. 
Exactly why OCs’ responses were so negative for this IT is unclear. Perhaps it relates to 
the fact that the OC sample was predominantly comprised of men convicted of violent acts 
(76% of OCs had committed at least one violent offence). At some stage in their history of 
incarceration a number of these men may have received anger management therapy that 
involved modification of beliefs pertaining to Uncontrollable. Unfortunately, the 
treatment experiences of offender controls were not recorded, so it is difficult to ascertain 
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what effect, if any, exposure to treatment may have had on offender controls’ 
Uncontrollable responses.  
Another explanation exists for the difference between OCs’ and CSOs’ 
Uncontrollable responses. Coping with the demands of a prison environment (where self 
protection is important and sexual activity is tightly constrained) may have had different 
effects on the belief systems of OCs and CSOs. OC participants’ belief in their ability to 
look after themselves and control their sexual urges might have been reinforced under 
such conditions. In contrast, the CSO sample might have had prison experiences that 
limited their opportunities to develop these beliefs (e.g., receiving constant threats from 
other prisoners may have led to a sense of vulnerability and reflecting on the nature of 
their crimes may have prevented formation of beliefs that sexual impulses can be 
controlled).  
Yet another possibility is that the significant difference between OCs’ and CSOs’ 
Uncontrollable responses is linked to cultural differences. With Māori comprising 49% of 
the OC sample, compared to 16% of the CSO and 14% of the CC samples, the difference 
in Uncontrollable scores might be attributable to Māori participants holding beliefs that 
oppose Uncontrollable. This suggestion is somewhat supported by the fact that for 
Uncontrollable Māori were less distorted (although not significantly so) than European 
New Zealanders and significantly less distorted than other non-European New Zealanders. 
Unfortunately, consideration of the cultural factors that might lead Māori to hold beliefs 
that oppose the Uncontrollable IT lies outside the remit of this thesis. However, 
consultation with Māori cultural advisors has uncovered the suggestion that for Māori 
men, among whom rates of offending are proportionately high (McFarlane-Nathan, 1999), 
offending may be associated with a sense of gaining control over adverse life conditions. 
Thus Māori prisoners may have a strong sense that they do guide their own destinies and 
have high self control. The possibility that Māori differ in some of the beliefs captured 
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within Ward and Keenan’s (1999) IT theory is an avenue worth exploring in future 
studies. Further experimental research is also needed to clarify whether the difference in 
cognitions regarding Uncontrollable between CSOs and other offenders is a widespread 
phenomenon.  
A potential limitation in this study is that some participants may have deduced task 
aims and deliberately responded to some words slower than others.  However, it seems 
unlikely that participants surmised that responding slower to offence-supportive words 
would make them look less distorted. In fact, verbal feedback from participants on 
completion of the task indicated general confusion about the aim of the experiment, with 
some participants expressing doubt that it could tell the experimenter anything useful at 
all. Furthermore, having a mere 2000ms in which to respond would have made it very 
difficult for participants to decide whether or not they were viewing a real word and 
decide whether or not to deliberately stall each response. Nevertheless, some individuals 
did get removed from this study because they made too many errors or nonresponses, and 
a disproportionate number of these were CSOs. Perhaps the excluded participants made 
mistakes because they were distracted by concerns about what the experiment might 
reveal regarding their cognitions, and this could have biased overall group results. 
Unfortunately there is no simple way of confirming or denying this possibility. 
This study could have been improved by asking all participants to complete a 
cognitive distortion questionnaire so that their responses could be compared with their 
LDT scores. Showing conclusively that CSO participants had higher levels of 
endorsement than control groups on cognitive distortion items would have strengthened 
the claim that cognitive distortion endorsements do not necessarily reflect faulty beliefs. 
On the other hand, as noted in the introduction to this thesis, interview studies almost 
invariably find that CSOs utter cognitive distortions, and questionnaires typically find that 
CSOs endorse more cognitive distortion items than controls, making it likely that had 
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CSO participants been tested for the presence of cognitive distortions using conventional 
methods they would have appeared distorted. The fact that the sample was composed 
primarily of extrafamilial CSOs also makes it likely that the CSO sample would have 
endorsed cognitive distortions, since extrafamilial CSOs are commonly reported as being 
more cognitively distorted than intrafamilial CSOs (Fisher et al., 1999; Vanhouche & 
Vertommen, 1999; Ward, 2000).  
Regardless of any potential limitations, this study certainly adds weight to recent 
calls by researchers to fully assess the assumption that all cognitive distortions reflect 
underlying offence-supportive beliefs (see Gannon & Polaschek, 2006; Maruna & Mann, 
2006; Ward, Keown, & Gannon, 2007). Further research needs to be conducted that 
explores other drivers of cognitive distortions. For example, by manipulating the personal 
and interpersonal circumstances in which cognitive distortions are measured, 
psychologists may reach a greater understanding of the types of processes, both internal 
and external to CSOs, that determine whether they are likely to endorse or articulate a 
proposition that appears “distorted” to onlookers. 
Another avenue for exploration is to investigate the effects of priming when using 
the LDT to study CSOs. Priming involves increasing the accessibility of a mental 
representation (e.g., a schema, belief or stored information structure) by exposing an 
individual to a relevant concept, word, or environmental cue (see Baldwin, Carrell & 
Lopez, 1990; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Higgins, 1989). In the current study it was 
assumed that CSOs’ offence-supportive beliefs would be sufficiently accessible that upon 
reading context sentences their offence-supportive beliefs would activate and lead them to 
interpret sentences differently than controls. However, it is possible that prior, stronger 
priming was needed to activate CSOs’ beliefs and thereby generate abnormal 
interpretations. For instance, CSOs may have responded differently if they had been 
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primed by sexually or emotionally salient cues before completing the LDT. In Study Two 
this idea is explored.  
Future research should also be directed at implementing other cognitive 
experimental techniques in the study of sexual offenders’ implicit cognitions. Cognitive 
psychology has produced a wide range of experimental techniques designed to shed light 
on individuals’ information processing styles and the contents of their beliefs and 
schemas. Thus far, very few of these techniques have been implemented in the study of 
sexual offenders. Therefore, the continued application of cognitive experiments in the 
study of CSOs is sorely needed.  
 In conclusion, the findings from this study have called into question the idea that 
CSOs articulate and/or endorse cognitive distortions because they hold abnormal, offence-
supportive beliefs. This study has underscored the need for alternative research methods to 
be used in conjunction with questionnaire-based approaches when trying to understand the 
cognitive processes of CSOs. In addition, it has indicated that researchers and clinicians 
should continue to strive for a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
cognitive distortions.  
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Chapter Five 
A Study of the Effects of Visual Priming on Information Processing in 
Child Sexual Offenders 
Introduction 
Contextual and environmental variables can increase the likelihood that an 
individual will take cognitive short-cuts rather than engaging in effortful processing 
(Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988; Kunda, 1999). The use of even highly accessible 
schemas can be influenced by these external factors. In the case of sexual offenders, it has 
been proposed that a variety of important external stimuli serve to increase cognitive load, 
and decrease motivation and ability to engage in effortful, data-driven information 
processing. For instance, very positive or negative affective states, sexual arousal, and 
intoxication have all been said to increase the likelihood that sexual offenders will process 
information according to pre-existing schema shortcuts (Gannon & Polaschek, 2006; 
Ward et al., 1997).  
An interesting explanation for the null results reported in the previous chapter (and 
those found by Gannon et al., 2006) could be that CSOs’ belief structures were not 
appropriately primed. When beliefs are primed they can affect subsequent information 
processing. For instance, Baldwin et al., (1990) found that visually priming either negative 
or positive beliefs about the self in a group of students altered the way that those students 
evaluated their own research ideas. More recently, Murray, Spadafore, and McIntosh 
(2005) demonstrated that activation of just-world beliefs affected participants’ processing 
of rape-related information. Murray et al. primed half of a group of female participants by 
presenting them with rape-related words, before all participants read a dating scenario that 
was ambiguous in terms of the male dater’s aggressiveness and the female dater’s 
provocative behaviour. The authors found that participants holding strong just-world 
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beliefs perceived the woman dater more negatively after being primed with rape-related 
words than those who were primed with neutral words.  
 In the study presented in Chapter Four it was hoped that as CSOs read context 
sentences (e.g., “A child who is fondled by an adult will probably be…”) they would 
interpret those context sentences in line with offence-supportive beliefs and would 
therefore respond faster to the IT-consistent completion word “okay”, for example, than to 
the IT-inconsistent completion word “hurt”. While it was hoped that each context sentence 
would be a sufficient cue to activate an offence-supportive belief, it is possible that prior, 
stronger priming was needed in order for CSOs to make such faulty interpretations.  
Study Two: The Effects of Visual Priming on Interpretation of Ambiguous Sentences 
Related to Child Behaviour 
In the current study, attempts to activate beliefs regarding Children as Sexual 
Beings are made using visual primes. A memory-based study is then conducted to 
investigate whether CSOs hold the Children as Sexual Beings IT. Focussing specifically 
on Children as Sexual Beings (rather than all five ITs, as was done in Study One) allows 
in-depth examination of a single IT in each participant. Children as Sexual Beings has 
been selected as the most appropriate IT to investigate because it is thought to be CSO 
specific (Ward et al., 2007), it is the IT most widely represented in commonly-used 
cognitive distortion questionnaires (Gannon et al., in press), and Marziano et al.’s (2006) 
self-report study found that it was the IT most frequently endorsed by CSOs. Focussing on 
an IT that is thought to be CSO-specific has also obviated the need for CCs in this study, 
as CSOs’ beliefs should appear different to all controls’ for this IT (recall also that in 
Study One offender controls responded in a more, albeit nonsignificantly, IT-inconsistent 
manner than community controls).  
The current study contains three successive stages: priming, encoding, and 
recognition.  In the priming phase, CSOs’ offence-supportive beliefs are primed by 
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presenting CSOs and OCs with computerised images of semi-clothed children. Total time 
spent viewing such images is a significant predictor of sexual interest (Abel, Huffman, 
Warberg, & Holland, 1998; Gress, 2005; Harris, Rice, Quinsey, & Chaplin, 1996). That is, 
researchers have found that CSOs tend to view images of unclothed or semi-clothed 
children longer than non-CSO comparisons do. For instance, Gress (2005) measured the 
amount of time that 19 CSOs and seven adult sexual offenders spent viewing slides of 
nude and clothed males and females ranging in age from five years to adult. Gress 
reported that viewing times for both nude and clothed stimuli accurately predicted age and 
gender preference classifications when compared to participants’ past sexual behaviour. 
Thus, if CSOs spend lengthy time periods looking at the images of children, presumably 
their belief structures should be activated, leading them to make sexualised interpretations 
of children’s actions.  
The subsequent two stages in this study are adapted from a previous design used 
successfully by Copello and Tata (1990) to investigate the manner in which violent 
offenders interpret ambiguous (but potentially violence-related) sentences. Copello and 
Tata asked participants to read a series of sentences (encoding phase) before surprising 
them with a memory task (recognition phase). For each ambiguous sentence shown during 
encoding, one of two disambiguated violent and non-violent versions were shown during 
recognition. As predicted, non-offender controls did not recognise violent versions of the 
ambiguous sentences as often as violent offenders did. More recently, Copello and Tata’s 
design has been used to demonstrate cognitive biases towards aggressive stimuli among 
users of the drug MDMA (Curran, Rees, Hoare, Hoshi, & Bond; 2004). While Curran et 
al. did not find that MDMA users recognised more violent sentences than non-users, 
MDMA users did show faster reaction times to violent sentences and were more confident 
that they had previously seen them.  
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In the current study, sentences describing children’s behaviour are used in the 
encoding and recognition tasks in place of Copello and Tata’s violence-related sentences. 
During the encoding phase participants are asked to read ambiguous sentences about 
children that could be interpreted in a sexualised manner. Finally, participants are given a 
surprise recognition task in which they read slightly different versions of sentences 
presented during encoding; half of the originally sexually-ambiguous sentences are 
presented with a clear sexualised interpretation, while the other half are presented with a 
clear nonsexual interpretation.  
The first hypothesis is that viewing time in the child priming condition will be 
longer for CSOs than OCs, while viewing time in the adult control condition will be 
statistically equal for both participant groups. The second hypothesis is that, compared to 
controls, CSOs in the priming condition will recognise more sexualised versions of the 
unambiguous sentences than benign versions. Because individuals are faster to process 
schema-congruent information (e.g., Fincher-Kiefer, 1992; Sharkey & Sharkey, 1987), 
and in line with the findings of Curran et al. (2004), it is also hypothesised that this biased 
recall for sexualised sentences will be accompanied by faster responses among primed 
CSOs, compared to OCs and unprimed CSOs. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Sixty-four men took part in this study: 27 CSOs and 37 OCs. Participants were 
recruited from New Zealand Department of Corrections prisons. Prison managers 
distributed a recruitment flyer to prisoners inviting them to take part in “a reading study” 
and “an internet study”. As with Study One, flyers stated that participants were wanted 
who could read the recruitment flyer with ease. Also, the volunteer rates in this study 
again could not be monitored. Twenty-two CSOs and 29 OCs who took part in this study 
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also participated in Study One. Selection criteria and demographic details for each 
participant group follows.  
Group selection criteria and demographic details 
CSOs 
CSOs were prison inmates whose index offences included at least one sexual conviction 
against a person under the age of 16. Their ages ranged from 22 to 77 years (M = 45.85, 
SD = 14.61) and their victims’ ages ranged from 2 to 15 years (M = 9.52, SD = 4.33). 
According to CSOs’ conviction records, 16 were extrafamilial offenders (i.e., had 
molested at least one non-relative), while 11 were intrafamilial offenders (i.e., had 
molested only biological or non-biological family members). Two of the extrafamilial and 
none of the intrafamilial CSOs had received cognitive-behavioural therapy to reconstruct 
distorted offence-related cognitions. Since receiving therapy, the two treated CSOs had 
committed at least one sexual assault against a child. The mean Static-99 score for all CSO 
participants indicated a medium-low recidivism risk level (M = 2.85, SD = 2.25) according 
to criteria set by Phenix et al. (2000). The number of years that CSOs had spent in formal 
education ranged from nine to 15 years (M = 10.26, SD = 1.56). Five CSOs identified 
themselves as Māori, 15 as European, and seven as “other”.  
OCs  
OCs were men who were serving a prison sentence, but who had never been 
convicted of a sexual offence against a person under the age of 16. OCs were aged from 
20 to 69 years (M = 34.16, SD = 9.63). Conviction records showed that six OCs had been 
convicted at some time for a sexual offence against a person over the age of 16.  The 
number of years that OC participants had spent in formal education ranged from nine to 12 
years (M = 10.00, SD = 1.05). Seventeen OCs identified themselves as Māori, 16 as 
European, and five as “other”.  
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 Independent sample t-tests revealed the two offender groups did not differ 
significantly on number of years spent in education or length of prison sentence. A Chi-
square test for independence confirmed that between-group differences approached 
significance for ethnicity, χ2 (2, N = 64) = 5.98, p = .05, Cramer’s V = .306. CSOs and 
OCs differed significantly on age, t(62) = 3.86, p < .001, with CSOs having a higher mean 
age (M = 45.85, SD = 14.61) than OCs (M = 34.16, SD = 9.63). Analyses of Variance 
(ANOVAs) were run to see whether differences existed across the four participant groups 
(i.e., primed and control CSOs and OCs). The four groups did not differ significantly on 
number of years spent in education and length of prison sentence, and a Chi-square test for 
independence confirmed that between-group differences did not exist for ethnicity. Also, 
an independent samples t-test confirmed that CSOs did not differ in their Static-99 scores 
across the two conditions. However, the groups were found to significantly differ in age, 
F(3,60) = 7.23, p < .001. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that primed CSOs were 
significantly older (M = 51.91, SD = 11.53) than control CSOs (M = 41.00, SD = 15.34), 
primed OCs (M = 34.30, SD = 8.39), and control OCs (M = 34.00, SD = 11.19). 
Characteristics of the four participant groups are displayed in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 
Demographic details for participant groups: Study Two 
Child Prime Adult Prime Child Prime Adult Prime
n  = 12 n  = 15 n  = 20 n  = 17
Age (years)
Mean 51.92 41.00 34.30     34.00***
SD 11.53 15.34 8.39 11.19
Years in education
Mean 10.08 10.40 9.90 10.12
SD 1.83 1.35 0.97 1.17
Ethnicity (n)
Maori 3 2 9 8
European 7 8 10 6
Other 4 3 1 3
Reading time (ms)
Mean 3476.77 4055.11 3092.29 3553.09
SD 2349.74 3584.54 1332.25 3115.36
Violent Convictions (n)
Mean 1.67 1.13 3.45 3.71
SD 1.67 1.96 4.01 4.10
CSO type (n)
Intrafamiliail 5.0 6.0  -  - 
Extrafamilial 10.0 6.0  -  - 
Child vicitms (n)
Mean 3.00 3.07  -  - 
SD 2.95 2.71  -  - 
Victim age (years)
Mean 10.13 11.47  -  - 
SD 3.97 3.37  -  - 
STATIC-99 Score
Mean 2.67 3.00  -  - 
SD 2.02 2.48  -  - 
* = p<.05; ** = p<.01; *** = p<.001
Child Sex Offenders Offender Controls
 




New Zealand Department of Corrections and Victoria University of Wellington 
approved all procedures and materials used in this study. Before testing began all 
participants read (or were read) an information sheet outlining the study procedure and 
their rights as participants (which met NZPS Code of Ethics criteria). Participants were 
told they would need to provide details of their offending, which an experimenter would 
verify by checking their prison records on completion of testing. Participants signed a 
consent form before taking part in the experiment and were sent a combined debriefing 
and results summary sheet once results were collated.  
Design 
A Mixed Subjects Experimental Design was used. The overall study design is 













Figure 5.1. Study Two Experimental Design 
 
Read Sentences  
  2 Ambiguous types: Sexual and “social threat”. 
1 Filler type: Neutral, unambiguous sentences. 
Primed CSOs  
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clothed adults 
Primed OCs  
 













Recognition Task  
Do CSOs disproportionately recognise sexual interpretations 
compared to OCs? Is this recognition bias limited to sexual stimuli? 
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There were three experimental phases: priming, encoding, and recognition. 
Priming 
Half the CSOs and OCs viewed pictures of semi-clothed children twice. The other 
half viewed pictures of clothed adults twice. Pictures were presented twice to ensure 
adequate exposure. To disguise task aims, this phase was described to participants as an 
‘Age Judging Task’ in which the task aim was to indicate whether depicted subjects were 
over or under a particular age (see Priming Phase in upcoming ‘Procedure’ section). 
Encoding 
Participants viewed 20 ambiguous and ten filler sentences. 
Recognition 
Participants viewed 50 sentences similar to those viewed during encoding and 
indicated whether they recognised each sentence.  
A mixed subjects design was used. Independent between-subjects variables were 
group (CSOs vs. OCs) and condition (priming vs. control). Dependent variables were 
picture response time (during the age-judging task), comparative recognition scores for 
recognition sentences, and reaction time to recognition sentences.   
Materials 
Priming pictures 
Child priming pictures were selected from computer-generated images (available 
commercially from Pacific Psychological Assessment Corporation, 2004).  They were 
constructed via computer morphing technology designed for use in studies of sexual 
arousal to children. Females were depicted wearing swimming costumes; males wore 
boxer shorts. Pictures were selected that the researchers deemed to be maximally attractive 
and provocative in terms of stance and facial expression. Twenty images were presented, 
comprised of five images from each of four categories: females and males aged 
approximately nine and 13 years old (see Appendix Three for example images). Adult 
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control pictures were photographs chosen from the International Affective Picture System 
(Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention, 1999). Ten females and ten males judged 
to be middle-aged or older were depicted fully-clothed (see Appendix Four for example 
photographs). These pictures were deemed being highly unlikely to arouse sexual interest 
and thus should not have primed cognitive structures relating to children or sex. 
Encoding sentences 
Twenty ambiguous and ten neutral “filler” sentences were used (see Appendix 
Five). Ten ambiguous sentences could be interpreted in a sexual or nonsexual way; these 
were target stimuli (e.g., “As 7-year old Jenny played cards, she showed her knickers”). 
These “sexual” sentences were designed to tap beliefs that children are sexual beings. In 
addition, ten sentences were presented that could be interpreted in a more generally 
threatening or nonthreatening way (e.g., “The doctor frowned as he measured little Sarah’s 
growth”). These potentially threatening sentences (hereafter called “threat sentences”) 
were based on sentences used by Copello and Tata (1990) and were presented to monitor 
whether group differences in responding reflected general negative biases. The ten 
remaining filler sentences were not ambiguous (e.g., “The two old friends played pool 
until closing time”). They were added to the task to conceal experiment aims and to 
monitor participant responding.  
Recognition sentences 
Fifty recognition sentences were used that were similar in wording and content to 
encoding sentences (see Appendix Six). Ten filler recognition sentences had identical 
meanings to the ten filler sentences presented at encoding but contained minor word 
changes (e.g., “The two friends played pool until the pub closed”). Of the forty 
unambiguous recognition sentences, ten presented a nonsexual interpretation of encoding 
sentences (e.g., “While Jenny played cards, she accidentally showed her knickers”), ten 
presented a sexual interpretation (e.g., “While Jenny played cards, she deliberately 
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showed her knickers”), ten presented a nonthreatening interpretation (e.g., “The doctor 
frowned as he measured little Sarah’s height”), and ten presented a threatening 
interpretation (e.g., “The doctor frowned as he measured little Sarah’s cancer”).  
All sentences presented in the recognition and encoding phases were similar in 
length and complexity. An Analysis of Variance found that average Flesch Kincaid scores 
for each sentence type (sexual, threat, and neutral) were statistically equivalent in both the 
encoding phase, F(2,27) = 0.90, p = .419, and the recognition phase, F(2,57) = 0.77, p = 
.466.  Using t-tests it was found that average Flesch Kincaid scores in the recognition 
phase were equivalent between the disambiguated sexual and nonsexual sentences, t(18) = 
.46, p = .652, and between the disambiguated threatening and nonthreatening sentences, 
t(18) = .06, p =  .952. 
Apparatus 
All tasks were programmed using a Superlab package. The program was run on 
12-inch colour monitor screen from a Dell Pentium Latitude D600 laptop computer. 
Written instructions and stimuli were centred on a white screen in bold black Times New 
Roman text (font size 40). Participants made their responses on a Cedrus Model RB-730 
response pad. In the age judging task, labels were placed over keys on the response pad 
reading “under 16” and “over 16” in the priming condition and “under 75” and “over 75” 
in the control condition. These were replaced with labels reading “recall” and “don’t 
recall” during the recognition phase. Placement of labels was carefully alternated across 
tasks and across participants to eliminate handedness effects. 
Superlab controlled the random presentation of pictures in the age-judging task, 
and recorded the time that elapsed between each button press made to indicate an age 
judgment. Superlab also controlled the random presentation of encoding and recognition 
sentences, and recorded type of response made (recall/don’t recall) and RT to recognition 
sentences.  




 Participants were tested individually, in a single session. Each testing session 
took approximately 45 minutes per participant. After giving written consent, participants 
supplied demographic information about themselves (e.g., age and ethnicity) and provided 
details about the nature and number of their crimes. Participants randomly allocated into 
the priming condition were told that on first presentation of the child pictures they should 
simply familiarize themselves with the pictures. On second presentation, however, they 
should use the respond pad to indicate whether the person in the picture was over or under 
the age of 16. They were advised to spend as long as they wanted looking at each picture. 
To disguise task aims, priming participants were told that the study was looking at trends 
in the use of internet pornography and that a research aim was to establish whether adult 
men can accurately deduce age in young people. Participants generally appeared to accept 
this as a task aim, with many commenting on the difficulty of currently distinguishing age 
in young people. Control participants were told that they were to view two sets of images 
of mature adults. As with priming participants, they were told to familiarize themselves 
with the pictures on first presentation and to indicate whether the depicted subjects were 
over or under 75 years of age on second presentation (in both conditions people in the 
images looked younger than the designated age threshold). Control participants were told 
the study aimed to investigate modern-day age perceptions.  
 Before the age-judging task all participants completed a practice run. To create a 
sense of privacy a large screen was placed around the computer, blocking it from the 
experimenter’s view. This was ostensibly put up to ensure that good lighting conditions 
were available to all participants. To increase privacy the experimenter also faced away 
from the participant and perused some papers. 
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Encoding phase 
 Participants were asked to take part in “a reading study”. They were instructed to 
read sentences—taking as long as needed—that they would later be asked questions about. 
Participants read 30 sentences presented serially and in random order. Upon reading each 
sentence participants pressed a button on the response pad to view the next sentence. 
Recognition phase 
Participants next completed a surprise “memory test”. They were presented with 
30 recognition sentences: ten unambiguous versions of sexual sentences (i.e., five sexual 
and five nonsexual), ten reformulations of filler sentences, and ten unambiguous versions 
of threat sentences (i.e., five threatening and five nonthreatening). As each sentence 
appeared participants indicated whether they had seen that sentence (or one with the same 
meaning) during the encoding phase. Participants were told that all test sentences would 
be slightly different to the earlier sentences, so the aim was to indicate sentences that had 
the same meaning as prior sentences. 
RESULTS 
Analyses were conducted to explore the hypotheses that: (1) during the priming 
phase, primed CSOs will display longer viewing times for children than OCs or control 
CSOs; (2) during the recognition phase, compared to OCs and control CSOs, primed 
CSOs will remember more sexual than nonsexual recognition sentences; and (3) this 
biased recognition of sexual recognition sentences by primed CSOs will be accompanied 
by faster responses relative to other groups. 
Data Preparation: Reaction Times 
Two sets of RT data were of interest in the current analysis: (1) Time taken to 
indicate age judgments for pictures during the priming phase; and (2) Time taken to 
indicate sentence recollection during the recognition phase. 
    
104 
As noted in Study One, RT data needs to be transformed such that the effects of 
outliers on ANOVAs are minimised (Ratcliff, 1993). Because RT data in the current study 
contained extreme responses that probably did not represent the intended cognitive 
mechanisms, and in line with previous research (e.g., Holden, Kroner, Fekken, & Popham, 
1992; Ratcliffe, 1993; Welford, 1980) both sets of RT data (i.e., (1) and (2)) were 
Windsorised to adjust for outliers. 
For RT data set (2), mean RTs to unambiguous nonsexual sentences were 
subtracted from mean RTs to unambiguous sexual sentences to create a mean sexual RT 
score for each participant. Likewise, mean RTs to unambiguous nonthreatening sentences 
were subtracted from mean RTs to unambiguous threatening sentences to create a mean 
threat RT score for each participant. This procedure clarified each participant’s overall 
pattern of responding to sexual and threat sentences. A positive mean sexual RT score 
would indicate that a participant was faster to recognise sexual sentences relative to 
nonsexual sentences, while a positive mean threat RT score would indicate that a 
participant was faster to recognise threatening sentences relative to nonthreatening 
sentences. 
Data Preparation: Recognition Analysis 
Sentences presented in the recognition phase were grouped according to the 
following five categories: filler, nonthreatening, threatening, nonsexual, and sexual. 
Recognition scores for each category were calculated so that possible scores ranged from 
zero (no sentences recognised) to five (all sentences recognised). Next, mean recognition 
scores for unambiguous nonsexual sentences were subtracted from mean recognition 
scores for unambiguous sexual sentences to create a mean sexual recognition score for 
each participant. Likewise, mean recognition scores for unambiguous nonthreatening 
sentences were subtracted from mean recognition scores for unambiguous threatening 
sentences to create a mean threat recognition score for each participant. This procedure 
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clarified each participant’s overall pattern of responding to threat and sexual sentences. A 
positive mean sexual recognition score would indicate that a participant had recognised 
more sexual than nonsexual sentences, while a positive mean threat recognition score 
would indicate that a participant had recognised more threatening than nonthreatening 
sentences.  
Main analysis of picture viewing times 
To see whether viewing time during the age judging task differed between the two 
offender groups (CSO vs. OC) according to the type of picture presented (priming vs. 
control) two independent samples t-tests were conducted. The first t-test compared the 
length of time that CSOs and OCs looked at control pictures. As expected, no significant 
difference in looking times was found between the two groups t(30) = .08, p = .934. The 
second t-test compared the length of time that CSOs and OCs looked at priming pictures. 
Here a significant difference was found between CSOs’ and OCs’ looking times, t(30) =  
2.44, p = .021, partial eta squared = .166, with CSOs viewing the child pictures 
considerably longer (M = 1787.08ms, SD = 871.81ms) than OCs (M = 1200.97ms, SD = 
492.21ms). Thus, CSOs displayed longer viewing times than OCs in the priming condition 
only.  
Main analysis of sentence recognition 
The crucial question of whether primed CSOs showed a recognition bias for 
unambiguous sexual sentences was first investigated. A two-way ANOVA was conducted 
to see whether experimental condition (priming vs. control) differentially affected the 
offender groups (CSO vs. OC) in terms of the types of unambiguously sexual/nonsexual 
sentences they recognised. The independent variables were Offender Group (CSO and 
OC) and Condition (priming and control). The dependent variable was Mean Sexual 
Recognition Score. There was no main effect of Group, F(1,60) = 0.75, p = .391, partial 
eta squared = .012, nor Condition, F(1,60) = 1.01, p = .947, partial eta squared < .001. 
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Also, contrary to predictions, no significant interaction between Offender Group and 
Condition emerged, F(1, 60) = 2.53, p = .117, partial eta squared = .041, illustrating that 
there did not appear to be a difference in participants’ recognition of unambiguously 
sexual and nonsexual sentences (see Figure 5.2). In other words, primed CSOs (M = -0.67, 
SD = 1.07) did not have more positive Mean Sexual Recognition Scores than control 
CSOs (M = -0.07, SD = 1.83), primed OCs (M = 0.30, SD = 1.49), and control OCs (M = -
0.35, SD = 1.62). Thus, contrary to expectation, neither primed nor control CSOs showed 
a bias for sexual sentences.  
An analysis was conducted to ensure that inclusion of intrafamilial CSOs did not 
account for the above nonsignificant interaction.  An independent-samples t-test was used 
to compare extrafamilials’ and intrafamilials’ Mean Sexual Recognition Scores. It was 
found that no significant difference, t(25) = -0.33, p = .742, existed between 
extrafamilials’ recognition scores (M = -0.25, SD = 1.44) and intrafamilials’ recognition 
scores (M = -0.45, SD = 1.75), indicating that inclusion of intrafamilial CSOs did not 
account for the above null results. 
 

































Figure 5.2. Mean Recognition Differences (+/- SEM) for Sexual Recognition 
Sentences. 
 
Next participants’ recognition scores for filler sentences were compared to ensure 
general recognition levels did not differ. A two-way ANOVA was conducted to see 
whether experimental condition (priming vs. control) differentially affected the offender 
groups (CSO vs. OC) in terms of the number of filler sentences they recognised. The 
independent variables were Offender Group (CSO and OC) and Condition (priming and 
control). The dependent variable was Mean Filler Recognition Score. There was no main 
effect of Group, F(1,60) = 1.55, p = .218, nor Condition, F(1,60) = 2.36, p = .130. As 
expected, no significant interaction between Offender Group and Condition emerged, 
illustrating that there did not appear to be a difference in the number of times that primed 
and control CSOs and OCs said they recognised filler sentences, F(1,60) = 2.99, p = .586, 
partial eta squared = .005. Participants’ Mean Threat Recognition Scores were also 
analyzed to ensure that general recognition biases for threatening sentences did not exist. 
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The above two-way ANOVA was repeated with Mean Threat Recognition Score as the 
dependent variable. There was no main effect of Group, F(1,60) = 0.16, p = .695, nor 
Condition, F(1,60) = 0.08, p = .773. No significant interaction between Offender Group 
and Condition emerged, illustrating that there were no differences in the Mean Threat 
Recognition Scores of primed CSOs (M = -0.08, SD = 2.23), control CSOs (M = 0.60, SD 
= 1.64), primed OCs (M = 0.55, SD = 1.85), and control OCs (M = -0.41, SD = 1.87), 
F(1,60) = 2.94, p = .092, partial eta squared = .047. In other words, as expected, 
participant groups did not differ in their relative recognition of nonthreatening and 
threatening sentences.  
Because CSOs were significantly older than OCs, all two-way ANOVAs described 
above were rerun with age as a covariate. The main pattern of results remained the same 
throughout (i.e. no significant interactions emerged). Also, to check that the above 
findings were unaffected by the fact that six OC participants had sexually offended against 
adults, the above two-way ANOVAs were rerun with data gathered from these six OCs 
removed from the analysis. Again, the pattern of results was unchanged. 
 
Main analysis of sentence reaction times 
If primed CSOs had recognised more sexual than nonsexual sentences compared to 
other participant groups, this would indicate that they had a processing bias towards 
sexual sentences and so should produce faster response speeds to sexual sentences. 
However, as the above analyses did not reveal a processing bias in primed CSOs towards 
sexual sentences, primed CSOs should not be faster to make a decision about sexual 
sentences relative to nonsexual sentences compared to OCs and control CSOs. In the 
following section this claim is investigated. 
In order to investigate RTs to sexual sentences, the relative rates of responding 
participants had to unambiguous sexual and nonsexual sentences were of key interest. 
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Therefore, a two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine whether experimental condition 
(priming vs. control) differentially affected offender groups (CSO vs. OC) in their Mean 
Sexual RT Scores. Main effects were not found for Offender Group, F(1,60) = 0.67, p = 
.417, nor Condition, F(1,60) = 1.21, p = .275. In addition, an Offender Group x Condition 
interaction was not found, F(1, 60) = 0.49, p = .488, partial eta squared = .008. Thus it 
was found that primed CSOs (M = 6987.05ms, SD =3418.96ms) were no quicker than 
primed OCs (M = 5889.74ms, SD =3348.10ms), unprimed CSOs (M = 5683.59ms, SD 
=2360.42ms), and unprimed OCs (M = 5597.09ms, SD =2041.20ms) to react to 



































Figure 5.3. Mean Reaction Time Differences (+/- SEM) in Milliseconds (ms) for Sexual 
Recognition Sentences. 
 
To first ensure that CSOs and OCs in the priming and control conditions did not 
differ in their baseline sentence processing speed, a two-way ANOVA was conducted to 
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examine whether experimental condition (priming vs. control) differentially affected 
offender groups (CSO vs. OC) in their RTs (in milliseconds) to filler sentences. The 
independent variables were Offender Group (CSO and OC) and Condition (priming and 
control). The dependent variable was Mean Filler RT Scores. There was no main effect of 
Group, F(1,60) = 1.48, p = .229, nor Condition, F(1,60) = 0.22, p = .639. No significant 
differences existed in RTs to filler sentences between primed and control CSOs and OCs 
across the two conditions, F(1,60) = .824, p = .368, partial eta squared = .014. 
Participants’ Mean Threat RT Scores were also analyzed to ensure that general RT biases 
for threatening sentences did not exist. The above two-way ANOVA was repeated with 
Mean Threat RT Score as the dependent variable. There was no main effect of Group, 
F(1,60) = 2.52, p = .118. However, there was a main effect for Condition, F(1,60) = 8.31, 
p = .005, with participants in the priming condition showing a more negative Mean Threat 
RT Score (M = -902.17ms, SD = 1744.84ms) than participants in the control condition (M 
= 571.58ms, SD = 2426.08ms). As expected, no significant differences existed in the 
relative times CSOs and OCs in the priming and control conditions took to respond to 
threatening and nonthreatening sentences, F(1,60) = .02, p = .897, partial eta squared < 
.001.  
Because CSOs were significantly older than OCs, all two-way ANOVAs involving 
RTs were rerun with age as a covariate. Once again, no significant interactions emerged. 
DISCUSSION 
In line with the first hypothesis, CSOs and OCs viewed images of clothed adults 
for equivalent lengths of time, while CSOs viewed images of semi-clothed children longer 
than OCs did. This finding accords with studies in which CSOs have shown longer 
viewing latencies than comparison groups when presented with clothed or unclothed 
images of children (e.g., Abel et al., 2004; Harris et al., 1996). As research has 
demonstrated, viewing time is a reliable measure of sexual interest (e.g., Abel, et al., 1998; 
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Abel et al., 2004; Gress, 2005; Harris et al., 1996). Thus, the protracted priming picture 
viewing time found for CSOs in this study appears to indicate CSOs experienced sexual 
interest when exposed to images of children. This suggests that the priming stimuli 
simulated cues encountered by many CSOs during the offence process, which presumably 
activated CSOs’ beliefs linking children and sexual behaviour. 
Our second hypothesis was that CSOs in the priming condition would demonstrate 
preferential recognition for unambiguously sexual sentences compared to controls. 
Interestingly, this result did not emerge. Primed and control CSOs and OCs showed no 
difference in recognition levels for any sentence type nor reaction times to any sentence 
type. While it comes as no surprise that CSOs didn’t differ from controls in the way they 
remembered filler and threat sentences, it was expected that primed CSOs would interpret 
ambiguously sexual sentences in line with beliefs that children are sexual beings, and 
hence would recognise a greater number of sexualised versions of these sentences than 
controls, or at least respond faster to sexualised sentences. The null result in this regard 
does not accord with the idea formalised by Ward (Ward, 2000; Ward & Keenan, 1999) 
that CSOs tend to hold beliefs that children are sexual agents who invite and enjoy sexual 
activity. In short, the CSOs in this study showed no evidence of holding these types of 
beliefs, even when exposed to a prime that should have activated beliefs linking children 
and sex. Previous studies that have used words or images to prime participants’ beliefs 
have demonstrated subsequent changes in the way that participants process and respond to 
related stimuli (Baldwin et al., 1990; Murray et al., 2005). Even in studies that haven’t 
utilised priming, the current experimental design has found expected group differences in 
responses to disambiguated sentences, both in terms of the groups’ recognition rates 
(Copello & Tata, 1990), and reaction times (Curran et al., 2004). The fact that comparable 
results did not emerge in the current study raises questions about the extent to which the 
CSO participants held stable beliefs that children are sexual beings.  
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Similar doubts were raised by the previous study reported in this thesis, in which 
evidence of beliefs linking sex and children could not be detected in CSOs’ responses to a 
lexical decision task. The current results also align with those of Gannon et al. (2006), 
who embedded ambiguous sentences in a vignette describing events surrounding the 
sexual abuse of a child. The sentences could be interpreted in line with four ITs, including 
the Children as Sexual Beings IT. Contrary to Gannon et al.’s expectations, CSOs did not 
recall these sentences in a markedly different way than controls did, leading Gannon et al. 
to surmise that the CSOs did not hold beliefs supporting Children as Sexual Beings.  
While Study One used stimuli that tapped all five of Ward and Keenan’s (1999) 
ITs, the sentences used in the current study only tapped beliefs contained within the 
Children as Sexual Beings IT. Of the five ITs identified by Ward and Keenan, the 
Children as Sexual Beings IT was found to be the most prevalent among CSOs in 
Marziano et al.’s (2006) self-report study, with all but one CSO endorsing this IT in an 
interview study (Marziano, 2002). Also, Children as Sexual Beings is the belief cluster 
most widely represented in commonly-used cognitive distortion questionnaires (Gannon et 
al., in press). Having said that, it would seem unreasonable to expect all CSOs in the 
current sample to hold beliefs that children are sexual beings, and one could argue that this 
made it difficult to detect a statistical difference between primed CSOs and other 
participant groups in this study. However, a perusal of the mean recognition scores for 
nonsexual and sexual sentences for each participant group reveals no bias towards recall 
of sexual sentences between primed CSOs and the other three participant groups. Because 
the Children as Sexual Beings IT is hypothesised to be offence-specific, one would 
surmise that in the current study primed CSOs should have demonstrated at least a small 
bias towards sexual sentences relative to OCs.  
Nevertheless, the above issue raises an important point: Ward and Keenan (1999) 
have stated that individual CSOs hold varying numbers of ITs. That is, each CSO does not 
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necessarily hold all five ITs. Yet in Study One and the current study CSOs as a group 
have been compared with controls to see if they respond differently to material tapping 
ITs. One would expect that for any IT there will be a subset of CSOs who, according to 
conventional measures of offence-supportive beliefs, do not appear to hold beliefs aligning 
with that particular IT. Perhaps when group differences are studied between CSOs and 
controls for any particular IT, the subset of CSOs who don’t support that IT on 
conventional measures are obscuring the distorted responding of other members of the 
CSO group. Research is needed to see whether CSOs can be distinguished from OCs in 
cognitive experiments when this important issue is addressed. Study Three in this thesis 
takes this issue into account.  
It is also possible that CSOs in the current study behaved defensively by 
deliberately pretending not to recall unambiguously sexual recognition sentences. 
However, other research suggests that when individuals “fake good” on similar tasks their 
reactions are typically faster than when they do not fake good (see Gannon & Polaschek, 
2005). Participant groups in the current study could not be distinguished according to their 
reaction times to any particular class of sentence, seeming to indicate that no group was 
deliberately manipulating responses.  
Another limitation concerns the small CSO participant sample obtained in this 
study. Although the interactions concerning sexual sentences did not even approach 
significance, ideally a larger number of CSOs would have been included in this study in 
order to increase statistical power. Interestingly, the results depicted in Figure 1 indicate 
that not only were differences between experimental groups nonsignificant, but the results 
did not follow an expected pattern, as primed OCs said they recognised a greater ratio of 
sexual sentences than primed CSOs (even though OCs had shown no signs of sexual 
interest in the child pictures). Although the fact that this difference was nonsignificant 
indicates that it is best explained by chance, it is possible that viewing the child pictures 
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somehow affected offender controls’ perceptions of sentences describing children’s 
actions (e.g., the pictures may have triggered beliefs that children can behave 
manipulatively or place one in danger).  
In summary, it is possible that the null results found in this study are attributable to 
experimental design flaws, or to the fact that the experimental manipulation was not 
sensitive enough to detect differences between groups. However, it appears more likely 
that CSOs in the current study did not hold beliefs that paint children as sexual beings.  
Future research should continue to apply cognitive-experimental techniques to the 
study of CSO cognition. Currently the implementation of these implicit techniques within 
the field of sexual offending is in its infancy. It is vital that psychologists understand 
whether the current lack of experimental evidence for CSO-specific beliefs reflects the 
fact that such beliefs are less widespread than currently thought, or whether it reflects the 
need for researchers to refine their techniques and develop more sophisticated ways of 
applying them. For instance, studies are needed that explore in greater depth the effects of 
alternative primes (e.g., emotion, mood, and sexual arousal manipulations) on information 
processing in CSOs.  
There is also a need to develop experimental stimuli that more accurately imitate 
situations likely to be experienced by CSOs in their day-to-day lives. It is possible that in 
the current study the experimental task given to participants was too far removed from a 
real-life situation to reveal information-processing biases. Clearly, reading brief sentences 
about children is not equivalent to interpreting the complex social data available in real-
life interactions with children. Of course, ethical considerations rule out the possibility of 
any direct contact between children and untreated CSOs, but in future more realistic test 
stimuli could be created, say, in the form of videos depicting interactions between adults 
and children, or computer programs that allow CSOs to converse with a “mock child”. 
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As with Study One, the current findings raise doubts about the notion that CSOs’ 
cognitive distortions are primarily driven by faulty beliefs. Theorists, researchers and 
clinicians have frequently adopted a stance that essentially equates cognitive distortions 
with beliefs. Because CSOs commonly articulate or endorse cognitive distortions, this 
stance has culminated in a widespread perception that the vast majority of CSOs hold 
beliefs that facilitate their offending. Yet cognitive-experimental research has as yet been 
unable to find strong evidence that offence-supportive beliefs are held by most CSOs, 
suggesting that additional mechanisms might underlie cognitive distortions.  
In conclusion, the current study adopted a cognitive-experimental approach to 
study CSOs’ offence-supportive beliefs. Contrary to expectations, findings did not support 
the claim that CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs that lead them to interpret sentences 
describing children’s actions in sexualised ways. The disjunction between results in the 
current study and findings from questionnaire and interview studies underscores the need 
for multiple approaches when seeking understanding of CSOs’ beliefs. The results and 
ensuing discussion contained in this study have also highlighted the need for further 
research into the phenomena that generate so-called “cognitive distortions”.  




A Multimethod Study of CSOs’ Offence-Supportive Beliefs. 
Introduction 
Results from the two experimental studies discussed in Chapters Four and Five 
uncovered virtually no evidence that CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs. As noted, 
however, the previous experimental designs could have been improved by examining 
whether CSO participants actually appeared to hold offence-supportive beliefs according 
to conventional methods of CSO assessment. Measuring offence-supportive beliefs 
according to interview and questionnaire methods would have allowed comparison of the 
extent and types of offence-supportive belief endorsement found using conventional 
measures versus cognitive-experimental methods and thus provided important information 
about the nature of cognitive distortions. In addition, in the prior two studies when 
individual ITs were examined CSOs were compared as a group with OCs, despite the fact 
that Ward and Keenan (1999) posit that not all CSOs endorse all ITs. It is possible that a 
different pattern of results could have been found by including in the analysis of each IT 
only those CSOs who appear to support beliefs within that IT according to conventional 
measures (i.e., questionnaires and interviews). In the current study these two issues are 
addressed.  
The current study also addresses the recommendation made in Studies One and 
Two that alternative cognitive-experimental techniques be applied to the study of CSOs’ 
offence-supportive beliefs. Hence, a different experimental paradigm called the Rapid 
Serial Visual Presentation is used in this study. Unlike Study Two, where only Children as 
Sexual Beings was examined, all five ITs will be investigated to enable examination of the 
individual beliefs held by each CSO. Also, in accordance with recommendations made in 
Chapter Five, CSO participants are primed before commencing the cognitive experiment. 
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However, unlike the prior study, attempts are made to activate CSOs’ offence-supportive 
beliefs by interviewing them about their offending prior to them taking part in the 
cognitive experiment. Thus, rather than applying a general, impersonalised prime to CSOs 
as was done in Study Two (via presentation of visual primes) CSOs are interviewed one-
by-one. This ought to allow priming of each CSO’s specific beliefs, as each CSO spends 
time recalling stimuli that played a role in their own offending behaviour.  
Study Three: A Multimethod Analysis of Offence-Supportive Beliefs 
In the current study CSOs’ and non-sex offenders’ beliefs are measured using a 
cognitive experimental paradigm that has not yet been applied to the sexual offending 
field and the results compared with data gathered using interview and questionnaire 
methods. This unique, multimethod design represents the first instance within the sexual 
offending field where these three methodologies have been used on one participant sample 
and the results triangulated. In fact, despite the widespread use of questionnaire and 
interview measures with CSOs, a review of published literature indicates that this study is 
the first to match and compare the types of beliefs CSOs endorse on both these 
conventional measures. 
The current experimental paradigm, which has previously been called the RSVP 
task (Rapid Serial Visual Presentation), has often been used to investigate text 
comprehension processes (see Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; Macleod & Cohen, 1993). 
RSVP tasks are those in which certain parameters of text presentation are experimentally 
controlled. Because the technique has traditionally involved presenting single words 
serially to a fixed location on a viewing screen (Sinclair, Healy, & Bourne, 1989) the 
RSVP variant adopted in the current study will be referred to as the RSVP-modified 
(RSVP-M). 
RSVP-M tasks are based on the finding that when individuals read text their 
sentences reading time varies according to whether the sentence in question continues 
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preceding text in a way that is congruent with the mental model constructed by the reader. 
In short, individuals are faster to read sentences that are consistent with their prior 
comprehension of the text (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; Galambos, Abelson, & Black, 
1986). Because people use their long-term knowledge structures to interpret texts, the 
RSVP-M has been used to investigate the content of cognitive structures readers use to 
comprehend texts (e.g., Macleod & Cohen, 1993; Wingrove & Bond, 2005). For instance, 
Macleod and Cohen used the RSVP-M to investigate the way that students high in trait 
anxiety comprehended ambiguous texts compared to students low in trait anxiety. All 
participants read sentence pairs, the first of which could be interpreted in a threatening or 
nonthreatening manner, and the second of which was unambiguously threatening or 
nonthreatening. Because individuals high in trait anxiety are thought to hold beliefs that 
bias them towards threatening interpretations of stimuli (Beck & Clark, 1988) the authors 
hypothesised that high-anxiety students would comprehend the ambiguous first sentences 
as threatening and therefore, relative to low-anxiety students, read unambiguously 
threatening second sentences faster than nonthreatening sentences. This is exactly the 
pattern of results that emerged. Similarly, Wingrove and Bond (2005) also presented 
passages to participants either high or low in trait anger. The authors predicted that, 
because trait anger is thought to be associated with stable beliefs that encourage hostile 
interpretations, participants high in trait anger would read texts about potentially anger-
provoking situations in a different way to low-anger participants. Wingrove and Bond 
asked participants to read, sentence by sentence, passages at a self-paced rate that 
described characters reacting either with anger or non-anger to ambiguous situations. Two 
key sentences embedded in each passage described these angry or non-angry reactions. As 
expected, trait anger was associated with faster reading times for key sentences that 
described an angry reaction versus sentences describing a non-angry reaction.  
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 In the current experiment CSOs and non-sex offenders read, sentence by sentence, 
passages that could be interpreted in line with the five belief types hypothesised to 
characterise CSOs’ ITs. Each passage concludes with two sentences that are either 
consistent or inconsistent with the targeted belief type. It is hypothesised that CSOs will 
interpret passages in an IT-consistent manner and thus respond faster, relative to controls, 
to sentences that are consistent with IT content than to sentences that are inconsistent.  
 CSOs and OCs also answer a questionnaire measure of offence-supportive beliefs 
that has been found to tap the five ITs outlined in Chapter Two (i.e., the MOLEST; 
Bumby, 1984; Gannon et al., in press). Recall that the MOLEST has been found by a 
number of researchers to discriminate between CSOs and non-CSO offender control 
groups (Arkowitz & Vess, 2003; Blumenthal et al., 1999; Bumby, 1996; Feelgood et al., 
2005; Marshall et al., 2003). In this study the MOLEST is combined with the Balanced 
Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR), which is a measure of tendency to “fake 
good” designed by Paulhus (1984). In the introduction to this thesis it was explained that 
questionnaire measures of offence-supportive beliefs are often combined with measures 
such as the BIDR, purportedly as a way of ensuring that socially desirable responding to 
offence-supportive belief questionnaires can be monitored and controlled for. Inclusion of 
the BIDR in this study will allow exploration of the relationship between general socially 
desirable responding and “faking good” on offence-supportive belief questionnaires. CSOs 
are also interviewed about their offending and the interviews will be coded for the 
presence of beliefs relating to each IT. Interviews are conducted prior to the RSVP-M task 
to ensure that CSOs’ offence-supportive beliefs are primed when they complete the 
RSVP-M.  
Results from the three techniques will be compared to see what differences, if any, 
lie in the information about CSOs’ beliefs that they reveal. According to the prevailing 
theory, CSOs’ interviews should identify the presence of offence-supportive beliefs, and 
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CSOs should more strongly endorse questionnaire items than nonsexual offender controls. 
Also, if questionnaires and interviews accurately measure beliefs (rather than other 
artefacts), the types of beliefs that CSOs endorse in the questionnaire and interview should 
correlate with the types of beliefs they show evidence of in the RSVP-M study. Thus, this 
study aims to reveal new and important information about the use of different techniques 
in the study of CSOs' beliefs.  
METHOD 
Participants 
Sixty-seven men took part in this study: 34 CSOs and 33 OCs. Participants were 
recruited from New Zealand Department of Corrections prisons. Prison officers distributed 
a recruitment flyer to prisoners inviting them to take part in an “Offender Beliefs study. As 
with the previous studies, flyers stated that participants were wanted who could read well. 
Again, volunteer rates in this study could not be monitored. Five CSOs and one OC who 
took part in this study also participated in Study One. Three CSOs and no OCs who took 
part in this study participated in Study Two. Selection criteria and demographic details for 
each participant group follows.  
Group selection criteria and demographic details 
CSOs 
CSOs were prison inmates whose index offences included at least one sexual conviction 
against a person under the age of 16. Their ages ranged from 20 to 70 years (M = 46.35, 
SD = 11.52) and their victims’ ages ranged from two to 16 years (M = 10.06, SD = 3.29). 
According to CSOs’ conviction records, 25 were extrafamilial offenders and nine were 
intrafamilial. Four extrafamilial and one intrafamilial CSOs had received cognitive-
behavioural therapy to reconstruct offence-related cognitions but had re-offended against a 
child since. Index and historic conviction records revealed that seven CSOs had sexually 
assaulted a person over the age of 16. The mean Static-99 score for all CSO participants 
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indicated a medium recidivism risk level (M = 3.53, SD = 2.60) according to the criteria 
set by Phenix et al. (2000). Numbers of years CSOs had spent in formal education ranged 
from ten to 17 years (M = 11.15, SD = 2.12). Fourteen CSOs identified themselves as 
Māori, 19 as European, and one as “Other”.  
OCs were prison inmates who had never been convicted of a sexual offence. They 
were aged from 20 to 50 years (M = 31.27, SD = 7.39) and had spent between ten and 17 
years in formal education (M = 10.93, SD = 1.50). Thirteen OCs identified themselves as 
Māori, 19 as European, and one as “Other”.  Independent sample t-tests revealed the two 
offender groups did not differ significantly on number of years spent in education, number 
of violent convictions, or total number of convictions. CSOs and OCs differed 
significantly on age, t(65) = 6.36, p < .001, with CSOs having a higher mean age (M = 
46.35, SD = 11.52) than OCs (M = 31.27, SD = 7.39). Characteristics of the participant 
groups are displayed in Table 6.1.  
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Table 6.1. 
Demographic details for participant groups: Study Three 
 
C hild Sex  O ffenders O ffender C ontro ls
n  =  34 n  =  33
A ge (years)
M ean 46.35*** 31.27
SD 11.52 7 .39
Y ears in  education
M ean 11.15 10.93
SD 2.12 1 .50
Ethnic ity  (n)
M aori 14 13
European 19 19
O ther 1 1
T otal C onvictions (n)
M ean 29.79 47.76
SD 35.10 77.57
V iolen t C onvictions (n)
M ean 2.76 1 .70
SD 6.04 1 .90
C SO  type (n)
Intra 9 .0  - 
Extrafam ilia l 25.0  - 
C hild vic itm s (n)
M ean 3.88  - 
SD 5.53  - 
V ictim  age (years)
M ean 10.06  - 
SD 3.29  - 
ST A T IC -99 Score
M ean 3.53  - 
SD 2.60  - 
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Ethical Considerations 
The procedures and materials used in this study were approved by New Zealand 
Department of Corrections and Victoria University of Wellington. Before testing began all 
participants read (or were read) an information sheet outlining the procedure and their 
rights as participants (which followed NZPS Code of Ethics criteria). Participants were 
told they would need to provide details of their offending, which would be checked 
against their prison records on completion of testing. CSO participants were also informed 
that their interviews would be audiotaped and transcribed. Participants signed a consent 
form before taking part in the experiment and were sent a combined debriefing and results 
summary sheet once results were collated. Participants were also provided with a feedback 
form regarding the study, on which they could indicate their thoughts about the research 
and mention any issues that may have arisen through their participation. 
Overall Design 
The research design utilised three methods, as depicted in Figure 6.1. CSOs were 
interviewed and their transcripts used for a within-subjects analysis. CSOs and OCs took 
part in the RSVP-M and then completed a cognitive distortion questionnaire.  
 



































Measure One –Interview  
A semi-structured interview was conducted to measure CSOs’ offence-supportive 
beliefs (see Appendix Seven) and to activate those beliefs prior to CSOs commencing the 
RSVP-M. Open-ended interview questions were drawn from various sources, including 
interview schedules used to identify ITs in other CSO studies (e.g., Marziano, Ward, 
Beech, & Pattison, 2006) and consultation with Tony Ward and with the directors of New 
Zealand’s two CSO treatment programmes (Te Piriti and Kia Marama). Questions were 
designed to elicit beliefs that could be classified according to Ward and Keenan’s (1999) 
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their thoughts and feelings at the time of the offending, and their and their victims’ 
reactions to the offending. Four CSOs who denied their crimes were asked an unstructured 
series of questions regarding their perception of the offence (e.g., “why do you think the 
child accused you?” and “how was your relationship with the child different from other 
relationships?”). 
Measure Two –RSVP-M 
This design was based upon the successful RSVP-M design utilised by Wingrove 
and Bond (2005) wherein participants read short passages, sentence by sentence, at a self-
paced rate, while time taken to respond to each sentence was recorded. In the current study 
participants read 28 passages containing six to nine sentences (see Appendix Ten). Eight 
passages were “fillers” added to obscure task aims and provide a measure of overall 
reading speed. Twenty passages were constructed to tap into the five IT types. Embedded 
within these 20 passages were 40 target sentences (i.e. 20 sentence pairs) half of which 
were IT-consistent, and half of which were IT-inconsistent. To ensure a balanced design 
two versions of RSVP-M task material were created such that for every consistent target 
sentence pair that appeared in a passage in version one, an inconsistent target sentence pair 
appeared in that passage in version two, and vice versa. (see Figure 2). Participants were 
randomly assigned to each version of the RSVP-M. Target sentences were between six 
and nine words long. Target sentence pairs were carefully balanced for length and Flesch-
Kincaid Reading Ease levels across versions and IT type. To disguise task aims, each 
passage was followed by a related question which participants were instructed to answer 
yes or no to. For example, a passage about a lonely widowed man who molested his 
daughter was followed by the question, “Should David be punished for his actions?” 
Participants were told the study aim was to see whether different offender groups 
answered these questions differently.  
 




Figure 6.2. RSVP-M Design 
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The RSVP-M task was programmed using a Superlab package and run on a 12 
inch colour monitor screen (resolution = 1440 x 900 pixels) from a Dell Latitude D620 
laptop computer. Written instructions and stimuli were centred on a white screen in black 
20 pt. Tahoma font. Participants used a Cedrus Model RB-730 response pad with a clearly 
labelled, centrally positioned key to view each new sentence. Follow-up question answers 
were also indicated using the two endmost keys of the response pad, which were labelled 
Yes and No. These two keys were not alternated across participants because question 
responses were not a variable of interest in this study. Superlab controlled the random 
presentation of 28 passages and recorded (in milliseconds) the time that elapsed between 
each button press participants made to view a new sentence.  
Measure Three – Questionnaire 
The 78-item questionnaire was comprised of two measures (see Appendix Eight): 
1) MOLEST; Bumby, 1996.  
The MOLEST is a 38-item questionnaire designed to measure offence-supportive beliefs.  
It was selected for use in the current study because of its demonstrated success in 
distinguishing between CSOs and other offender groups (e.g., Arkowitz & Vess, 2003; 
Blumenthal et al., 1999; Bumby, 1996; Feelgood, Cortini & Thompson, 2005, Pervan & 
Hunter, 2007). Bumby (1996) reported that psychometric properties of the MOLEST are 
excellent (internal consistency; α = .97 and test-retest reliability; r = .84).  An example 
item is, “Some children can act very seductively”. Items are scored on a 4-point Likert 
scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 4 (Strongly agree) and the scores are summed. In line 
with previous research (Gannon, et al., 2007) and to increase measure sensitivity the 
MOLEST’s response format was modified by adding unsure as a response option to create 
a 5-point scale. Gannon et al. (in press) found that the MOLEST measured each of the five 
belief clusters identified by Ward and Keenan (1999). The ITs most frequently represented 
in the MOLEST are Children as Sexual Beings (15 items), Nature of Harm (10 items), and 
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Uncontrollable (five items). Unfortunately, Dangerous World and Entitlement are not well 
represented on the MOLEST: these ITs were tapped by only three and two MOLEST 
items respectively. The IT categories to which MOLEST items were assigned by Gannon 
et al. (2007) are listed in Appendix Nine. 
2) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR); Paulhus, 1984, 1988.  
To measure whether participants responded to the MOLEST in a socially desirable 
way items were randomly mixed with the 40-item BIDR. The BIDR is a self-report 
measure designed to assess the general tendency to answer questionnaire items in a 
socially desirable manner. It was chosen in the current study because it is a recommended 
measure of biased responding that is commonly used in conjunction with forensic risk 
assessment measures (Kroner & Weekes, 1996; Lanyon, 2001). Items on the original 
measure were scored on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not true) to 7 (very true). 
However, in line with previous research (Gannon et al., 2007), in this study a 5-point scale 
was used in place of Paulhus’ 7-point one. This modification to the scale was made for 
two reasons: 1) researchers in the current study have previously observed that the 
complexity involved in answering a seven-point scale can be confusing for offender 
participants, and, 2) adopting a five-point scale allowed items from this measure to be 
randomly mixed with MOLEST items and thereby helped disguise the MOLEST's 
purpose. Thus, in the current study, scale ratings ranged from 1 (not true) to 5 (very true). 
In the BIDR half the items are reverse scored. For reverse-scored items a rating of 5, for 
instance, was assigned a score of 1, while a rating of 1 was assigned a score of 5. The 
scores were then summed and correlated with the MOLEST5.  
                                               
5
 This use of the BIDR differs from that recommended by Paulhus (1988), who suggests removing participants with extreme responses 
(i.e., less than one or greater than 12 Likert scale responses of six or seven). In the current study, BIDR items were correlated with 
MOLEST items because a correlational approach has been adopted by other researchers. That is, other researchers have ensured that 
measures such as the Marlowe-Crowne Socially Desirability Scale (see Bumby, 1996; Hayashino et al., 1995; Stermac & Segal, 1989) 
and Other-Deception and Self-Deception Questionnaires (see Blumenthal et al., 1999) do not correlate (or are added as covariates) with 
CSO cognition scale responses. Nevertheless, the BIDR was not an ideal scale to use for correlational analysis in this study. 
Fortunately, RSVP-M results remained unchanged when the statistical analyses described in this study were rerun with extreme BIDR 
scorers removed from the sample. 
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The BIDR has two subscales: Impression Management scale (IM) and the Self 
Deception scale (SD). The IM contains 20 items measuring overt attempts to appear 
favourable to others (e.g., “I don’t gossip about other people’s business”). Paulhus (1988) 
reported good IM internal consistency (α ranging from .75 to .86), and moderate test-retest 
reliability (r = .65) over five weeks. The SD contains 20 items measuring participants’ 
tendency to self deceive (e.g., “I am a completely rational person”). Paulhus reported good 
SD internal consistency (α ranging from .68 to .80) and test-retest reliability (r = .69) over 
five weeks.  
Certain questionnaire items pertained to events some participants had not 
experienced and so could not be answered by those participants (e.g., “I always declare 
everything at customs”). These null responses were excluded from the group means 
reported below. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a single session that took between 40 and 
120 minutes. After giving written consent, participants provided demographic information 
(e.g., age and ethnicity) and outlined their index and historical convictions. CSOs then 
completed steps one, two and three below, while OCs completed steps two and three only.  
Step One – Interview 
CSOs were interviewed for between 20 and 60 minutes regarding their sexual 
offending. Each interview was audiotaped and later transcribed.  
Step Two – RSVP-M 
After receiving standardised verbal instructions participants completed a practice 
trial involving one passage and follow-up question. Participants then read the experimental 
passages at a self-paced rate and answered the question that followed each passage. 
Step Three – Questionnaire 
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Participants were given a paper questionnaire sheet to answer on their own. 
Responses were made by ticking a box on the Likert scale printed beneath each item.  
RESULTS 
Interview Data 
 Interview transcripts were analysed and coded for content that endorsed IT 
themes6. Content that seemed IT-consistent was highlighted and labelled. Coders noted 
instances where they were uncertain whether the content could definitely be categorised as 
IT-consistent. They then reviewed each transcript and considered whether, on balance, the 
speaker showed clear signs of holding each IT. To be classed as holding a particular IT the 
speaker must have uttered one or more statements that the coder was certain endorsed the 
IT.  
The main coder (Rater One) was the principle researcher in this study. Initially, the 
research supervisor (TW) held a training session with Rater One and reviewed three 
transcripts Rater One had analysed and coded. There was 100% agreement between TW 
and Rater One regarding IT-consistent themes in these transcripts. To allow reliability 
checks a second coder (Rater Two) who had coding experience and familiarity with ITs 
was drawn from Victoria University of Wellington’s Clinical Diploma programme. Rater 
One trained Rater Two using five randomly-selected transcripts. Raters One and Two then 
independently coded 40% of the total transcripts. Rater One coded the remaining 36% of 
transcripts. Interrater reliability was examined using Cohen’s Kappa. Because each IT was 
coded as present or absent there were five possible points of disagreement. For Children 
as Sexual Beings agreement occurred in 100% of ratings (κ = 1.00, T = 3.61,p < .001). For 
Nature of Harm there was 100% agreement (κ = 1.00., T = 3.60, p < .001) and for 
Uncontrollable 91% agreement (κ = .52, T = 2.13, p = .033). For Dangerous World there 
                                               
6
 One participant who strongly denied his offending declined to be interviewed.  
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was 85% agreement (κ = .68, T = 2.60, p = .009) and for Entitlement 100% agreement (κ 
= 1.00., T = 3.61, p < .001). According to Fliess’ (1981) criteria, the reliability rating for 
Uncontrollable was “fair,” for Dangerous World it was “good”, and for Children as 
Sexual Beings, Nature of Harm, and Entitlement ratings were “excellent.” Disagreements 
over ratings were discussed and resolved. 
 Thirty-two interviews were found to contain one or more IT-consistent themes, 
while one interview (where the speaker strongly denied offending) held no such themes. 
Numbers of CSOs endorsing each IT are as follows: Children as Sexual Beings, n = 25; 
Nature of Harm, n = 24; Uncontrollable, n = 25; Dangerous World, n = 14; Entitlement, n 
= 4.  
Questionnaire Analysis 
Cognitive distortions 
Based on prior research, it was hypothesised that CSO participants in the current 
study would tend to agree more with cognitive distortion questionnaire items than 
offender controls.  Each participant’s mean response score across 38 MOLEST items was 
calculated: these could range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Independent-samples t-tests comparing CSOs’ and OCs’ responses showed the two groups 
significantly differed in their responses, t(65) = 3.92, p < .001, partial eta squared = .191, 
with CSOs indicating greater endorsement of items (M = 2.30, SD = .58) than OCs (M = 
1.84, SD = .34). Both groups’ average scores tended towards the disagree option, but 
CSOs’ scores fell between disagree and unsure, while OCs’ scores fell between disagree 
and strongly disagree. A Pearson correlation was not found between CSOs’ Static-99 
scores and their MOLEST scores, r = -.147, n = 34, p = .407. 
Questionnaire items were grouped according to the IT they tapped and 
independent-samples t-tests were run for three ITs: Children as Sexual Beings (15 items), 
Nature of Harm (10 items), and Uncontrollable (five items). Dangerous World and 
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Entitlement were excluded from the analysis for two reasons: 1) Offenders and delinquents 
other than CSOs are thought to hold cognitions that have themes of entitlement (Walters, 
1995) and of the world being a dangerous, hostile place (Beck, 1999; Palmer, 2000; 
Walters, 2002), and 2) these ITs were tapped by only three and two items respectively.  
Because the analysis involved three t-tests, alpha was set at .01 to compensate for 
the associated inflation of type 1 error. CSOs’ scores were significantly higher for 
Children as Sexual Beings, t(65) = 3.01, p = .004, partial eta squared = .122, (M = 2.35, 
SD = 0.68 for CSOs and M = 1.94, SD = 0.39 for OCs), Nature of Harm, t(65) = 2.99, p = 
.004, partial eta squared = .121, (M = 1.92, SD = 0.62 for CSOs and M = 1.53, SD = 0.41 
for OCs), and Uncontrollable, t(65) = 4.50, p < .001, partial eta squared = .237,  (M = 
2.85, SD = 0.70 for CSOs and M = 2.11, SD = 0.64 for OCs). Thus—relative to OCs—
CSOs  made significantly higher endorsements of statements depicting (1) children as 
sexual, (2) children as being unharmed by sexual abuse, and (3) sexual abuse as 
uncontrollable. 
Self Deception (SD) and Impression Management (IM) 
As with the MOLEST, individual average response scores were calculated for SD 
and IM scales. Again, mean scores could range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). As expected, no significant difference was found in SD responses, t(65) = -0.52, p 
= .604. Both groups answered unsure to SD items (M = 3.00, SD = 0.39 for CSOs and M = 
3.05, SD = 0.32 for OCs). However, an unexpected significant difference was found 
between CSOs’ and offender controls’ IM scores, t(65) = 4.43, p < .001, with CSOs 
indicating greater endorsement of items (M = 2.79, SD = 0.52) than OCs (M = 2.27, SD = 
0.43). Both groups’ scores fell between the disagree and unsure options, but CSOs’ scores 
fell closer to unsure, while offender controls’ scores fell closer to disagree. Because 
groups differed on IM, Pearson correlations were calculated to investigate whether IM 
scores might account for group differences on the MOLEST. No significant correlation 
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existed between CSOs’ MOLEST and IM scores, r = -.076, n = 34, p = .668, nor between 
OCs’ MOLEST and IM scores, r = .220, n = 33, p = .219. Also, when a one-way ANOVA 
was run with IM as a covariate virtually no shift occurred in the MOLEST responses of 
CSOs (M = 2.29) and OCs (M = 1.85), and CSOs still showed significantly higher levels 
of MOLEST endorsement, t(64) = 2.54, p = .001. A Pearson correlation was also 
calculated to investigate the relationship between SD and the MOLEST. Again, no 
significant correlations were found between CSOs’ SD and MOLEST scores, r = -.300, n 
= 34, p = .085, and OCs' SD and MOLEST scores, r = -.280, n = 33, p = .115.  
In summary, questionnaire responses indicated that CSOs endorsed cognitive 
distortion items more strongly than offender controls, although they still tended to 
disagree with items. Although CSOs’ response scores on the SD scale were statistically 
equivalent with offender controls’, their response scores on the IM scale indicated higher 
levels of impression management than offender controls. However, neither CSOs nor OCs 
showed correlations between their IM and MOLEST scores, suggesting that CSOs’ higher 
MOLEST scores (and OCs’ lower MOLEST scores) were not influenced by a general 
tendency to portray oneself in a more favourable light. Results from the RSVP-M will also 
shed light on whether CSOs deliberately attempted to hide distorted beliefs when 
answering the MOLEST since this cognitive-experimental task examines relatively 
unconscious, automatic responses. 
RSVP-M 
Before comparing CSOs’ and offender controls’ responses to target sentences it 
was important to ensure general sentence response times did not differ. Individual mean 
RTs to all filler passage sentences combined were calculated. Independent-samples t-tests 
indicated that there was no significant difference t(65) = -0.19, p = .850,  in the mean time 
CSOs (M = 16611.51ms, SD = 7852.41ms) and OCs (M = 16946.31ms, SD = 6477.31ms) 
took to respond to filler passage sentences. 
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As discussed in Chapter Four, RT data typically contains extremely long or short 
responses resulting from factors unrelated to the variable being measured (Ratcliffe, 
1993). For example, very short RTs can reflect accidental button-pressing while very long 
RTs result when participants are distracted from the task. In line with recommendations 
for dealing with such data (Barnett & Lewis, 1978; Ratcliffe, 1993), RTs to target 
sentences were Windsorised such that CSOs’ and OCs’ extreme RTs were adjusted to sit 
within two standard deviations of their group’s mean.   
 Next, the important question of whether CSOs and OCs showed different patterns 
of responding to IT-consistent and IT-inconsistent target sentences was explored. If CSOs 
hold IT-consistent beliefs, when compared to controls they should show a pattern of 
smaller RTs to IT-consistent than IT-inconsistent sentences. To investigate, each 
participant’s mean RTs to IT-consistent and IT-inconsistent target sentences within each 
IT were calculated. Next, these means were used to deduce the pattern of responding each 
participant showed within the five IT categories. Within each IT category IT-consistent 
sentences were subtracted from IT-inconsistent sentences to produce a mean difference 
score. In addition, mean RTs to all IT-consistent sentences were subtracted from all IT-
inconsistent sentences to produce a mean difference score for all ITs combined. A positive 
mean difference score would indicate a participant was faster to respond to IT-consistent 
sentences relative to IT-inconsistent sentences, and thus would indicate a more “distorted” 
pattern of responding. 
 A series of alpha adjusted (.01) independent-samples t-tests were run to investigate 
whether CSOs and OCs differed in their pattern of responding. Surprisingly, no significant 
differences were found in the mean difference scores for CSOs and OCs for Children as 
Sexual Beings, t(65) = -0.79, p = .430, partial eta squared = .010 (CSOs’ M = -564.34ms, 
SD = 5567.10ms; OCs’ M = 581.38ms, SD = 6227.47ms), Dangerous World, t(65) = -
0.02, p = .980, partial eta squared < .001 (CSOs’ M = -203.04ms, SD =  10069.91 ms; 
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OCs’ M = -156.30 ms, SD = 4325.66ms), and Entitlement, t(65) = -0.02, p = .980, partial 
eta squared < .001 (CSOs’ M = -2123.92ms, SD = 7671.96ms; OCs’ M = -2069.05 ms, SD 
= 10335.04ms). Similarly, no significant differences were found for Nature of Harm, t(65) 
= -0.14, p = .885, partial eta squared < .001 (CSOs’ M = -2851.19ms, SD = 9304.19ms; 
OCs’ M = -2565.22ms, SD = 6612.44ms), Uncontrollable, t(65) = -0.30, p = .764, partial 
eta squared = .001 (CSOs’ M = 321.71ms, SD = 10926.20ms; OCs’ M = 972.13ms, SD = 
5876.43ms), nor for all ITs combined, t(65) = -0.57, p = .574, partial eta squared = .005 
(CSOs’ M = -1084.16ms, SD = 3213.97ms; OCs’ M = -647.41ms, SD = 3108.09ms). A 
Pearson correlation was not found between CSOs’ Static-99 scores and their RSVP 
responses to any IT. 
 Thus far no significant differences could be found between CSOs and offender 
controls. However, each CSO would not be expected to hold all five IT-themed belief 
clusters. Inclusion of CSOs who do not appear to endorse a particular IT when responding 
to conventional assessments may therefore have obscured group differences in RSVP-M 
responses to that particular IT. Hence, data gathered from the interviews and questionnaire 
was now used to partition out CSOs from the RSVP-M analysis who showed no evidence 
of holding each IT according to these conventional methods.  
 For this phase of the analysis only three ITs were investigated: Children as Sexual 
Beings, Nature of Harm, and Uncontrollable. Again, this was done because Dangerous 
World and Entitlement beliefs are thought to be held by offenders other than CSOs and 
because these ITs achieved low levels of endorsement in the interviews and were 
underrepresented by items in the MOLEST. 
 To prepare RSVP-M data for this phase of the analysis, two datasets were created 
for each of the three ITs under investigation. Of the two datasets, one had removed from it 
all the CSOs who did not endorse that particular IT in their interview. The other had 
removed from it all CSOs who did not endorse that particular IT on the questionnaire (i.e., 
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CSOs whose mean Likert scale scores across questionnaire items tapping that IT were 
equal to or lower than the mean OC score for that IT). Numbers of CSOs classified as 
endorsing each of the three ITs on the questionnaire were: Children as Sexual Beings, n = 
20; Nature of Harm, n = 20; Uncontrollable, n = 13. To recap results reported earlier, 
numbers of CSOs endorsing ITs in the interview were: Children as Sexual Beings, n = 25; 
Nature of Harm, n = 24; Uncontrollable, n = 25.    
 Having selected CSOs who, according to traditional measures, appeared to hold 
distorted beliefs, would RSVP-M data reveal differences between CSO and OC 
responses? A series of alpha adjusted (.01) independent-samples t-tests were rerun on each 
of the six datasets to see if a difference existed between the group’s mean difference 
scores for each of the three ITs. Looking at datasets where CSOs had been selected for 
removal according to interview responses, no significant differences were found in the 
mean difference scores for CSOs and OCs for Children as Sexual Beings, t(56) = -0.60, p 
= .552, partial eta squared = .006 (CSOs’ M =  -408.24ms, SD = 6249.75ms; OCs’ M =  
581.38ms, SD =  6227.47ms), Nature of Harm, t(52) = -0.20, p = .843, partial eta squared 
= .001 (CSOs’ M = -3021.44ms, SD = 10244.03ms; OCs’ M = -2565.22ms, SD = 
6612.44ms), and Uncontrollable, t(56) = 0.16, p = .875, partial eta squared < .001 (CSOs’ 
M = 1349.70ms, SD =  11961.92ms; OCs’ M = 972.13ms, SD = 5876.43ms).  
Looking at datasets where CSOs had been removed according to their 
questionnaire responses, again no significant differences were found for mean difference 
scores for Children as Sexual Beings, t(53) = -1.23, p = .224, partial eta squared = .028 
(CSOs’ M = -1490.80ms, SD = 5950.92ms; OCs’ M = 581.38ms, SD = 6227.47ms), 
Nature of Harm, t(55) = -0.81, p = .421, partial eta squared = .012 (CSOs’ M = -
4326.59ms, SD = 9804.02ms; OCs’ M = -2565.22ms, SD = 6612.44ms), and 
Uncontrollable, t(61) = -0.42, p = .674, partial eta squared = .003 (CSOs’ M = 29.33ms, 
SD =  11225.12ms; OCs’ M = 972.13ms, SD = 5876.43ms). 
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 Because CSOs and OCs significantly differed on age all questionnaire and 
RSVP-M analyses mentioned above were rerun as ANOVAs with age added as a 
covariate. In each case the pattern of results remained the same.  
Agreement Across Measures 
 An important final question to address concerns the extent to which interview, 
questionnaire and RSVP-M responses related to each other. In other words, did the three 
measures show agreement in terms of whether they classified a CSO as holding a 
particular IT? To examine this, for each measure CSOs were assigned a ‘1’ if they had 
been classed as supporting a particular IT and a ‘0’ if they had not. CSOs were classed as 
supporting an IT on the RSVP-M if their mean difference score for that IT was positive 
(see above for interview and questionnaire classification methods). Classification of IT 
endorsement according to the three methods is shown in Table 6.2. Cohen’s Kappa was 
then calculated to assess agreement between the three measures as to whether each CSO 
held each IT. Once again, only responses to Children as Sexual Beings, Nature of Harm, 
and Uncontrollable were tested. Table 6.3 sets out the percentage of CSOs endorsing each 
belief cluster, while Table 6.4 provides interrater reliability coefficients between belief 
clusters.  
Kappa ratings below .40 are considered “poor” (Fliess, 1981), while negative 
Kappa ratings indicate observed agreement is less than chance agreement. As Table 6.3  
demonstrates, interrater reliability between the three measures was very low, ranging from 
poor to below chance levels. The interview and questionnaire measures were similar in 
terms of the numbers of CSOs that were classed as holding a particular IT. However, the 
two measures disagreed in terms of which CSOs were classed as holding each IT. In other 
words, the types of IT a CSO was demonstrated to hold depended on the type of measure 
used. Compared to the two conventional measures, the RSVP-M classed far fewer CSOs 
as holding each of the three ITs (RSVP-M classification rates ranged from about one third 
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to one half lower than interview and questionnaire rates). Therefore, the lack of agreement 
between the RSVP-M and other measures could be due to low levels of RSVP-M IT 
endorsement, although perusal of the data in Table 6.2 suggests that the RSVP-M varied 
from other measures both in terms of the number and type of ITs being measured. 
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Table 6.2 
Classification of IT endorsement, per individual, according to three methods 
CSO Interview Questionnaire RSVP-M Interview Questionnaire RSVP-M Interview Questionnaire RSVP-M
1 X X X X X
2 X X X X X X X
3 X X X X X X X X
4 X X X X X
5 X X X X X X
6 X X X X X X
7 X X X X X X X
8 X X X X X
9 X X X X X X
10 X X X
11 X X X X X
12 X X X X
13 X X
14 X X X X X
15 X X X X X X X X
16 X X X X X X X
17 X X X X X X
18 X X X X
19 X X X X X X X X
20 X X X X X X X
21 X X X X X
22 X X X X X X X X
23 X X X X X X X
24 X X X X
25 X X X X X
26 X X X X X
27 X X X X X X X
28 X X X X X X X
29 X X X X X X
30 X X X X X X
31 X X X X X
32 X X X X X X X
33 X X X X
Total 25 22 15 21 24 14 25 29 15
Children as Sexual Beings Nature of Harm Uncontrollable
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Table 6.3 
Percentages of CSOs classed as holding three belief clusters by measure (n = 33)  
 
IT
Children as Sexual 
Beings (CSB) 76% 67% 45%
Nature of Harm 
(NOH) 64% 73% 48%
Uncontrollable 










Questionnaire κ = 0.05, T = 0.29, p = . 774  - 
RSVP-M κ = 0.31, T = 2.15, p = . 032 κ < 0.01, T = 0.00, p =1.000
Questionnaire κ = -0.18, T = -1.03, p = .301  - 
RSVP-M κ = -0.07, T = -0.40, p = .692 κ = .127, T = 0.86, p = .392
Questionnaire κ = -0.19, T = -1.21, p = .227  - 
RSVP-M κ = -0.04, T = -0.30, p = .767 κ = -0.02, T = -0.20, p = .846
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DISCUSSION 
The aim of this study was to investigate offence-supportive beliefs in CSOs using 
interview, questionnaire and experimental measures. It was hypothesised that CSOs would 
show evidence, according to each of these measures, of beliefs with themes matching 
Ward and Kennan’s (1999) five ITs. In terms of interview data, this hypothesis was 
supported. Of the 33 CSOs interviewed, only one CSO (who strongly denied his offences) 
failed to utter statements that could be classed as IT-consistent. This finding aligns with a 
recent interview study of CSOs in which all 22 participants were found to endorse ITs 
(Marziano, 2002). It also accords with the many other interview studies that have shown 
CSOs utter cognitive distortions when being interviewed (see Gannon & Polaschek, 
2006). As with Marziano et al.’s (2006) study it was also found that the most commonly 
endorsed IT in the current study was Children as Sexual Beings, while the least endorsed 
was Entitlement.  
 In keeping with the hypothesis, CSOs also showed evidence of holding offence-
supportive beliefs when their MOLEST responses were compared with those of offender 
controls. Again, this finding aligns with previous research showing that CSOs can be 
successfully distinguished from comparison groups using the MOLEST and other 
questionnaire measures of CSOs’ beliefs (see Gannon & Polaschek, 2006). When 
MOLEST items were grouped according to IT type CSOs provided higher endorsement 
levels than OCs for Children as Sexual Beings, Nature of Harm, and Uncontrollable. This 
is the first time that CSOs’ and OCs’ item responses to an existing CSO questionnaire 
have been grouped and analysed according to IT-themed belief clusters. This finding will 
be useful information for researchers wishing to develop questionnaire measures designed 
to tap ITs or similar schemas.   
 It was interesting to compare participant’s MOLEST responses with their IM and 
SD scores. Impression management (IM) refers to a general tendency to deliberately alter 
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one’s responses to questionnaires in order to appear more socially desirable. Although 
CSOs in the current study showed higher levels of IM endorsement than OCs, no 
correlation was found between IM and MOLEST scores, and adjusting MOLEST scores 
for IM responses did not alter the pattern of results. Self-Deception (SD), which is the 
tendency to unconsciously and positively distort one’s self-perception, was not found to 
differ between CSOs and OCs and, again, adjusting for the presence of SD made no 
difference to the pattern of MOLEST responding. These findings are similar to other 
studies in which socially desirable responding has not appeared to account for CSOs’ 
responses to questionnaire measures of offence-supportive beliefs (see Gannon & 
Polaschek, 2006). This could suggest that, contrary to some claims, CSOs do answer such 
questionnaires honestly. On the other hand, the tendency to be honest about one’s flaws 
and foibles does not necessarily predict the honesty with which one answers items relating 
children and sexual themes. That is to say, CSOs and/or OCs might show a general 
tendency to answer questionnaires with candour, but still answer sensitive questions 
regarding child-related sexuality in a false manner designed to meet assumed 
administrator expectations. Thus, it can be very hard to deduce from CSO questionnaires 
exactly what phenomena respondents’ answers reflect. 
Our findings that CSOs showed evidence of offence-supportive beliefs on 
interview and questionnaire measures merely add weight to a body of research 
demonstrating similar findings. Of key interest, however, was whether CSOs would show 
evidence of such beliefs when their responses to the RSVP-M task were compared with 
those of controls. Against predictions, no differences could be found between the two 
offender groups. This result held even when three ITs were singled out and analysis of 
each IT included only those CSOs who had endorsed that IT, first in the interview and 
then on the questionnaire. Recall also that CSOs in this study had been interviewed about 
their offending immediately prior to completing the RSVP-M. Presumably the 
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interviewing process would have activated any offence-supportive beliefs they held, 
meaning CSOs were well primed before taking part in the RSVP-M.  
On the one hand, the RSVP-M results mirror the experimental results of Gannon et 
al. (2006) and those obtained in Studies One and Two in this thesis. The current result 
suggests the null findings in these earlier studies did not arise because CSO participants’ 
beliefs were not primed, or because certain CSOs included in the analyses obscured group 
differences. On the other hand, the RSVP-M result runs contrary to the questionnaire and 
interview results found in this and other studies, and also to theoretical and practical work 
asserting that CSOs generally hold entrenched beliefs that set them apart from others.  
 There are two very broad interpretations that can be made in respect of this 
finding. One interpretation is that design flaws in the RSVP-M experiment (and the other 
cognitive experiments conducted in this thesis) led to a failure to statistically distinguish 
CSOs from controls. Certainly the current study had limitations, which will be discussed 
shortly. The other interpretation is that CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs to a lesser 
extent than the literature and current treatment practices imply; an interpretation that will 
also be discussed. Before turning our attention to these interpretations, however, a final 
and very important result must be addressed; the lack of agreement between the IT ratings 
that each of the three measures assigned to CSOs. There was nonsignificant agreement 
between the three measures for Children as Sexual Beings, Nature of Harm, and 
Uncontrollable, meaning that IT classification agreements were either at or below levels 
that would be obtained by chance. The lack of correlation between RSVP-M ratings and 
those on the conventional measures is perhaps not surprising in light of the fact that 
cognitive experiments have typically not found evidence of CSOs’ beliefs, while 
questionnaire and interview typically have. In other words, research thus far has suggested 
experimental results might not align with those generated via more traditional means. 
Much more surprising, however, is the lack of agreement between questionnaire and 
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interview ratings of CSOs' IT-themed beliefs. While previous research has found that 
interview techniques reveal more distortions than questionnaires (Neidigh & Krop, 1992) 
one would still expect agreement between the types of endorsements being made by CSOs 
on both measures. This study is apparently the first to investigate this highly important 
relationship. It is vital that researchers and clinicians understand differences in the nature 
of responses generated from questionnaires and interviews as these are the two main 
methods of CSO beliefs assessment. Therefore, there is a strong need for further research 
to find out whether the current lack of agreement between the two measures is a general 
finding or unique to this study.   
 As mentioned, there were limitations in the RSVP-M experiment that may have 
affected study outcomes. First, sample sizes were fairly small, which may have made it 
difficult to detect differences. However, the overall pattern of responding did not 
generally run in the expected direction—offender controls’ RSVP-M scores actually 
tended to run in a slightly more “distorted” pattern of responding than CSOs’ scores—
indicating that the null RSVP-M results were unlikely to be attributable to sample size. 
Nevertheless, replication of this study using larger sample sizes would be useful. 
The study was also limited by the lack of a non-offending control group. Offenders 
in general are thought to have beliefs and attitudes that set them apart from nonoffenders 
(Walters, 1995), so perhaps more distinct differences might emerge between CSOs’ and 
nonoffenders’ RSVP responses if non-offending samples are included in future RSVP-M 
research. Nonoffenders could also provide norms that would allow CSOs who show no 
Dangerous World or Entitlement beliefs (according to conventional measures) to be 
removed from analysis when looking at RSVP responses to these ITs.  
 The RSVP-M experiment might also have been improved through inclusion of 
more, or different, passages. Only four passages for each IT were presented to participants 
in this study and prior testing was not conducted to ensure that passages most effectively 
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represented IT themes and could be related to by CSOs. The experiment could be 
replicated with more passages that are demonstrably likely to trigger CSOs’ ITs. 
 Despite potential limitations of the RSVP-M experiment, the current results are not 
isolated. They add weight to the two previous pieces of experimental research in which 
evidence for CSO-specific cognition has not yet been detected, despite the fact that in each 
case the experimental design was previously used in other studies to detect information 
processing differences between groups. If CSOs generally have abnormal beliefs why 
don’t they appear to process information differently to comparison groups? Researchers 
must continue to probe this question, seeking new and improved methods for 
experimentally testing the way CSOs attend to and interpret their worlds. It is possible that 
CSOs do not typically hold entrenched beliefs that significantly differ from the beliefs of 
other men and that can be isolated and probed at will. 
The lack of correlation between the three methodologies also indicates that 
different measures can introduce different response artefacts. Questionnaire and interview 
measures have suggested that such beliefs are common among CSOs, but without 
knowing exactly what phenomena it is that CSO questionnaires and interviews measure 
scientists must remain open-minded about this issue. 
To summarise, this concluding study has used a unique, multimethod approach to 
investigate the offence-supportive beliefs of CSOs. All but one CSO participant showed 
signs of holding abnormal beliefs with IT-consistent themes when being interviewed. 
Similarly, CSOs appeared to show higher levels of belief in the IT-themed statements 
listed in a questionnaire measure. However, when an implicit experimental measure of IT-
consistent beliefs was used CSOs could not be distinguished from OCs. Furthermore, 
there was no agreement between the three measures in terms of the types of beliefs they 
classified each CSO as holding. These results indicate that researchers must continue to 
seek new ways of conceptualising and investigating the nature of CSO cognition. 




What Were They Thinking? General Conclusions 
 
 
Personally, I did not meet any [child sexual] offenders who did not hold distorted beliefs 
when explaining what actually happened. We are talking about sexual offences against 
children.   




This thesis began by outlining the popular theory that CSOs hold offence-
supportive beliefs. As the above quote illustrates, the intuitive appeal of this theory rests 
on the fact that it posits a common locus of causation among CSOs, and seems to explain 
how CSOs can commit crimes that most people find abhorrent. Unfortunately, however, 
the overall approach by which this theory has so far been tested has somewhat lacked in 
scientific rigour. Methods examining the theory have typically measured the extent to 
which CSOs utter or endorse “cognitive distortions”, on the rationale that those distortions 
represent the contents of stable cognitive structures that occupy a fundamental causal role 
in the generation of sexual offending behaviour. In the preceding pages it has been argued 
that cognitive distortions (i.e., CSOs’ seemingly distorted-sounding statements) can in fact 
represent other phenomena, such as socially desirable responding and post-hoc 
rationalising. The primary aim of this thesis has been to investigate CSOs’ beliefs using 
methods less susceptible to socially desirable responding and less dependent on 
introspective and retrospective reporting. None of the experimental designs employed in 
this thesis have previously been used within the CSO population. Furthermore, Studies 
two and three represent the first occasions in which CSOs’ beliefs have been primed prior 
to experimental investigation.  
 
                                               
7
 This comment was written by an anonymous peer reviewer of a well-known psychology journal. 
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Lexical Decision Task 
 In Chapter Four CSOs’ beliefs were investigated using a robust experimental 
technique called the lexical decision task. Lexical decision tasks have long been used to 
study the contents and nature of cognitive structures. Although there are different types of 
lexical decision task, all draw upon the fact that people are faster to process words that 
follow a relevant cue (e.g., a related context sentence) than words that do not. The type of 
lexical decision task employed in this thesis was previously used in other populations to 
probe expected differences between readers’ beliefs (e.g., Baldwin et al., 1993; Kay & 
Jost, 2003; Mikulincer, 1998; Mikulincer et al., 2000).  
 CSOs, OCs, and nonoffender controls were presented with incomplete sentences 
that could be interpreted in an offence-supportive or non offence-supportive manner, 
depending on the reader’s predominant beliefs. Each sentence stem was followed by a 
word that was either consistent or inconsistent with an offence-supportive interpretation of 
the preceding sentence. It was hypothesised that, compared to controls, CSOs would 
respond faster to words that completed sentences in a manner consistent with offence-
supportive beliefs than sentences inconsistent with offence-supportive beliefs. Contrary to 
predictions, CSOs did not show a different overall pattern of responding to consistent and 
inconsistent words than either control group. When the data was grouped according to the 
belief themes that characterise individual ITs, CSOs remained statistically 
indistinguishable from controls for four out of the five ITs (Children as Sexual Beings, 
Dangerous World, Entitlement, and Nature of Harm). Compared to OCs, CSOs did show 
accelerated recognition for words supporting the Uncontrollable IT. While that result 
could suggest that CSOs hold Uncontrollable beliefs, this interpretation is questionable for 
two reasons: 1) CSOs’ responses to this IT did not differ from community controls’, and 
2) OCs’ responses to Uncontrollable were unusually elevated.  
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 Overall, results from the lexical decision task indicated that CSO participants did 
not interpret sentences in line with offence-supportive beliefs. This might indicate that 
CSOs do not hold offence-supportive beliefs to the extent currently posited in the 
literature. Or, as will be discussed, it could suggest that current conceptions of the 
structure of such beliefs are inadequate. What is certain—as discussed in Chapters Four, 
Five and Six—is that the results highlight the need to continue to use cognitive 
experimental methods to study CSOs’ beliefs. 
Primed Memory Study 
 Chapter Five presented a study in which a different experimental method was used 
to investigate beliefs relating to the Children as Sexual Beings IT. In order to maximise 
the chance that these types of beliefs were activated, and to study the effects of activation, 
visual primes (i.e., pictures of scantily-clad children) were presented to half the CSO and 
OC participants. Under the guise of an age-judging task, CSOs and OCs were exposed to 
pictures of either semi-clothed children (priming condition) or clothed, mature adults 
(control condition). Participants then read ambiguous sentences describing children’s 
actions that could be interpreted in a sexualised manner. To disguise task aims and ensure 
that more general interpretation or response biases did not exist between groups, neutral 
sentences and ambiguous sentences that could be interpreted in a threat-consistent manner 
were also presented. Next, participants completed a surprise recognition test in which half 
the potentially sexual sentences were re-presented in an unambiguously sexual form, and 
half in an unambiguously nonsexual form. Reworked neutral sentences and unambiguous 
threat-related sentences were also presented.  
 As expected, CSOs in the priming condition looked at pictures of children longer 
than OCs. Because viewing times are an indicator of sexual interest (e.g., Abel et al., 
1998; Gress, 2005), this suggested that beliefs which might lead CSOs to make sexualised 
interpretations of children’s behaviour should be primed. Also as expected, none of the 
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four groups (i.e., primed and unprimed CSOs and OCs) differed in their responses to 
neutral and threat-related recognition sentences, indicating that results were not influenced 
by more general memory biases. Contrary to hypotheses, primed and/or control CSOs did 
not show a recognition bias for sexualised sentences, nor faster response times to these 
sentences. This finding suggests that CSOs did not interpret the original sentences in line 
with offence-supportive beliefs, which is surprising given that the Children as Sexual 
Beings IT is meant to be widely held by CSOs (Marziano et al., 2006) and is thought to be 
CSO-specific (Ward et al., 2007). As with the first study in this thesis, the results raise 
questions about whether CSO participants actually held offence-supportive beliefs, or 
whether current conceptualisations of such beliefs are accurate. The findings also imply 
that the null findings of the lexical decision task did not occur because CSOs’ cognitive 
structures weren’t appropriately activated. Once again, this study highlights the need for 
further experimental research within the sexual offending field. 
The Multimethod Study 
In the concluding study to this thesis, data regarding the content of CSOs’ beliefs 
was gathered using three methods: interview, questionnaire, and cognitive experimental. 
Results generated by these methods were then triangulated to see whether the methods 
showed agreement regarding the extent and nature of offence-supportive beliefs. CSOs 
were interviewed and the content of each CSO’s statement was categorised according to 
the five IT types. Next, with CSOs’ beliefs presumably primed by their interview 
discussions, CSOs and OCs participated in an experimental task (Rapid Serial Visual 
Presentation-Modified), which uses sentence reading times to explore the content held in 
cognitive structures. RSVP-M tasks are based on the finding that readers process 
sentences faster if the sentences continue preceding text in line with the reader’s mental 
model (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993). This finding has successfully been used to investigate 
differences in the content of cognitive structures that particular groups of readers have 
    
150 
used to comprehend texts (Macleod & Cohen, 1993; Wingrove & Bond, 2005). Finally, 
CSOs and OCs completed a questionnaire measure (MOLEST; Bumby, 1984), which is 
often used to assess CSOs’ beliefs for treatment and research purposes.  
As hypothesised, CSOs showed evidence of holding distorted beliefs according to 
interview data: 32 out of 33 CSOs made statements that appeared to endorse beliefs 
pertaining to one or more of the five ITs. CSOs also appeared distorted according to the 
questionnaire measure, although they disagreed on average with MOLEST items, their 
ratings were significantly higher than OCs’ average item ratings. Against predictions, 
however, CSOs did not show evidence of holding distorted beliefs on the RSVP-M task; 
their pattern of responding to IT-consistent and IT-inconsistent sentences could not be 
distinguished from that of OCs.  This finding held true for each of the five ITs. Even when 
RSVP-M responses to three ITs (Children as Sexual Beings, Nature of Harm, and 
Uncontrollable) were reanalysed with inclusion of only those CSOs who demonstrated IT 
endorsement on the conventional measures, CSOs could still not be statistically 
discriminated from controls. Thus, once again, the experimental result obtained in this 
study seemed to suggest that CSO participants did not hold distorted beliefs that produce 
offence-supportive interpretations of social stimuli.  
An important question in this study was whether the three methods would concur 
in terms of the types of IT that each CSO was deemed to hold. To investigate, CSOs were 
categorised as either endorsing or not endorsing Children as Sexual Beings, Nature of 
Harm, and Uncontrollable according to each of the measures. Categorisations made via 
the RSVP-M did not show agreement with either the interview or questionnaire 
categorisations, and considerably fewer CSOs were categorised as endorsing each IT 
according to the RSVP-M method. This result did not come as a great surprise, given the 
fact that experimental techniques so far have not detected evidence of widespread offence-
supportive beliefs among CSOs.  More surprising, however, was the finding that although 
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the interview and questionnaire techniques rated similar numbers of CSOs as endorsing 
each IT, the two methods showed considerable variation regarding the types of belief each 
CSO was deemed to hold. Overall, the findings from this third study raise important 
questions about the phenomena and potential artefacts measured by interview, 
questionnaire, and experimental methods. 
Limitations 
 Across the three studies, findings seemed to suggest that the CSOs tested did not 
hold beliefs whose contents map onto the ITs identified by Ward and Keenan (1999). Of 
course, an alternative explanation is that CSO participants did hold distorted beliefs, but 
methodological flaws in all three studies prevented the detection of those beliefs. 
Although all methods in this thesis were based on methods that have been successfully 
deployed to find expected group differences within other fields, like any experimental 
research the present studies had limitations. For instance, this thesis investigated a sample 
of child sexual offenders that by its very nature was biased. All CSOs who took part in the 
three studies volunteered to do so. Perhaps CSOs were more prepared to take part because 
they had adjusted their thinking in relation to sexual offending, and thus were not as 
defensive as CSOs who shunned the research. Of course, forcing unwilling individuals to 
participate in psychological research is hardly a viable option, so this idea must remain a 
speculative one. Another potential sampling bias is the fact that only CSOs who had 
actually been detected and incarcerated for their crimes were studied. There may well be 
key differences between these men and those who abuse children but avoid incarceration. 
Qualities characteristic of incarcerated men might have existed prior to imprisonment 
(e.g., less expertise grooming and silencing victims, greater desire for detection by others), 
or might be a consequence of imprisonment (e.g., greater reflection on offending, 
willingness to change). These factors should be considered when using the current 
findings to draw conclusions about CSOs as a whole. Also worth considering is the fact 
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that out of the 67 men who took part in one or more studies in this thesis, seven had 
previously received cognitive-behavioural treatment for their offending. Although all 
seven had since re-offended, the previous attempts at belief modification may have altered 
their responses somewhat. 
The requirement that participants be reasonably good at reading also created a 
sampling bias. Well-read offenders are not necessarily representative of the offender 
population at large. Perhaps CSOs who are poor readers (and therefore excluded from this 
type of research) are for some reason more likely to hold offence-supportive beliefs than 
good readers. For instance, poor readers may have cognitive limitations that make them 
less likely to analyse and modify their belief systems while in prison. While the idea that 
excluding poor readers may have skewed results is worth bearing in mind when 
considering current findings, in the absence of neuropsychological testing this idea is mere 
conjecture.  
 The requirement for good readers also resulted in fairly small sample sizes being 
used in each study. This could have made it difficult for group differences to reach 
statistical significance. Having said that, overall patterns of responding in each of the 
studies did not move in the expected direction. That is, CSOs’ responses did not tend to 
look more distorted than controls. Therefore, even if group sizes were increased, it seems 
highly unlikely that significant differences in the expected direction would have been 
found between CSOs and controls.  
 Finally, it should be noted that the settings in which this research took place were 
often less than ideal. The makeshift experimental facilities that were set up in different 
units across different prisons sometimes left participants exposed to noise interference and 
interruptions from others while completing reaction time tasks. Compounding this was the 
fact that not all participants seemed to maintain concentration well and some even talked 
during tasks. In reaction time studies cognitive interference and lapses in attention can 
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skew overall results. Although attempts were made to statistically compensate for this 
(i.e., all reaction time data was transformed through Windsorising), it would have been 
preferable to work in experimental settings that minimised distractions and encouraged 
participants to remain focused on the task.  
 Regardless of potential limitations, the overall findings in this thesis raise some 
substantial questions regarding current conceptions of CSOs’ beliefs. In the following 
section some of these questions will be addressed. First it will be asked whether offence-
supportive beliefs are as widespread as commonly thought and, if not, what implications 
this has for the underlying nature of cognitive distortions. Second, traditional experimental 
approaches towards CSOs' beliefs will be examined in the light of recent conceptions 
about the dynamic and embodied nature of cognitive processes. The discussion will then 
turn to research and treatment implications that arise from the findings generated within 
this thesis. 
Current Conceptions of CSOs’ Beliefs 
 In the introduction to this thesis it was argued that researchers and clinicians tend 
to accept the idea that most or all CSOs hold distorted beliefs. Consequently, a key aim of 
current treatment programmes is to change or restructure these beliefs. However, the 
findings that emerged from the three studies in this thesis suggest that there may be 
something wrong with current conceptions of CSOs’ beliefs. This raises two key 
possibilities: either offence-supportive beliefs do not play as predominant a role in CSOs’ 
crimes as is currently thought, or offence-supportive beliefs are major aetiological factors 
but revisions are needed in the way that they are conceived of and studied. Each of these 
possibilities will now be considered in turn. 
Prevalence of CSOs’ Offence-Supportive Beliefs 
 Offence-supportive beliefs or schemas are generally thought to be widespread 
among CSOs. These cognitive structures are also thought to differentiate CSOs from other 
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individuals. Yet evidence of IT-themed beliefs was not uncovered in this thesis. This is 
not the first time evidence of CSOs’ offence-supportive beliefs has failed to materialise 
under experimental investigation; a null result also emerged when Gannon et al. (2006) 
used an implicit memory study to investigate beliefs clustered within four IT categories. 
Recall that Gannon et al. used a similar paradigm to that used by Stermac and Segal 
(1989), inasmuch as CSOs and controls were compared on how they interpreted vignettes 
describing adult-child sexual contact. However, rather than asking participants to self-
report on their interpretations, Gannon et al. adopted an implicit, recall-based approach 
designed to minimise experimenter effects and socially desirable responding. The null 
result that emerged prompted Gannon et al. (2006) to suggest that there is some doubt 
surrounding “…existing cognitive distortion literature predicting that child molesters are 
generally guided by a number of implicit theories” (p. 14). Results from the current three 
studies could be interpreted in a similar way. Of course, the findings of this thesis are not 
being used to deny the importance of beliefs as aetiological factors; there are undoubtedly 
CSOs whose beliefs are abnormal and supportive of child sexual abuse. However, it is 
possible that these beliefs are less widespread among CSOs than is currently thought, or 
that they are not especially specific to this population of men.  In short, their role in the 
commissioning of child sexual offending may have been overstated.  
 The strong sense in the literature that CSOs typically hold abnormal beliefs is 
predominantly based on the fact that CSOs so often seem to utter or endorse seemingly 
distorted-sounding statements (i.e., cognitive distortions). However, it is far from obvious 
that such utterances or endorsements are reliable indicators of distorted beliefs. They 
might in fact reflect a host of other phenomena, ranging from attempts to appear more 
agreeable (to oneself or others) or to meet presumed experimenter expectations, through to 
attempts to create rational accounts of seemingly irrational behaviour or to simply provide 
fairly accurate event descriptions that are mistakenly classed as distorted. The fact that in 
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the third study of this thesis CSOs endorsed cognitive distortions according to interview 
and questionnaire measures but did not show evidence of abnormal beliefs on the RSVP-
M may indicate that conventional, self-report methods measure phenomena other than 
beliefs. Like other experimental techniques used in this thesis, the RSVP-M task was 
designed to minimise the opportunity to provide false responses and the need to introspect 
on implicit cognitions. It is intriguing that under such conditions CSOs who had seemed 
distorted using conventional measures appeared no different to offender controls. In 
addition, the types of beliefs that CSOs were deemed to hold differed according to which 
cognitive distortion measure was used (i.e., interview or questionnaire). If cognitive 
distortions tend to represent beliefs, why didn’t CSOs’ endorse the same sorts of themes 
across the two methods? 
 Given the somewhat questionable evidence supporting the theory that CSOs hold 
distorted beliefs, it is surprising that the theory is so often propounded, implicitly or 
explicitly, in the literature. It seems there is something about the abhorrent and deviant 
nature of CSOs’ crimes that invites examination of the perpetrators’ beliefs. This idea is 
illustrated by the words quoted at the start of this discussion, which were made in defence 
of the idea that CSOs as a group hold distorted beliefs: “We are talking about sexual 
offences against children.” While psychologists typically approach human behaviour with 
the underlying question, “Why did they?”, when the topic of child sexual abuse is raised 
the question seems more to become, “How could they?” So why do current attempts to 
understand CSOs’ actions seem to focus rather strongly on their cognitive structures? 
 Maruna and Mann (2006) have pointed out that researchers might be inclined to 
target stable cognitive drivers when explaining CSOs’ actions because it is a relatively 
comfortable avenue to pursue. It is reassuring to think that beliefs endorsing the 
undesirability of child sexual abuse have a strong preventative effect. The alternative 
view—that in the presence of strong environmental, emotional, and biological cues such 
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beliefs may be overridden—is threatening, as it implies that even “good” people can 
commit sexual crimes. Maruna and Mann suggest that those involved in the criminal 
justice system might feel particularly unsettled by the idea that bad circumstances, rather 
than bad people, can drive criminal actions. As the authors point out, 
 “After all, excuses can undermine the very foundations of criminal justice. If we 
 are to punish (or arrest, convict, study, classify, etc.) a person as an offender, the 
 individual needs at some level to be responsible for the crime.” (p. 12). 
 
In the upcoming ‘Treatment Implications’ section of this discussion the issue of 
offender responsibility and blame will be elaborated upon. 
Perhaps another reason for isolating CSOs’ beliefs as a general cause of child 
sexual offending is to simplify treatment. For one thing, in forensic settings CSOs are 
typically not engaged in treatment till they near the end of their sentence, meaning that 
years have usually passed since they last offended. Therefore, when looking to modify 
current cognitions that contributed to a CSO’s offending years ago, the therapist targets 
cognitions that have remained relatively stable over time. The fact that CSOs are treated in 
restrictive forensic settings also renders the targeting of stable beliefs easier than targeting 
temporary appraisals. Unlike non-offending clients, CSOs cannot go out into their 
everyday worlds between therapy sessions and record, as they arise, the transitory thinking 
errors that occur in response to environmental input. Also, within the confines of the 
forensic setting therapists cannot readily help CSOs deal with the environmental stressors 
that contributed to earlier offending. These factors all serve to make a systems-based 
model of therapeutic change difficult and thus increase the attractiveness of a model in 
which stable beliefs or schemas form the therapeutic focus. As for the popular idea that 
CSOs’ distorted beliefs are widespread; because treatment of CSOs usually takes place in 
group formats it is probably easier to assume that all group members need belief 
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modification than to try to single out those who do and those who do not. Nevertheless, 
the current thesis is not the first work to argue that treatment programmes should tailor 
therapy to better suit the psychological needs of individual clients (e.g., Hanson et al., 
2002; Kirsch & Becker, 2006; Marques, Wiederanders, Day, Nelson, & van Ommeren, 
2005 ). 
Regardless of any intuitive or practical leanings they may have towards belief-
based explanations of child sexual offending, it is important for social scientists to bear in 
mind that highly undesirable behaviours can be understood without reference to 
perpetrators’ beliefs or schemas. For instance, one of the founding, and perhaps most well-
known, social psychology experiments was that conducted by Stanley Milgram (1963). As 
the reader is no doubt aware, Milgram found that in certain social circumstances 
seemingly ordinary individuals can be induced to torture experimental confederates with 
dangerous (and even lethal) doses of electricity as punishment for failing to remember 
word pairs. In their attempts to explain why Milgram’s participants so behaved, 
psychologists have not declared that those participants probably held beliefs supporting 
the electrocution of people with less-than-perfect memories. Rather, explanations have 
typically focused on the interaction between general human psychological characteristics 
and the unusual demands of the experimental setting.   
This sort of approach recognises that it is possible to elicit abhorrent behaviour in 
the absence of distorted or abnormal beliefs. In fact, the concept of cognitive 
deconstruction introduced at the start of this thesis suggests that sexual offending can 
occur when inhibitory, non-distorted beliefs are actually overridden. According to the 
cognitive deconstruction literature, humans can perform undesirable acts when factors 
such as strong sexual arousal and intense emotion leave them highly motivated to pursue a 
particular goal. In this situation, beliefs are swept aside, leaving the individual 
unhampered by the usual concerns that inhibit terrible misdeeds. Thus, CSOs may differ 
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from others more in terms of the nature and strength of their emotional, biological, and 
environmental inputs than in terms of their beliefs.  
To summarise, the results of this thesis may indicate that CSOs do not hold 
abnormal, offence-supportive beliefs to the extent portrayed within the current literature 
and implied by current treatment practices. While interview and questionnaire techniques 
have often revealed evidence of CSOs’ cognitive distortions, this should not be equated 
with evidence of abnormal beliefs (at least not until the mechanisms driving cognitive 
distortions are better understood).  Although it might be challenging to rethink the idea 
that CSOs typically hold offence-supportive beliefs, it is also vitally important that social 
scientists remain open-minded to alternative hypotheses and rigorously test the models 
under which they work.  
The Nature of Offence-Supportive Beliefs  
 It has been discussed in this thesis that certain assumptions underlie the use of 
interviews and questionnaires in the study of CSOs’ beliefs.  In preceding pages particular 
attention was paid to the assumption that beliefs can be quantified by measuring CSO’s 
seemingly distorted-sounding statements. There are other assumptions about the nature of 
offence-supportive beliefs implied by interview and questionnaire methods. First, the way 
that such methods are applied indicates an assumption that beliefs are propositional in 
nature. Also, they assume that beliefs are static entities that can be picked out and studied 
in isolation from other psychological, biological and environmental inputs. 
To illustrate, the questionnaires used to assess CSOs are essentially lists of 
propositional statements (e.g., “Sometimes, victims initiate sexual activity”, “I believe that 
sex with children can make the child feel closer to adults”). Within environments that are 
far removed from their everyday lives, CSOs rate the extent to which they believe these 
propositions, or “cognitive distortions”, are true. In other words, it is assumed that beliefs 
are propositional and static “things” that are readily available to be measured. Similarly, 
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interview assessments often aim to uncover beliefs by having CSOs speak to relative 
strangers—usually in correctional settings—about offending that happened some time 
ago. Propositions that seem to minimise, justify, excuse, or rationalise that offending are 
taken as evidence that the speaker has a distorted way of interpreting his social world 
which has long-term behavioural consequences. CSO treatment programmes typically 
place strong emphasis on changing these so-called cognitive distortions. For instance, 
Marshall and Barbaree (1999) describe how CSOs in treatment are asked to describe their 
offences to a therapy group so that members can challenge statements that seem to 
minimise or excuse the speaker’s role in his offences. In addition, the success of treatment 
programmes is in part monitored by the shift that CSOs show on questionnaire lists of 
distorted propositions. “Change the propositions,” these treatment approaches seem to say, 
“and you will produce stable changes in the way the offender interacts with his world”. 
This view flies in the face of advances in cognitive science wherein cognitions such as 
attitudes and beliefs have come to be seen as non-propositional in nature (e.g., 
Churchland, 1992; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986; Wright & Schneider, 1999). 
The first study in this thesis worked under similar assumptions to those currently 
operating within the CSO literature. That is to say, CSOs and controls were asked to 
respond to offence-related propositions in a setting that contained few, if any, relevant 
primes. This might explain why no differences emerged between groups. In the second 
two studies attempts were made to overcome these conceptual issues. The second and 
third studies investigated the way CSOs process non-propositional information following 
exposure to offence-relevant primes. However, these two approaches may also have failed 
to find evidence of offence-supportive beliefs because CSO participants were still too 
removed from real-life offending situations. 
Increasingly, cognitive science is moving away from a view of mind as an abstract 
information-processor whose links to the world have little theoretical or causal importance 
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(see Clark, 1997; Damasio, 1994; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Wilson, 2002). Beliefs are not 
seen as static representations of a world that sits outside the brain, but instead as fluid 
patterns of neuronal activity that unfold in conjunction with emotional, biological, and 
environmental inputs (Clancey, 1993). Thus cognition is seen as situated (i.e., enmeshed, 
on a moment-by-moment basis, with the environment) and embodied (i.e., fused with 
bodily perceptions, sensations, and movements).  
Such an approach emphasises the synchronous nature of the interaction between 
beliefs and other inputs. Beliefs produce adjustments in behaviour that bring about 
changes in the individual’s environment (and his placement in it), which in turn bring 
about changes in the stimuli being received, which in turn impact upon the individual 
biologically and alter his patterns of neuronal activity. In this way, a constant feedback 
loop exists between the individual’s cognitions, his behaviour, his biology, and his 
environment.  
Although the experiments in this thesis tended to look more at the way that CSOs’ 
process information than the propositions they endorse, and although attempts were made 
to prime CSOs’ beliefs, all three studies nevertheless treated beliefs as stable 
representations of the world “out there”, rather than patterns of processing that unfold in 
conjunction with other dynamic factors. Perhaps this fact could account for the null results 
across the three studies. 
The concepts of embodied and distributed (or situated) cognition have recently 
been introduced to the sexual offending field via a ground-breaking article by Ward and 
Nee (in press). In their article Ward and Nee use recent philosophical and cognitive 
science concepts to critique a view of CSOs as rational, disembodied decision-makers. 
The model upon which Ward and Nee focus their argument is called the Reasoning and 
Rehabilitation programme (Ross & Fabiano; cited in Ward & Nee, in press), a programme 
that essentially aims to reduce reoffending by teaching offenders how to reason about, and 
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plan, their actions. Ward and Nee argue that such programmes fail to take into account the 
role that emotional, environmental, and experiential inputs play in decision-making 
processes. In discussing emotional influences, Ward and Nee reiterate the point which was 
covered in the introduction to this thesis that humans typically make decisions based on 
intuitive, emotionally-driven processes; it is only in the aftermath of these decisions that 
rational judgement is invoked as a guiding principle. Ward and Nee also highlight the fact 
that humans are cognitively and behaviourally malleable creatures who both shape, and 
are shaped by, their environments. Thus, to quote Ward and Nee, “…it is a mistake to 
view human nature as biologically fixed and contained inside people’s heads” (p. x). It is 
hoped that researchers will follow Ward and Nee’s lead and strive to stay abreast with 
current conceptions of the nature of cognition when conducting studies of it. 
Of course, it is not being argued that researchers cannot understand CSOs’ beliefs 
without conducting exhaustive (and impossibly exhausting) analyses of CSOs’ 
environments. As Wilson (2002), points out, the fact that environment plays a causal role 
in cognition does not mean that researchers and theoreticians have to look at the entire 
system surrounding cognition. As an analogy, although the human heart is part of a 
complex biological system, scientists have learnt much about it by studying it in isolation 
from living bodies. What is being argued here is that researchers should always be very 
mindful of the types of inputs and interactions that might influence the way in which 
beliefs operate. 
 Taking a less symbolic, more distributed view of cognition might help to explain 
the implicit association test (IAT) results discussed in the introduction. Recall that a 
number of researchers have used IAT experiments to investigate links between particular 
concepts among CSOs versus controls. It has been found that CSOs have stronger 
semantic links between the concepts of children and sex (Gray et al., 2005; Mihailides et 
al., 2004; Nunes, 2007), and the concepts of sex and uncontrollability and sex and 
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entitlement (Mihailides et al., 2004). As argued, these findings do not necessarily mean 
that CSOs hold mental representations that, for instance, portray children as consenting 
sexual agents. However, the findings do seem to show that patterns of neural activity that 
occur when CSOs receive inputs related to sexual experiences tend to be associated with 
input experientially related to children. A question that needs to be resolved is whether or 
not these associated patterns of activity exist prior to (and play a causal role in) sexual 
offending, or whether they occur in response to sexual offending and its consequences. 
Research Implications 
 Perhaps the most important research implication to arise from this thesis is the 
clear need to continue to apply cognitive-experimental techniques in the study of CSO 
cognition. Questions raised in this thesis about the way that offence-supportive cognitions 
are arranged, and operate, in CSOs simply cannot be resolved by asked CSOs to report on 
their own thoughts. While there is undoubtedly a place for interview- and questionnaire-
based research in this field of enquiry, there must be recognition that that use of self-report 
techniques can only take social scientists so far. As long as the focus falls solely on 
cognitive distortions as indicators of the complex cognitive systems utilised by CSOs, 
social scientists will struggle to understand how these systems actually function when in 
action. Thus, there is a strong need for continued use of techniques that are designed to 
implicitly capture offence-relevant cognition as it unfolds. Currently the implementation 
of these implicit techniques within the field of sexual offending is in its infancy, leaving 
the way open for researchers to refine techniques and develop more sophisticated ways of 
applying them. 
For instance, there is a need for studies to explore in greater depth the effects of 
alternative primes on information processing in CSOs. Although attempts were made to 
prime CSOs’ beliefs in the final two studies of this thesis, these studies represent 
metaphorical “first steps” for research into the effects of priming on CSOs’ information 
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processing. There are many primes that could be used to try to activate CSOs’ beliefs 
(e.g., emotional states, sexual arousal, moods, alcohol consumption) and many ways in 
which these primes could be manipulated and applied. Sexual offenders appear to be 
highly impulsive (Kirsch & Becker, 2006), implying that situational primes may have 
particular importance in the study of CSOs. It is hoped that through the creative 
application of priming variables to the measurement of beliefs, researchers will gain a 
better understanding of the nature and extent of CSOs’ beliefs.  
This thesis also indicates that there is a strong need to develop experimental 
stimuli that more accurately imitate situations likely to be experienced by CSOs in their 
day-to-day lives. For instance, rather than having offenders respond to written stimuli 
describing offence-relevant situations they could watch realistic videos while being 
prompted to make  automatic, keypad-based responses to, or recall particular aspects of, 
the scenarios being presented.  Computers could also be used to allow feedback between 
the offender participant and his environment. For instance, if participants are required to 
make a series of decisions or responses in reaction to events unfolding on a computer 
screen, and each decision has implications for the way that events unfold, a deeper 
understanding may be gained about the role of cognition in the offending process. Virtual 
technology could also be used such that participants interact with virtual children while 
measures are taken of the way in which CSOs attend to stimuli, the interpretations they 
make, and the factors that influence their responses. Using virtual technology, participants 
could even be embedded in simulated environments and scenarios that are offence-related 
and their interactions with these environments could be assessed. The themes represented 
by Ward and Keenan’s ITs may be used to inform the type of experimental stimuli 
presented within realistic experimental designs. For although evidence for ITs as cognitive 
structures housing belief-based knowledge has not been found in this thesis, the themes 
captured by these ITs are still likely to have value (as evidenced by results from IAT 
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studies discussed earlier). If cognition is best conceived of as being distributed across 
environments, when designing realistic experimental settings those settings could be 
designed to encourage perceptions of children as sexual beings, for example, or of the 
world being a dangerous place.  
 Research into alternative drivers of cognitive distortions (i.e., CSO’s distorted-
sounding statements) would also be a valuable pursuit. Measuring cognitive distortions 
under different personal and interpersonal situations may reveal processes—both internal 
and external to the offender— that influence the generation of distorted-sounding 
propositions among CSOs. Research of this nature may enable psychologists to create 
situations in which the belief components of cognitive distortions are more readily 
isolated. 
 A final research implication that must be mentioned is the need for further study 
into the degree of agreement between information about CSOs’ beliefs that is gleaned 
from interview, questionnaire, and experimental methods. In the final study of this thesis 
these three methods generated quite different results concerning which CSOs held which 
types of beliefs. Even interviews and questionnaires, which are two very widely used 
methods of CSO belief assessment, showed no alignment in the type of information 
generated about CSOs. It seems rather startling that in the two decades of interview and 
questionnaire use within this field these methods have not been compared in terms of the 
information they reveal about offence-supportive beliefs. If use of these methods is to 
continue there is clearly a need to investigate this relationship further. By replicating (and 
adjusting) the multimethod approach employed in study three researchers will be able to 
discover whether its findings were idiosyncratic or commonplace.  
Treatment Implications 
The findings of this thesis have implications for the way in which CSOs are 
rehabilitated; if faulty beliefs are not universally held by CSOs it follows that 
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rehabilitation programs may need to tailor treatment approaches that are better suited to 
CSOs for whom faulty beliefs play little or no role in their offending. As Kirsch and 
Becker (2006) have pointed out, sexual offender rehabilitation is typically group-based, 
with all participants receiving the same cognitive interventions. In a recent review of 
studies specifically assessing the effectiveness of cognitive–behavioural sexual offender 
treatment, Kirsch and Becker (2006) concluded that between 10% and 30% of treated 
sexual offenders recidivate within five years of their release. These figures certainly leave 
room for improvement. The authors suggested that one way of improving cognitive-
behavioural treatment could be to target only those factors relevant to intervention. In light 
of the current findings, this may mean reducing the time devoted to restructuring some 
CSOs’ distorted cognitions, and increasing the time spent identifying other causative 
factors. Many of these potential alternative drivers (e.g., emotional dysregulation, alcohol 
abuse, antisocial peers, environmental stressors, limited coping skills, and social skills 
deficits) were located within the multifactor theories of sexual offending outlined in the 
introduction to this thesis. Note that it is not being claimed here that these factors are 
currently ignored within current treatment programmes; the point is simply that, for some 
CSOs, the time and resources allocated to modifying beliefs could be reduced, while time 
spent addressing other factors could be increased.  
 Another implication of this thesis is that therapists need to take great care when 
deciding that a CSO’s distorted-sounding utterance in therapy is evidence of a distorted 
belief. At present there is a view that cognitive distortions spoken by CSOs in therapy 
need to be challenged; that way a shift in thinking will be produced and the likelihood of 
reoffending reduced. However, if cognitive distortions are sometimes excuses being 
offered by the speaker to salvage his self- or public image, it is not necessarily helpful to 
challenge it.  
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Some authors have emphasised the importance of confronting CSOs’ excuses and 
requiring them to take responsibility for their actions (for a review see Maruna & Mann, 
2006). However, this approach goes against best practice guidelines and may be disruptive 
to the therapeutic relationship (Beech & Mann, 2002; Maruna & Mann, 2006). It also 
assumes that changing people’s beliefs about, or attitudes towards, laws and norms will 
change their behaviour. Yet as Palmer (2003) has pointed out, lawful or moral behaviour 
is not necessarily determined by lawful or moral attitudes, for situational factors such as 
emotional drives and social variables can limit correspondence between attitudes and 
behaviour.  
In addition, excuses may be associated with positive mental health because they 
serve to protect self esteem (Bowens, 2004; Gudjonsson, 1984; Lord & Willmot, 2007; 
Maruna & Mann, 2006). Given that low self-esteem is thought to contribute to child 
sexual offending (Marshall et al., 1999a) and that attacks to self esteem probably increase 
desire to self deceive (Thagard, 2006), challenging CSOs’ excuses might actually 
undermine treatment aims. In support of this, some evidence has suggested that recidivism 
is actually negatively associated with the act of excusing or minimising one’s misdeeds 
(see Maruna & Mann, 2006).  
Despite this, the claim that CSOs’ excuses could be best left unchallenged may 
seem alarming to some. This concern might stem from the idea that often repeated excuses 
may become entrenched beliefs that facilitate future offending. In response to this concern 
the point must be raised that if CSOs can be helped to alter the underlying mechanisms 
causing them to want to believe excuses, repetition of those excuses may automatically 
cease. To illustrate, rather than challenging CSOs who utter excuses, it may be more 
helpful to teach them alternative ways to cope with feelings of distress or self-dislike. 
Research has shown that CSOs are more prone than other types of offenders and non-
offenders to utilise emotionally focused strategies when dealing with unwanted situations 
    
167 
(Feelgood et al., 2005; Marshall et al., 1999a). In other words, CSOs focus their attention 
on strategies that try to deal with the emotional consequences of experiencing stressors, 
rather than using problem-solving strategies aimed at the stressors themselves. Thus, if 
CSOs are distressed by thinking about the implications of their offending, they may be 
more likely to generate soothing excuses rather than tackling the issue of the offending 
itself. By helping CSOs learn a more problem-solving approach the therapist may arm 
CSOs with skills that automatically reduce excuse generation, and thereby bypass the need 
to argue against those excuses. 
One example of a treatment that obviates the need to directly challenge offence-
supportive beliefs has been extended by Ward and Marshall (2007). Ward and Marshall 
have suggested using narrative therapy to address underlying drivers of sexual offending 
behaviour. The authors encourage therapists to help sexual offenders construct more 
adaptive self-identities that take into account offenders’ needs and values and help them 
move towards a future in which these needs can be met in socially acceptable ways. The 
emphasis is on providing offenders with positive means for meeting personal goals and 
shaping new lives, rather than working on strategies for avoiding unwanted outcomes. 
Because this future-focussed therapeutic approach is not aimed at attacking self-protective 
belief systems or assigning blame, it seems likely that it will release CSOs from historical 
cycles of recrimination and consequent defensiveness. In this way CSOs who receive 
narrative therapy have little need to “repackage” their past crimes as acceptable acts, 
which should in turn prevent their excuses, justifications, and minimisations from feeding 
long-term offence-supportive beliefs. 
 Another possible explanation for cognitive distortions is that they are merely 
descriptions of events that actually happened. That is, sometimes CSOs might report on 
accurately remembered events, but their reports are interpreted as attempts to distort the 
facts (Maruna & Mann, 2006). For instance, a CSO who says their victim did something 
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provocative is not necessarily distorting facts, as it is not unheard of for children to 
explore sexual matters. Another example is that a CSO who states that he only offended 
while drunk is not necessarily trying to excuse his actions.  
The idea that therapists need to take care not to read too much into CSOs’ 
explanations is somewhat supported by a study conducted by Drapeau, Korner, Granger, 
and Brunet (2005). Drapeau et al. asked CSOs to talk about the strengths and weaknesses 
of an inmate treatment program. The authors found a common complaint to be that 
therapists sometimes disbelieved truthful descriptions of offence-related events. As one 
participant stated, it was “hard to talk ‘cause when you do, they say you’re distorting, and 
when you don’t, you’re avoiding” (p.108). If therapists are sometimes labelling accurate 
recollections as distorted beliefs there is a strong risk of damage to client-therapist rapport. 
Furthermore, by downplaying the contributory effects of alternative mechanisms that are 
mentioned by CSOs, therapists may be discouraged from addressing key situational 
factors that play a unique role in their clients’ offence chains.  
Final Summary 
 
The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate a hypothesis popular in the sexual 
offending literature that CSOs hold offence-facilitating beliefs. In a series of novel 
experiments CSOs’ beliefs were studied using techniques designed to side-step issues 
associated with self-report methods. This controlled, empirical approach yielded no 
evidence that CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs, even when attempts were made to 
prime those beliefs. Furthermore, a multimethod analysis failed to find agreement between 
conventional, self-report methods regarding the belief types CSOs were found to endorse. 
The key conclusion to be drawn from this thesis is that research has thus far failed to 
produce convincing evidence that offence-supportive beliefs are widely prevalent among 
CSOs. This conclusion might indicate that CSOs do not generally hold such beliefs. 
Alternatively, it may indicate that the ways in which those beliefs are currently 
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conceptualised and researched are not fully adequate. In the face of these uncertainties one 
point is clear: researchers must strive to rigorously and innovatively test competing 
theories about CSO’s beliefs if they are to develop more effective treatments in this area.   
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Appendix One   
 
Study One: Simple and Complex Syntactic Sentences Used for Reading Speed 
Assessment (taken from Fischler & Bloom, 1979) 
 
Simple Sentences Flesch 
Score
 Number of 
Words
The hungry bear found some stale bread. 94 8
The death of his dog was a great shock. 100 9
Billy hit his sister on the head. 90.9 7
Jim had learned the special passage by heart. 92.9 8
They rested under a tree in the shade. 92.9 8
He mailed the letter without a stamp. 90.9 7
He bought them in a candy store. 100 7
He drove the nail into the wood. 100 7
Plants will not grow in dry soil. 100 7
She called her husband at his office. 90.9 7
Complex sentences
Three people were killed in a major highway accident. 66.1 9
The judge warned about the dangers of drinking. 82.3 8
The person who caught the thief deserves our thanks. 94.3 9
The surgeon tried vainly to save his patient. 71.8 8
The car stalled because the engine failed to start. 94.3 9
Rushing out he forgot to take his coat. 92.9 8
The police had never seen a man so drunk. 94.3 9
The surface of the water was nice and smooth. 94.3 9
Few had the nerve to take the needed shot. 100 9
George could not believe his son stole the car. 94.3 9
 




Study One: LDT Context Sentences and Target Words by Implicit Theory 
 
 
Implicit Theory Word Stem Target Word Type 


















 Most of us are really 
seeking 
power love umile 
 The world is full of  danger people tipsoe 
 Most people want to do damage good hinger 
 People who trust others 
are 
strange normal snither 
 People look out for  themselves others ungerstand 
 If you don’t strike first 
you are  
weak slow brab 
 Compared to adults, 
children are 
safe small salk 
 The best people to trust 
are 




When you’re lonely, 
turning to a child for 







 When it comes to sex, 
sometimes a man must 
exercise his 
rights will meadle 
 A man who puts his 
needs ahead of his 
child’s is 
strong mean sheeze 
 The idea that men are 
better than women or 
children is  
right false lauth 
 If a man is deprived of 
sex, sleeping with a 
child is 
okay wrong zine 
 Doing what I want, 
when I want is  
good wrong zine 
 Always putting yourself 
first is 
healthy unfair ottager 
 If I hurt others to get 
what I need, I feel  
fine guilty kilp 
 If a woman doesn’t give 
a man what he needs, 
he must exercise 
force control droam 
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Implicit Theory Word Stem Target Word Type 
 









Sexual relations with 







 Sometimes, giving in to 
a sexual urge is a  
must crime reak 
 When a man says he 
can’t resist touching 
children he is 
right wrong caich 
 Sex with some children 
is simply 
inevitable ignored steaighten 
 People can’t control anything everything jolidify 
 People who try to 
change things are 
odd great nop 
 Being unable to resist 
temptation is  
normal bad scleam 
 People who try to make 
changes in their lives 
are 
blind healthy skretch 
 Giving in to all your 
sexual urges is just  
human weak drike 
 
Nature of Harm 
 
Just touching a child’s 







 The belief that sex 
harms all children is 
false true falm 
 Having sex with 
children won’t do them 
any  
harm good knid 
 If a child is quiet during 
sexual activity, they are 
probably feeling 
glad shocked eddress 
 Sexual activity can 
contribute to a child’s 
learning problems struddle 
 A child who is fondled 
by an adult will 
probably be  
okay hurt jick 
 If a child is molested 
while they sleep they 
will probably be 
fine hurt jerf 
 Some children don’t tell 
if they have been 
fondled because they 
are secretly 
pleased frightened kribble 
 Sexual activity with a 
child can teach that 
child to  
love fear prink 
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Implicit Theory Word Stem Target Word Type 
 











don’t complain about 








 If a child shows you 
their bottom, they 
probably think you will 
find it 
exciting funny cotplain 
 A child who wants to 
see your genitals is  
dirty curious trush 
 If a child hops in your 
bed they probably want 
to be 
felt held bote 
 Sometimes, after doing 
sexual things, children 
feel 
nice sick hing 
 Young girls who show 
their knickers are just 
being  
bad kids jad 
 Some kids are very sexual honest scramch 
 A child who asks where 
babies come from wants 
to know more about  
sex life hup 
 Children who show an 
interest in sex are 
dirty normal grive 
 








Mean Ranked Frequency of Usage in 






























Study Two: Encoding Sentences 
 
Sexual 1 As 7-year old Jenny played cards, she showed her knickers.
Sexual 2 As Dave fondled the little boy, the boy let out a whimper.
Sexual 3 Jane didn’t tell anyone about her baby sitter’s “touches”.
Sexual 4 The coach told 10-year old Jo to stop teasing him.
Sexual 5 During the film, Ken felt his young niece looking at him.
Sexual 6 At the school gates, Kim kissed her teacher goodbye.
Sexual 7 Kate told her Uncle that she needed help to read the sexual education book.
Sexual 8 Scott didn’t say anything as the priest undressed him.
Sexual 9 Young Beth kept wriggling about on the man’s knee.
Sexual 10 The 13-year old climbed into bed with the farm-worker
Threatening 1 The doctor frowned as he measured little Sarah’s growth.
Threatening 2 Rob’s behaviour made it hard for Amy to hide her feelings towards him.
Threatening 3 Joseph’s exhibition attracted a lot of attention.
Threatening 4 After several hours, they decided that the leg was beyond repair.
Threatening 5 All the guests at the wedding giggled at Mark’s speech.
Threatening 6 The farmer turned to Dave and gave him the sack.
Threatening 7 Lisa was surprised when she saw her exam results.
Threatening 8 The party Steve threw turned out just as he had expected it to.
Threatening 9 When the mountaineers returned from the top, Mike was let down by Alan.
Threatening 10 Before leaving, the couple wanted to speak to the chef about their meal.
Neutral Filler 1 The pharmacist told the old lady to take her medicine every morning.
Neutral Filler 2 The two old friends played pool until closing time.
Neutral Filler 3 The teacher started the lesson at the school.
Neutral Filler 4 She was very surprised to receive the birthday card.
Sentence Type 
and Number Sentence Text
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Study Two: Encoding Sentences (Continued) 
 
Neutral Filler 5 The man started his morning exercises.
Neutral Filler 6
Neutral Filler 7 It took the man all day to paint the kitchen.
Neutral Filler 8
Neutral Filler 9 The landlord arrived at the door where the dog was barking.
Neutral Filler 10 The man drove the old car to the garage to get the oil filter changed.
The secretary was given a pay rise at the end of her first year in the 
company.
After having waited for the bus for half an hour the man decided to walk 
home. 
Sentence Type 
and Number Sentence Text




Study Two: Recognition Sentences 
 
Sexual 1 While Jenny played cards, she deliberately showed her knickers.
Nonsexual 1 While Jenny played cards, she accidentally showed her knickers. 
Sexual 2 As Dave fondled the little boy, the boy let out a happy whimper.
Nonsexual 2 As Dave fondled the little boy, the boy let out a shocked whimper.
Sexual 3 Jane didn’t mind her babysitter’s secret touches. 
Nonsexual 3 Jane worried about her babysitter’s secret touches.
Sexual 4 The coach told 10-year old Jo to stop flirting with him.
Nonsexual 4 The coach told 10-year old Jo to stop being cheeky with him.
Sexual 5 During the film, Ken thought his niece was being seductive.
Nonsexual 5 During the film, Ken thought his niece was looking bored.
Sexual 6 At the school gates, Kim showed she was attracted to her teacher.
Nonsexual 6 At the school gates, Kim showed she was going to miss her teacher.
Sexual 7 Kate told her Uncle that she wanted a sexual education lesson. 
Nonsexual 7 Kate told her Uncle that she wanted a reading lesson.
Sexual 8 Scott didn’t want to stop the priest undressing him.
Nonsexual 8 Scott didn’t know how to stop the priest undressing him.
Sexual 9 Young Beth moved suggestively about on the man’s knee.
Nonsexual 9 Young Beth moved uncomfortably about on the man’s knee.
Sexual 10 The naughty 13-year-old climbed into the farm-worker’s bed.
Nonsexual 10 The obedient 13-year-old climbed into the farm-worker’s bed.
Threatening 1 The doctor frowned as he measured little Sarah’s cancer.
Nonthreatening 1 The doctor frowned as he measured little Sarah’s height.
Threatening 2 Rob’s behaviour made it hard for Amy to hide her dislike for him.
Nonthreatening 2 Rob’s behaviour made it hard for Amy to hide her affection for him.
Threatening 3 The havoc Joseph created grabbed people’s attention.
Nonthreatening 3 The art Joseph created grabbed people’s attention.
Threatening 4 After several hours the doctor decided that the leg was beyond repair.
Nonthreatening 4 After several hours the carpenter decided that the leg was beyond repair.
Threatening 5 All the guests at the wedding ridiculed Mark’s speech.
Nonthreatening 5 All the guests at the wedding enjoyed Mark’s speech.
Sentence Type 
and Number Sentence Text
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Study Two: Recognition Sentences (Continued) 
 
Threatening 6 The farmer turned to Dave and gave him his notice.
Nonthreatening 6 The farmer turned to Dave and gave him the bag.
Threatening 7 Lisa was surprised that her results were so bad.
Nonthreatening 7 Lisa was surprised that her results were so good.
Threatening 8 The party Steve threw turned out to be a complete disaster.
Nonthreatening 8 The party Steve threw turned out to be a complete success.
Threatening 9
Nonthreatening 9
Threatening 10 Before leaving, the couple wanted to complain to the chef about their meal.
Nonthreatening 10 Before leaving, the couple wanted to complement the chef about their meal.
Neutral Filler 1 The pharmacist prescribed the medicine to the old lady.
Neutral Filler 2 The two friends played pool until the pub closed.
Neutral Filler 3 The lesson was started by the teacher at the school.
Neutral Filler 4 She was amazed when she received the birthday card.
Neutral Filler 5 In the morning, as usual the man started exercising.
Neutral Filler 6 The secretary had a salary increase after working in the firm for one year.
Neutral Filler 7 The man spent all day painting the kitchen.
Neutral Filler 8 He decided to walk home after waiting for the bus for too long.
Neutral Filler 9 The dog was barking when the landlord arrived at the door.
Neutral Filler 10 The man went to the garage so that the oil filter could be changed.
When the mountaineers returned from the top, Mike was disappointed by 
Alan.
When the mountaineers returned from the top, Mike was lowered down by 
Alan.
Sentence Type 
and Number Sentence Text




Study Three: CSO Interview Schedule 
 
1. Can you please begin to walk me through the first time that you had sexual contact 
with a child? What happened that lead up to that first sexual contact? 
 
2. When did you first start thinking about the child in a sexual way?  
 
3. And what actually happened during the first sexual contact with that child?  
 
4. What were you experiencing at the time? How were you feeling?  
 
5. What kind of thoughts were going through your mind about yourself, your life, 
your future? 
 
6. During the time that you were offending, what kinds of things did you say to 
yourself that made it easier to go ahead and do the offending?  
 
7. What was it about this particular child that made you want to have sexual contact 
with him/her? 
 
8. How did the victim react to what happened? 
 
9. Looking back at it, how do you make sense of your offending? 
 
10. How did you feel about what had happened following the offence? 
 
11. What did you say to yourself afterwards? 
 
 
Repeat questions for offenders’ other victims. 
 
Finish by summarising interview and reiterating key points raised, then thank for sharing 
the information. 
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